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ABSTRACT
The U.S. space launch industry has been in transition from government contractor
to a quasi-commercial state since 1984. Stiff competition from foreign launch
providers for the launch contracts of commercial and some foreign government
payloads has prompted calls for government action to ensure the competitiveness
of this new Commercial Launch Industry.
With a long history as a government contractor, the U.S. launch industry has and
continues to receive government support for technological development. As this
new commercial industry comes to life, government efforts to enhance industry
competitiveness through technological development must be scrutinized.
This thesis examines whether the government should take action to develop or
influence the development of technologies specifically to enhance the
competitiveness of the Commercial Launch Industry, and if so, what those actions
should be. The role of government is analyzed by exploring the reasons for
maintaining a competitive commercial launch industry, the economic rationales
for government intervention, and the technologies to improve competitiveness.
The results of these analyses are then incorporated with the realities of
government operation to develop appropriate and feasible recommendations.
The primary conclusion of this thesis is that the greatest opportunities, and most
appropriate actions, for government to enhance the competitiveness of the
Commercial Launch Industry with improved technology lie, not in government
development of new technologies, but in its role as customer for launch vehicles,
catalyst of private innovation, and provider of infrastructure.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since 1984 the United States space launch industry has evolved from
government contractor to a quasi-commercial state. In the past, all payloads
launched into space by the United States used launch vehicles procured from the
manufacturer by the government. With the advent of the Space Shuttle the
government moved away from using expendable launch vehicles leaving
manufacturers of those vehicles without much demand for their product.
Legislation was enacted allowing the manufacturers to market launch services
directly to private and foreign government customers, but with the Space Shuttle
offering low launch prices not many customers were found. The Challenger
accident changed that by prompting an Executive Order restricting Shuttle
launches of non-government payloads to those requiring its unique capabilities.
Now the U.S. Commercial Launch Industry is competing head to head with
foreign launch providers for commercial and some foreign government payloads.
Thus far the competition has been rather one sided with the new kids on the block,
the Europeans, winning most commercial launch contracts. This has prompted
calls for government action to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. Commercial
Launch Industry. Yet, as this new Commercial Launch Industry comes to life, the
role of government should be scrutinized to determine where government action
impedes growth, and where government support is no longer appropriate.
While many areas of government-business relations in the Commercial
Launch Industry merit exploration, those which result in a direct subsidization
should be given particular attention. With a long history as a government
contractor, the U.S. space launch industry has, and continues, to receive
government support for technological development. The Commercial Space Launch
Act Amendments of 1988 stated that "the U.S. Commercial Launch Industry must be
competitive in the international marketplace" and pledged to achieve this goal, in
part, through continued research and development of launch technology.'
The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the government should
take actions to develop. or influence the development, of technologies specifically
to enhance the competitiveness of the Commercial Launch Industry (CLI). and if so.
what those actions should be. The assessment of the role of government in
1PL100-657 Sec. 2 (3)
technological development for the Commercial Launch Industry is carried out by
answering the following questions:
What are the reasons for maintaining a competitive Commercial Launch Industry?
International trade, the potential for government cost reductions, national security
and national prestige all represent possible reasons for maintaining the
competitiveness of the CLI. But is a competitive Commercial Launch Industry
needed to maintain national security or prestige? And can the government obtain
cost reductions from a competitive CLI beyond those which might be obtained
through government procurement? The answers to these questions form the
essential framework within which the role of government must be evaluated.
Different motivations for maintaining a competitive CLI will necessarily yield
different sets of reasonable alternatives for government action.
What are the economic rationales for government intervention? Under most
circumstances a commercial industry would be left to operate without direct
government intervention to enhance competitiveness allowing the free market to
drive innovation. But imperfections such as the inability or unwillingness of the
financial market to finance projects, the non-appropriability of the results of R&D,
or government policies, may lead to barriers that hinder private development of
technology. Since the question at hand is whether the government should take
actions specifically to enhance the competitiveness of the CLI through technology
development, and not whether broader macro-economic steps are needed for the
nation's industries as a whole, the important factor is whether the CLI faces
barriers which other industries do not. Other economic rationales for government
support might be unfair competition from foreign launchers, or that the CLI
somehow represents an "strategic" industry important for the future economic
growth of the nation.
Can any areas of technological improvements be identified as key to enhancing
industry competitiveness? The competitiveness of a launch company can be
improved not only by reducing launch costs, but also by reducing the cost of risk
management, the cost of financing the launch, and the potential for launch delays.
Thus, the ability of technology to improve each of these areas must be explored.
The common means for doing this is through the use of mathematical models which
estimate the potential costs and benefits of a new technology. Unfortunately, for
launch vehicle technologies such estimates are based on assumptions and guesses
about the future which lead to inaccurate and highly variable results. In addition,
any new technology might be used differently by each launch company since their
vehicles and manufacturing processes are not identical leading to the need for
different estimates for each company. As a result, such estimates must be used very
carefully in the formulation of government policy. Over-reliance on these poor
estimates could lead to improper conclusions. Therefore rather than attempting to
explicitly quantify the costs and benefits from any new technology this thesis will
identify those groups of technologies which are key to improving the
competitiveness of the CLI. This will be achieved in part by identifying where costs
come from and by exploring the known technical and economic trade-offs
associated with proposed technologies. As will be seen, by doing so it is possible to
identify one group of technologies as key to improving the competitiveness of the
CLI through improvements to existing launch systems, and to show that the optimal
design of new launch vehicles will be highly dependent on government needs. In
addition, exploration of these trade-offs reveals important disparities in
government and commercial needs.
Given the answers to the above questions. what government role would be
appropriate and feasible? The government can influence technological
development for the CLI in four broad ways: as a developer of new technologies, as
a customer for launch vehicles, as a catalyst to private innovation, and by
providing infrastructure such as launch sites. Coupling the lessons learned by
answering the previous questions with the realities of government operation these
roles can be evaluated to formulate appropriate and feasible government actions.
This thesis begins with a brief history of the Commercial Launch Industry,
definitions of the terms "commercial" and "competitiveness", a look at the
competitors and customers, and finally a survey of current government support for
technological development. It then proceeds to explore each of the above questions
in turn.
2.0 INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
2.1 BIRTH OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL LAUNCH INDUSTRY
The Early Years.
In the late 1950's the United States and Soviet Union were racing to be the first
country to place a man made satellite in orbit. The first proposal to the U.S.
government to achieve this goal, called Project Orbiter, came from Army and Navy
rocket scientists, led by Wernher Von Braun, who were working on ballistic
missiles. They proposed to modify an Army Redstone ballistic missile and promised
to achieve the feat within 90 days 1 . But the Eisenhower administration wanted to
emphasize to the world the peaceful purpose of the mission and was reluctant to use
defense technology to achieve the task. As a result the Eisenhower administration
chose instead to pursue a project proposed by the Naval Research Laboratory called
Vanguard. Unlike Project Orbiter, Vanguard was to be a new vehicle rather than a
modification of a military missile.
On October 4, 1957 the launch of Sputnik shocked the United States and caused
an acceleration in the effort to reach orbit. Even before Vanguard attempted its
first launch, the Soviets launched Sputnik II. Then, on December 6, 1957 the U.S.
attempted its first launch of the Vanguard launch vehicle. The launch failed
completely with the vehicle losing thrust seconds into the flight. The Eisenhower
Administration quickly discarded its desire to avoid the use of military technology
and opted instead for the quickest means to a successful launch. On December 11,
1957 the Eisenhower administration gave Project Orbiter the go ahead to modify a
Redstone missile into a launch vehicle which would be called Juno I. Fifty days
later on February 1, 1958 the U.S. successfully launched the first U.S. satellite,
Explorer I, on Juno I. The use of military technology to launch Explorer I set a
precedent for the next thirty years of unmanned space launches.
The Government Plays Middle Man.
Eight months after the launch, on October 1, 1958, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) was inaugurated as the government agency in
1Space Technology. Gatland, Harmony Books, New York, 1981, p. 24.
charge of civilian space activities. Wernher Von Braun and his team of engineers
soon left the Army to work in this new agency. NASA was given the task of
"...development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments,
equipment, supplies, and living organisms into space".2  Yet, in spite of this charge,
nearly all expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) used by NASA throughout the years
had their birth in military missile programs. The one exception lies in the Saturn
rockets, which were specifically designed to carry men to the moon. The three
primary U.S. ELVs uesed today (Atlas, Titan, and Delta), all had their birth in missile
programs.
Soon after the launch of Explorer I, NASA began to make arrangements to
provide launch services for foreign and commercial users. In 1962, a mere four
years after Explorer I, NASA launched the first commercial communications
satellite, Telstar, for Bell Labs. The procedure for carrying out launches of non-
government satellites remained essentially the same for the next twenty years.
Under such arrangements, the commercial or foreign user contracted with NASA
which procured an ELV from the manufacturer. The manufacture of the launch
vehicle was subject to stringent oversight by the government to ensure that the
ELV met specifications. NASA then supervised the launch of the ELV and the
payload. The word "supervised" should be stressed because in most cases the
number of private contractors on site during the launch outnumbered government
employees. The charge to the outside user for this launch service was the cost of
the ELV and the government's total incremental costs. NASA launched all
commercial and foreign government satellites under these arrangements until the
Space Shuttle became operational.
The Shuttle Era.
With the advent of the Shuttle, NASA drastically changed its pricing policy.
No longer did the agency charge the total incremental cost of each launch. Rather,
NASA reasoned that since the shuttle was reusable, and predicted that incremental
costs would drop in the future, charges should be based on an estimated twelve year
average cost. NASA believed that a pricing policy based on current cost would be
an unacceptable commercial and foreign user price. 3  This was probably due to the
2NASA Act of 1958, sec. 102(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. 2451.
3International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, Office of Technology
assessment, OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, p. 131.
fact that charging actual incremental cost would have made the shuttle more
expensive than the ELVs previously being used.
As the shuttle program progressed, NASA and the Air Force announced their
intent to cease procurement of ELVs. This created an increased demand for Shuttle
services which coupled with the inability of the program to meet its launch rate
goals caused a large payload backlog. This backlog was ideal for the Europeans who
were completing the test flights of their new ELV "Ariane". Once operational, a
quasi-private marketing company called Arianespace began to offer the Ariane
launch vehicle on a commercial basis. The glut of commercial and foreign
government payloads awaiting launch provided many potential customers. In
addition to Ariane, China and the Soviet Union began efforts to sell launch services
to communications satellite companies and foreign governments.
However, NASA's Shuttle pricing policy made it nearly impossible for the small
American firms to enter the market, and many claim it forced the Europeans to
subsidize the launches of Ariane by as much as 25%-30% in order to remain
competitive. 4 With NASA's pricing policy a Shuttle launch of a satellite could cost
half as much as launching on a U.S. ELV. But the delay to launch on the Shuttle was
just too great. For a commercial satellite owner every extra month the payload
stayed on Earth cost millions of dollars in lost revenue. As a result, once again the
U.S. was shocked by news from Europe -- three U.S. commercial satellites were
going to be launched on Ariane.
Soon after, the Reagan Administration and Congress moved to enact legislation
in an effort to remedy the situation. The proposed solution -- commercialization of
the ELV industry. In 1984 two pieces of legislation intended to speed the
commercialization of the expendable launch industry were signed into law: The
1984 NASA Act Amendment, and The Commercial Space Launch Act.
The Commercial Space Launch Act designated the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to regulate the industry. In turn, DOT created the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) to carry out this task. This office
proceeded to publish a full set of regulations (14 CFR Ch. III 400-415). These
included licensing procedures, rules for the use of government facilities, and
penalties for failure to comply. While the creation of this legal framework was
4International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, Office of Technology
assessment, OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, p. 133.
essential for the operation of the U.S. industry, alone it was insufficient to prompt
commercial launches.
Congress realized that something needed to be done about NASA's pricing
policy and role as a launch provider so the NASA Act was amended. With regards to
the commercial launch industry, the NASA Act Amendment contained pricing
requirements which attempted to alleviate the difficulty private launch companies
were having competing with low NASA Shuttle prices. Congress attempted to
establish a "stable and fair pricing policy"5 by requiring NASA to recover full
additive cost which was defined as the average direct and indirect costs of
providing additional flights "...beyond the costs associated with those flights
necessary to meet the...needs of the U.S. Government". 6  Unfortunately, this left a
giant loop-hole for NASA. Because the Shuttle was required for government
launches anyway, NASA was not required to charge for any of the cost of the
Shuttle itself. Rather, the amendment only required NASA to charge for the
operational and integration costs of launching the payload. As a result, these
guidelines proved to be ineffective and prices for Shuttle services continued to be
below full recovery cost7 causing stagnation of the Commercial Launch Industry
(CLI) before it ever got started. The Challenger accident caused this to change.
Challeneer.
The loss of Challenger left the U.S. with a large backlog of payloads and no
quick means for putting them in orbit. As a result of the move to the Shuttle as the
nation's primary launch vehicle, the ELV manufacturers had begun to close down
their production facilities. The U.S. was left with a few ELV's from earlier contracts
and a dismantled ability to produce more. Failures of Delta, Titan and Ariane ELV's
several months after Challenger and an Atlas Failure ten months later served to
exacerbate an already difficult situation.
The government soon realized that putting all of its eggs in the Shuttle was
never a good idea. The nation's space program was paralyzed. To ease this paralysis
President Reagan signed an executive order more crucial to the commercial launch
industry than all of the legislation of 1984. The order "directed that the Space
Shuttle would no longer provide launch services for commercial and foreign
542 USC 2466
642 USC 2466 (b) (2)
7 Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, US Department of Commerce, May 1988, p. 6.
payloads that did not require its unique capabilities". s Also, it directed "the U.S.
government to purchase commercial space transportation services to meet its
requirements to the fullest extent feasible". 9  With the stroke of a pen President
Reagan eliminated competition from the Shuttle. Unfortunately, the launch
company's assembly lines were in the process of being moth balled.
The Air Force Comes To The Rescue
Commercial demand for launch vehicles alone could not have justified the
significant cost of restarting the ELV production lines. Large orders for ELVs
through the Air Force's new Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV), MLV II, and Titan IV
programs, were the only reason launch companies could afford the cost of
restarting production."1  It was probably no accident that each of the three major
launch companies (General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Martin Marietta)
won one of these contracts. As a result the three large ELV manufacturers were
able to begin production of their launch vehicles and enter the commercial market.
The Insurance Hurdle
The U.S. CLI slowly came to life, but significant problems still confronted the
industry. One problem which received an enormous amount of attention was the
inability to obtain adequate third party liability insurance coverage. In the past
when NASA performed the launches, launch companies did not have to obtain third
party liability insurance and NASA indemnified satellite owners for claims over
$500 million. Now that launches were being done privately, the companies needed
to obtain protection against possible claims from the general public and the
government itself. Third party liability posed a problem because the potential
exists for enormous claims if a launch vehicle were to go astray into a populated
area. However, the problem was not that premiums for such insurance were too
high, but rather that there was a lack of financing available in the insurance
industry to offer these potentially enormous policies. Few insurance companies
were willing or capable of selling policies to cover the possibility of such large
catastrophic third party claims. Thus, commercial launch companies had no choice
8President's Directive on National Space Policy, 2/11/88.
9Ibid.
10
"Space Commercialization Myth and Reality", Albert Wheelon, unpublished manuscript,
1/25/89, p. 4.
but to forgo insurance and take the risk. This was not only undesirable for the
company, but was also unacceptable for the well-being of the general public.
To remedy the insurance problem, and other problems related to use of
government facilities which had arisen, Congress enacted the Commercial Space
Launch Acts Amendments of 1988. This law returned third party liability to the
state which existed when NASA provided launch services for commercial payloads
by requiring launch providers to obtain $500 million in third party liability or the
maximum amount available at reasonable prices. The Deptartment of
Transportation was designated to determine what constitutes a reasonable price.
Above this amount, the government indemnifies the launch company.
Commercial Launch.
The first U.S. commercial launch which placed a satellite into orbit occurred
on August 27, 1989 as a McDonnell Douglas carried a British broadcasting satellite
into orbit. Unlike the launches done through NASA in previous years, this launch
and all commercial launches are arranged directly between the ELV manufacturer
and the customer without direct government oversight of the commercial ELV's
production. Negotiations take place on price, schedule, insurance arrangements,
and financing. However, the employees involved in the launch itself have not
changed much because contractors had always manned NASA launches under the
agencies supervision. The government's role in the commercial launch process is
one of maintaining the public utility of launch facilities, offering them for a fee,
and regulating the industry to insure public safety. Over the next four years The
Office of Commercial Space Transportation has 30 firm commercial launches on its
manifest. 1
2.2 DEFINING "COMMERCIAL"
The word "commercial" might be the most abused word in public policy today.
It has been used to describe a slew of projects and companies which fall in a grey
area where many would be hesitant to call them commercial. The Commercial
Launch Industry (CLI) certainly resides in this category. A whole paper could be
written on the denotation and connotation of the word "commercial", but for the
purpose of this thesis, delving into semantics would serve little purpose. Rather, it
is only necessary to have a common understanding of how the term will be used.
""U.S. Enters Commercial Launch Arena", AW&ST, 9/4/89, p. 24.
In the CLI distinctions must be made between a commercial launch company,
commercial payloads, and commercial launches. For the purpose of this study, a
commercial payload is any payload financed by a non-government entity. A
commercial launch company is any private company which builds (or procures
from sub-contractors) launch vehicles and markets their services for commercial
launches. A commercial launch occurs when a commercial launch company
launches any payload (whether government of privately owned) with the payload
owner contracting for the service of a launch, but carrying out no direct oversight
of the manufacture or launch of the vehicle except for matters related to the
integration of the payload with the vehicle. Commercial launches can be
contrasted with government procurement of a launch vehicle where the
government oversees manufacture and launch of the vehicle through design
specifications, inspection, reporting, and documentation requirements.
U.S. government payloads can be launched domestically on a commercial
(without direct oversight) or non-commercial (with oversight) basis. Within the
definition presented here, just because a company launches some vehicles
commercially and provides others for government procured launches, does not
preclude the company from being a commercial launch company. As long as a
private company markets its launch vehicle for commercial launches it will be
called a commercial launch company. Commercial and foreign government
payloads could be launched by a commercial launch company or by a government
agency. Thus, six types of launch arrangements can occur:
1. Commercial Launches of Commercial Payloads.
2. Commercial Launches of Foreign Government Payloads.
3. Commercial Launches of Government Payloads.
4. Government Launches of Commercial Payloads.
5. Government Launches of Foreign Government Payloads.
6. Government Launches of Government Payloads.
2.3 DEFINING "COMPETITIVENESS"
Another word prone to be used ambiguously is "competitiveness". One reason
for the ambiguity lies in the various levels at which efforts are made to describe
competitiveness. Company, industry, and national competitiveness are often
considered to be one in the same when in fact they may not be. The
competitiveness of an individual company depends strictly on its ability to get
customers to purchase its products or services over another provider. For an
individual company selling to customers in the same country this is directly related
to items such as price, quality, guarantees etc.. The competitiveness of an entire
industry takes the overall ability of the individual companies to compete with
foreign firms. Within an industry some companies will inevitably be more
competitive than others.
On a national level, government efforts to increase industry competitiveness
could have the net effect of decreasing the economic well being of the nation. For
example, devalueing the nation's currency would make domestic products cheaper
to other countries resulting in increased industry competitiveness. However, this
would reduce the buying power, and thus the standard of living, of the country. 12
Thus, government efforts to increase industry competitiveness should focus on the
net economic value to society of any actions, and not just the competitiveness of
industry.
2.4 COMPETITORS
The U.S government no longer holds a monopoly on launches of western
spacecraft. Now companies within the U.S. are privately offering launch services
and face stiff competition from other nations.
United States
The U.S. CLI is dominated by the three companies which have roots in the
early days of NASA and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Programs. These
companies are General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, and McDonnell Douglas. While
several small start-up companies have begun offering launch services, no other
U.S. companies presently have the capability to place a payload over 500 kg into
orbit. Nor do any of the young start-up firms have the thirty years of demonstrated
experience and success of the big three. Table 2-1 summarizes the payload
capability, and approximate price of existing U.S. commercial ELVs. In addition to
these companies, NASA still provides transportation for many U.S. government
satellites and experiments on the Shuttle and its Scout ELV.
12 Using Federal R&D to Promote Commercial Innovation, Congressional Budget Office, 4/88, p. 2 .
TABLE 2-1
U.S. COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES (1989)
Payload Approximate
Company ELV Capability (kg) Cost/Launch ($M)
Large
ELVs: General Dynamics Atlas I 2250 (GTO) 55-65
McDonnel Douglas Delta II (6925) 1450 (GTO) 40-50
Martin Marietta Titan III 5000 (GTO) 100-120
Small
ELVs: Orbital Sciences Pegasus 400 (LEO) 6-8
Space Services Conestoga I 275 (LEO) Never Launched
Starfire I 300 (Suborbital) 1+
NASA
While NASA no longer offers commercial launches, it continues to launch
many payloads which could conceivably be launched by commercial ELVs. Even
though the Department of Defense has moved away from using the Shuttle, some
military payloads will still be launched by NASA. In addition, NASA continues to
launch almost all of its own satellites and scientific missions on the Shuttle. Many
small experiments which are flown on the Shuttle and on NASA's remaining small
Scout ELVs could conceivably be launched on small ELVs. NASA's supply of Scout
ELVs will not be exhausted until about 1993."
General Dynamics
General Dynamics won the contract for the Air Force's Medium Launch
Vehicle II which will result in an upgraded version of the company's Atlas/Centaur
rocket to an Atlas II. At 2680 kg to Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) the Atlas
II's payload capability will be 20% greater than Atlas/Centaur. The Air Force has
ordered four Atlas II's with options for seven more at a total cost of $600 million. 14
The company will be offering both the Atlas II and the Atlas/Centaur (dubbed Atlas
I) on a commercial basis and presently has seven firm launch contracts. The first
commercial launch is slated for November of 1990.
The Atlas I rocket (Figure 2-1) is the result of numerous redesigns over the
past thirty years of an Atlas ICBM first launched in 1957. Of the three large launch
13
"Pegasus Air-Launched Test Vehicle is Rolled Out", AW&ST, 8/14/89, p. 40.
14
"Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment", U.S. Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 12.
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vehicles offered by U.S. companies, Atlas I is the only one which does not use any
solid rockets. Its first stage uses non-cryogenic liquid fuel, and its highly efficient
Centaur upper stage uses liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The company may
expand the series to include an Atlas IIA and possibly an Atlas IIAS each with a
greater launch capability than its predecessor.
McDonnell Douglas
McDonnell Douglas' Delta rocket of today bears little resemblance to its
ancestor the Thor ICBM. The Delta rocket has undergone over a dozen major
redesigns since its first flight. As with all previous redesigns, the new Delta II 6925
(Figure 2-2) came about as a result of a government program. In this case it was
the Air Force's requirement for a Medium Launch Vehicle with a slightly higher
payload capability than the Delta 3920 (Delta II's predecessor) to launch its stock of
28 Global Positioning Satellites. The contract for these ELV's is worth almost a
billion dollars. 15 The Delta II 6925 can boost 1450 kg to GTO and is being offered as
the company's commercial ELV.
The Delta 11(6925) consists of nine Castor Solid rocket strap-ons, a cryogenic
liquid first stage, and non-cryogenic liquid second and third stages. The company
manufactures the ELV's at a brand new facility in Pueblo Colorado made possible by
the large government MLV contract. Future plans may include a Delta II (7925)
with a 25% increase in payload capability over the Delta II (6925) to 1820 kg to GTO.
McDonnell Douglas has the distinction of being the first U.S. company to place
a satellite in orbit on a commercial basis. The company has eight firm contracts for
future commercial launches and seven more reservations for possible launches.
Martin Marietta
Martin Marietta has historically been the primary supplier of launch vehicles
to the Department of Defense (DOD). Since DOD payloads tend to be very large,
Martin's Titan series of ELV's have always had high payload capabilities, and
presently Martin builds the two largest U.S. ELV's the Titan III with a capability of
5000 kg to GTO, and Titan IV with a capability of 4550 kg directly to Geosynchronous
Orbit. However, unlike the other two large launch service providers, Martin does
not plan to offer all of its ELV models on a commercial basis retaining the Titan IV
15Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 1987, p.13.
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for the Air Force which has contracted for 23 vehicles at a cost of $10 billion. 16
While Martin Marietta's commercial launch vehicle, the Titan III, did not result
directly from a government contract, it is built on the same assembly line, and uses
many of the same employees as the Titan IV." Thus, Air Force procurement of the
Titan IV has a direct benefit to Martin's commercial launch program.
Titan III (Figure 2-3) uses two large solid rocket motors and two stages of non-
cryogenic liquid rockets. Because of its high payload capability, Titan III will often
be used to launch two satellites simultaneously into the same orbit. Currently
Martin has four firm launch contracts and launched its first two payloads on a
single launch in December of 1989. Martin's second commercial launch attempt
resulted in a failure from improper wiring of the upper stage. Technical
difficulties being experienced with Titan III coupled with sluggish sales may result
in a decision by Marting to exist from the commercial launch business. 18  Another
possible factor contributing to such a decision is the miniscule size of Martin's
commercial contracts compared to the billions being brought in by the Air Force's
Titan IV contract. Titan III may simply be more trouble than it is worth.
Other Companies
Through the 1980s many small commercial launch companies have been
started and many have failed. The most recent is the American Rocket Company
which has exited the commercial launch business after its first launch attempt in
October of 1989 burned on the launch pad. Today essentially four start-up
companies remain. These are E'Prime, Orbital Sciences, Space Services, and LTV.
Each of these companies are competing for small payloads going to Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) and suborbital experimental payloads, although several have plans for larger
ELVs in the future.
E'Prime is proposing a family of four ELVs derived from MX missile technology
with payload capability ranging from 450 to 3600 kg to Geosynchronous Transfer
Orbit (GTO). The company has signed a commercialization agreement with the Air
Force for the use of the MX technology, but at present the company has no firm
launch contracts.
'6 "Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment", U.S. Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 12.
17
"Commercial Titan Launch Vehicle Places Two Communication Satellites Into Orbit", AW&ST,
1/8/90, p. 43.
18Space News, "Future Clouded for Commercial Titan", 3/26/90, p.4 .
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Orbital sciences is offering an innovative winged launch vehicle which is
carried to high altitude by a B-52 and then released to fly into orbit. Payload
capability is limited to about 500 kg to LEO. The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is presently the only customer having contracted for two $6
million dollar launches. The first launch occured in April of 1990 and was a
resounding success
In September of 1982, Space Services became the first company to carry out a
privately funded and operated launch. The company's Conestoga I ELV carried a
small experimental payload on a suborbital trajectory on that day. A second
suborbital launch attempted in November of 1989 resulted in a failure. The
company plans two more launches in 1990. Space Services hopes to offer a series of
Conestoga rockets which will be constructed by using increasing numbers of Castor
solid rockets.
LTV manufactures the Scout rocket for the government. While the company
has not officially begun to compete for new government contracts it has expressed
a desire to do so.
Foreign -- Eurone. China. and The Soviet Union
Along with the advent of the Space Shuttle came a shift in the U.S. dominance
of commercial and foreign government payload launches to the European. But
even the Europeans are beginning to face stiff competition from the Soviets and
Chinese who, in their search for hard currency, are offering cut-rate launch
prices (Table 2-2).
Arianespace
Measured by number of firm contracts, Arianespace is the largest launcher of
commercial satellites in the world. Arianespace carried out its first launch in 1980
and has had 28 out of 32 successful launches through early 1990. Two of these
failures occurred when the U.S. was experiencing its string of failures in the
Challenger aftermath. As a result of the Ariane failures, Airianespace did not
launch a vehicle for eighteen months contributing to the western backlog of
payloads. Currently the company has 36 firm contracts worth $2.4 billion.1 9 At
present Arianespace represents the primary foreign competitor to U.S. commercial
launch companies.
19Arianespace, Press Release 89/13, p. 1.
Arianespace is a quasi-private company with 50 shareholders in eleven
European countries. While a number of these shareholders are private companies,
a significant portion of the company (and some argue majority) is held by various
government agencies. The role of Arianespace is to market, procure, and launch
the Ariane launch vehicles.
Currently Arianespace offers a series of six ELVs ranging in payload
capability from 1900 kg to 4200 kg to Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). Each
increase in payload capability is achieved by strapping on additional solid and/or
liquid rocket boosters (Figure 2-4). Arianespace launches its ELVs from a facility
TABLE 2-2
FOREIGN COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES (1989)
Country/ Payload
Region ELV Capability (kg) Approximate Cost($M)
China Long March 3 1400 (GTO) 20-30
Europe Ariane 40 1900 (GTO)
Ariane 42P 2600 (GTO)
Ariane 42L 3000 (GTO) 55-105
Ariane 44P 3200 (GTO)
Ariane 44LP 3700 (GTO)
Ariane 44L 4200 (GTO)
Soviet Union Proton 2100 (GTO) 30-50
owned by the European Space Agency (Europe's equivalent to NASA), in Kourou,
French Guiana. This launch site is well suited for launching commercial payloads
into GTO because it lies close to the equator where launch vehicles obtain a greater
benefit from the Earths rotation.
China
The Chinese government has been aggressively marketing the launch
services of their Long March ELVs to foreign customers. To do this the government
has set up the China Great Wall Industrial Corporation. The Long March vehicles
have proven enticing to satellite owners because of the cut-rate prices being
offered by the Chinese government. These prices have been as much as 66% less
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than U.S. prices. 20  China has entered into several agreements for satellite
launches. The U.S. government has been reluctant to issue export licenses for U.S.
manufactured satellites. However, after much debate, in 1988 the Reagan
administration approved export licenses for three Hughes satellites. These licenses
were subsequently suspended for several months as a result of the Tienamen
Square incident, but have since been reinstated. In April of 1990, China
successfully launched the first of these satellites.
The Chinese also market sub-orbital flights for micro-gravity experiments.
France has contracted for two missions, one of which was successfully completed in
1987. A West German consortium also flew some micro-gravity experiments aboard
a Chinese mission in 1988.
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union markets its launch services in the U.S. through a Texas based
company called Space Commerce Corporation. The low prices being offered by the
Soviet government have created a large interest in their launch services.
However, the U.S. government has yet to approve any export licenses for satellite
launches by the Soviets. In fact, a recent amendment to the 1990 appropriations
bill prohibits such launches unless the President certifies that such a launch is in
the "national interest". Recently the Soviet Union began an effort to circumvent
U.S. government opposition by offering to sell Zenit boosters to Australia which
would then launch them from their proposed Cape York facility. Congress
immediately passed legislation setting rigid pricing guidelines for any such
launches. The Soviets have numerous ELVs, but have primarily been marketing
their Proton launch vehicle to foreigners. Presently the Soviets have no firm
contracts for foreign satellite launches.
The U.S. restriction on satellite launches does not appear however to extend to
micro-gravity experiments. A collection of such experiments designed by Payload
Systems Inc. of Massachusetts will be delivered to the Soviet space station MIR in
early 1990. They will then be returned to the Earth two months later. Thus far,
Payload Systems is the only U.S. company that has been granted an export license
by the Commerce Department.
20"U.S. Approval of Chinese Launches Determined by Value of Satellites", AW& ST, 10/17/88, p.
25.
Other Nations
The Japanese government is completing development of their new H-2 launch
vehicle which will have a payload capability of 4000 kilograms to GTO. The first
launch of the H-2 is presently scheduled for 1993. Once the H-2 is operational, it is
likely that the Japanese government will offer it on a commercial basis. However,
before the H-2 is complete, the Japanese will not be able to enter the commercial
market because their current launch vehicle, the H-1 was built using U.S. Delta
technology under a licensing agreement which prohibits the use of the vehicle for
commercial launches.
The Indian government has a small launch vehicle which might be offered
for sub-orbital flights, and the Brazilians are in the process of developing a launch
vehicle. At present, however, neither India or Brazil have offered their launch
vehicles on a commercial basis.
2.5 CUSTOMERS -- THE BIG ONE, THE OTHER ONE, AND THE ETHEREAL ONE
Launch vehicle payloads can be broken down into two broad categories. First
are large satellites placed into a sustainable orbit. Next are very small satellites
launched into low orbits, and experimental payloads which require low-gravity or
high altitudes and are launched on sub-orbital trajectories.
Large Satellites
The majority of space launches are intended to place a satellite into orbit. In
the U.S. this is presently being done by the three big launch companies and the
Space Shuttle. Satellite construction can be financed by the commercial sector,
foreign governments, or the U.S. government. Excluding military payloads (for
which data is classified), the vast majority of satellites over the past eight years
have had masses ranging from 500-1500 kilograms and have been launched into a
Geosynchronous orbit (Figure 2-5) where they stay over the same point on the
Earth while orbiting. While most of these satellites could have been launched by
any of the three large U.S. launch vehicles, military payloads used for
reconnaissance can be much larger with launch masses reaching 40,000 kilograms
and can often only be launched on Titan or the Shuttle.
In the short term the future demand for satellite launches can be predicted
with fairly good accuracy because it takes several years to design, build and launch
most satellites. 21  Thus, the satellites in production today will constitute most of the
launch demand for the next two or three years. However, predicting long-term
demand in excess of those satellites already planned is very difficult to do
accurately and previous estimates have been atrociously poor. For example, in 1979
NASA, using a model prepared by Battelle, predicted the equivalent of 44 shuttle
flights for 1985, but in 1985 only 12.5 equivalent shuttle flights occurred.22 The
further into the future the prediction goes, the worse it will inevitably be.
Every commercial satellite placed in orbit has been a communications satellite,
and most foreign government satellites placed into orbit by the U.S. have been for
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communications. Through the 1970's and early 80's demand for satellite
communications grew steadily. However, the advent of fiber optics in the mid
1980's has begun to make a dent in the demand for satellite communications.2 3  For
point to point communication, such as between two telephone switching centers,
21
"Launcher supply Expected to Exceed Payload Demand in 1990s", Space News, 2/19/90, p. 28.
22Setting Space Transportation Policy for the 1990s, Congressional Budget Office, 10/86, p. 10.23Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 43.
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fiber optic cables represent an economical alternative to satellites. While demand
for some other types of satellite communications, such as direct broadcast and
mobile service, continue to grow they may not make up for the losses in point to
point demand. The number of communications satellites in construction and
awaiting launch over the next few years seem to confirm this as they decrease
steadily from 1990 to 1992 (Figure 2-6). Granted a few more satellites might still be
built over the next few years, but it seems extremely unlikely that the number to be
launched in 1992 would grow by enough to surpass 1990 levels. Thus, commercial
satellite and foreign launch demand will remain constant or decrease over the next
few years.
On the other hand, U.S. government demand for ELVs will increase in 1990 and
remain steady over the next few years. The Air Force is planning seven Delta, six
Titan IV, and two Atlas launches, over the next several years for a total of fifteen
launches per year. In addition, the Navy, Department of Commerce, and NASA, will
be launching a total of two to three payloads per year on ELVs. As a result, in 1990
over 70% of U.S. ELV launches will be for government payloads.24 In 1991 this
fraction will very likely become even higher since the number of commercial and
foreign government payloads will decline. Even if U.S. companies captured all of
the uncommitted payloads for 1991 (an extremely unlikely possibility), government
satellites would still account for well over 60% of U.S. satellite launched on ELVs.
Thus, the U.S. government will continue to dominate the demand for U.S. ELVs over
the next several years.
Presently no other viable market appears to exist for commercial satellites
other than communications. For a while remote sensing appeared like it may be a
promising new commercial use of satellites. But efforts to commercialize the
remote sensing services of LANDSAT were a resounding failure, and presently no
private company has plans to construct a remote sensing satellite. 25  As a result of
the lack of other markets, communications satellites will continue to constitute the
vast majority, if not all, of commercial satellite demand for the foreseeable future.
24Compiled from company manifests.
25Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 60 and p. 71.
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As previously mentioned, in the long-run it is very difficult to say exactly
what launch demand will be like. However, even Battelle's model, which made the
ridiculously high prediction for NASA, predicts that the number of communications
satellites requiring commercial launches through 1999 will be at most 20 per year
(Figure 2-7) which is less than the number being launched in 1990 and only four
more than those presently planned for 1991. Launch and satellite industry experts
themselves believe that demand will remain flat in the years to come. 26 If
Arianespace continues to capture 50% of this market, then only 10 satellites will be
launched commercially by U.S. companies each year -- the same number planned
for 1990. Even if the three large U.S. companies and Arianespace each launched
equal portions of future demand (an unlikely scenario considering other
competitors are attempting to enter the launch market), at present government
launch rates the U.S. government would still account for well over 50% of domestic
demand.
26"1990s Promise to Trim Ranks of Launch Firms", Space News, 2/19/90, p. 6.
Non-U.S. Government S•tellite# 
in
Construction or Awaiting Commercial 
Launch
.. _ Compiled from "Satellite Inventory" and company manifests
0- -r- __9r_
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
FIGURE 2-7
Long-term government demand will be determined by policy decisions made
in the future. For example, SDI would require an enormous number of ELV
launches. Also, if the Space Station is built, it will require a majority of the Shuttle
flights for assembly and resupply. This will push other planned government
satellites onto ELVs. Government programs will almost certainly account for the
majority of U.S. ELV demand over the next several years, and as the dominant
customer, will definitely have the single greatest influence on long term domestic
launch demand.
Small and Sub-orbital Payloads -- A Commercial Facade
The government operated Scout is the only small U.S. ELV to have placed a
payload into orbit. The satellites launched by Scouts have all been government
financed and commercially no firm plans exist for small satellites. The greatest
demand for the small launch vehicles currently being offered by several small
entrepreneurial firms has been for sub-orbital flights. These payloads have
primarily been experiments requiring a low-gravity environment or high
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Commercial Launch Demand Estimates
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altitudes. All of the experiments which have been launched on small ELVs, and all
those planned, have been financed directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.27
Commercial demand for sub-orbital flights is almost non-existent. The use of
the microgravity environment for materials processing has received much
attention, and has been touted as a future area of commercial growth, but private
financial commitments have been very small. Many point to McDonnell Douglas'
microgravity experiments which were flown on the Space Shuttle, and claim that
this indicates the potential of future commercial demand. However, the drug
processing experiments flown by McDonnell Douglas, and other private
microgravity ventures, have been heavily subsidized through NASA Joint Endeavor
Agreements or Centers for the Commercial Development of Space. 28  McDonnell
Douglas received a free flight on the Shuttle for its experiments. 29  Even with such
subsidization, in recent years many companies, including McDonnell Douglas, have
discontinued their microgravity experiments.3 0
The cost of space flight makes the economic viability of any space processed
material unlikely. One expert estimates that for a space processed material to be
economical it would have to sell for more than $100,000 per kilogram, or nearly ten
times the cost of gold.31  Because of this, and the highly uncertain prospect that
microgravity research will result in a marketable material, future commercial
investment in sub-orbital experimental flights is unlikely to be significant without
government subsidization. 32
Near-term government demand for small ELVs will be five to six per year.33
However, as mentioned in section 2.3, the government still has a stock of Scout
launch vehicles that it intends to use, and which will not be exhausted until about
1993. This will put a dent in demand for commercially available small ELVs over the
next few years. The long-term government and commercial demand for small ELVs
will be highly dependent on government policy. Government programs such as
27Personal Communication, Eric Gabler, Department of Transportation, 1/15/90.28Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 101.29Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 101.
30Space Commerce: An Industry Assessment, Department of Commerce, 5/88, p. 99. and "Small
Launchers to Vie for CCDS Science Payloads", Space News, 2/12/90, p.1.
31
"Space-Born Materials: How Practical Are They?", Sheahen, Materials Engineering, 8/87, p.
27.
32
"Government Interest in Small Launchers Grows", Space News, 2/19/90, p. 7.33
"Pegasus Air-Launched Test Vehicle is Rolled Out" AW&ST, 8/14/89, p. 40.
DOD's Lightsat communications satellites, or tests for SDI, would greatly increase
future demand.
Thus, future demand for domestic small ELVs will continue to be driven by
government programs and government subsidization of private payloads.
2.6 CURRENT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
With their historical role as government programs, launch vehicles, and their
associated infrastructure, continue to receive government support for
technological development. This section briefly examines the current government
technology development efforts both in the United States and abroad.
United States
Before the creation of the CLI in the United States, the government financed
all research and development towards technological advances for launch vehicles
and their infrastructure. Now commercial launch companies are beginning to
commit some of their own funds to improve their vehicles and facilities. However,
the U.S. government still foots the bill for the vast majority of R&D for existing and
new launch vehicles. It does this through improvements to government owned
launch facilities, procurement of ELVs, and leading edge technology programs.
Currently there are three primary government initiatives to advance launch
vehicle technology. These are, the National Aerospace Plane, the Advanced Launch
Vehicle (ALS), and Civilian Space Technology Initiative (CSTI),
National Aerospace Plane (NASP)
The NASP program is an effort to develop a completely new means of high
speed propulsion using air-breathing hypersonic "scramjet" engines. Multiple
missions have been proposed for NASP including high speed civilian transport,
strategic defense, manned space flight, and placing payloads in orbit at
significantly reduced cost. Regardless of the mission, NASP will face enormous
technical challenges in the areas of propulsion, fuels, materials, and computational
fluid dynamics. Currently, the program envisions a manned vehicle that would
take off from a conventional runway, accelerate to speeds up to Mach 25, and have
the capability to fly into orbit. The present effort is geared towards developing a
single experimental vehicle designated the X-30 in the mid 1990's. Through 1989
total program funding will be over $800 million. The 1989 funding for the program
is $316 million with NASA contributing $88 million and DOD $228 million.34
Estimates for the total cost to develop the experimental vehicle have ranged from $3
billion to over $17 billion35, and estimates of the cost per flight from $1 million to
$9 million.36  Current plans envision a vehicle with a payload capability of about
9000 kg to Low Earth Orbit (LEO).
Advanced Launch System (ALS)
ALS was born as a result of the need to place the large volume of payloads
required for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) into orbit at a reasonable
expense. Jointly managed by DOD and NASA, the original goal of ALS was to reduce
launch cost by a factor of ten to about $600 per kilogram to LEO. Several contractor
concept definition studies suggested vehicles with enormous payload capabilities
ranging from 23,000 to 90,000 kilograms to LEO. Most of the concepts also called for
partially reusable launch vehicles with unmanned fly-back boosters. However, the
various studies differed in their dependence on new materials and advanced
propulsion technologies. Some argued that cheaper materials and rockets offset the
drawback of increased weight or lower efficiency while others argued the exact
opposite. Estimates of the cost to develop ALS ranged from $3 billion to $15 billion
dollars. 3 7
As a result of SDI budget cuts in 1989, the ALS program was changed from an
effort to build a new launch vehicle to a technology development program (which
some are now calling the Advanced Launch Technology Program or ALTP).
Funding for ALS in 1990 will be $120 million which is about 40% less than the
amount originally planned by the Air Force.38  With shrinking SDI budgets the Air
Force has been looking to relinquish its role as the lead agency in the project
making it clear (if there was ever any doubt) that SDI was the driving force behind
ALS. At present it is not clear whether NASA will take over as the lead agency or if
the program will fade out of existence. However, if NASA takes over as the lead
agency, indications are that the focus will shift to producing a large highly
34Round Trip To Orbit, OTA-ISC-419, 8/89, p. 75.
35
"The Aerospace Plane: Technological Feasibility and Policy Implications", Korthals-Altes,
MIT-PSTIS, Report #15, 5/86.
36Round Trip To Orbit, OTA-ISC-419, 8/89, p. 68.
37
"USAF Cuts Vehicle Design Work on ALS", AW&ST, 12/18/89, p. 112.
38"USAF Cuts Vehicle Design Work on ALS", AW&ST, 12/18/89, p. 112.
efficient rocket engine prototype. 39  Such an engine might be used on a large ELV
for voyages to the Moon or Mars which NASA envisions.
Civilian Space Technology Initiative (CSTI)
CSTI is a NASA effort to enable less costly space transportation and operations
by funding research which leads to demonstrations of actual hardware. Funding
for the program in 1989 was $122 million.40  About 30% of CSTI funds are designated
for propulsion technology. 4" These efforts focus on developing a large scale
advanced cryogenic liquid propulsion booster engine very much like the one being
discussed by NASA for the new ALTP program. A portion of the funds for
propulsion research are also being used to develop a liquid booster to replace the
solid rocket boosters on the Shuttle.4 2  Other areas of research in decreasing order
of funding, include automation & robotics, structures, information systems, vehicle
concept development, and power generation. However, work in these areas focuses
almost exclusively on manned projects centered around the proposed Space
Station.4 3
Procurement -- The R&D Workhorse
Historically improvements to todays ELVs have resulted primarily from small
incremental changes achieved through government production contracts and not
through leading edge of technology development programs. The large ELVs of
today bear little resemblance to their predecessors. For example, the Delta ELV has
undergone over a dozen major changes during its thirty year history. Such
changes resulted directly from government requirements for slightly improved
(generally larger payload capability) launch vehicles.
The most significant recent government support for commercial launch
vehicle and infrastructure technology was the procurement of the medium launch
vehicle (MLV), the MLV II, and the Titan IV by the Air Force. As discussed in
section 2.1, without these large DOD contracts to restart production lines it would
have been difficult for U.S. companies to enter the commercial launch market. In
39
"USAF Cuts Vehicle Design Work on ALS", AW&ST, 12/18/89, p. 112.
40NASA, Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, Congressional Budget, 1/2/90.
4Launch Options For the Future, OTA, p. 56.
42
"Civilian Space Technology Initiative: A First Step", NASA, TM-100944, 1988, p. 7.
43
"Civilian Space Technology Initiative: A First Step", NASA, TM-100944, 1988 and Launch
Options For the Future, OTA, p. 56.
addition, these contracts financed increases in payload capability for the major
launch company's ELVs. Similarly, government orders for the small ELVs
currently being offered on a commercial basis are the only reason these companies
could finance their R&D and why these companies still exist today.
Launch Facilities
The government owns, manages, and maintains the launch facilities for all
commercially available U.S. ELVs. As a result, improvements to those facilities have
historically been government financed.
Europe
Aside from than U.S. companies, the only launch company not completely
government owned and operated is Arianespace which procures, markets and
launches Europe's Ariane launch vehicles. The Ariane ELVs were developed by the
European Space Agency (ESA) which is jointly financed by a group of 15 European
governments. ESA not only performed the R&D for the launch vehicles, but also
funded the initial demonstration launches before turning the vehicles over to
Arianespace for commercial use. In many ways this has mirrored what happened
with the commercial ELVs in the United States where the government paid for ELV
development and recently turned them over for commercial use. However, ESA does
not finance small incremental changes considered to have little or no risk, such as
the recent expansion of the Ariane 44's lift capability. Nor does ESA directly fund
incremental improvements in manufacturing facilities of Arianespace contractors
although some improvements which benefit Arianespace come about as the result
of other ESA contracts. 44  Similar to the situation in the U.S., the Ariane launch
facilities in French Guyana are government owned (by ESA) and any improvements
to them are funded by the European governments. In all cases, the cost of
implementing any new technology developed by ESA resides with Arianespace.
Thus, while ESA develops new technologies, Arianespace must still pay to purchase
them.
Currently ESA is designing the Ariane 5 launch vehicle which will have a
payload capability of 5800 to 6800 kilograms to GTO. One of the primary missions
envisioned for Ariane 5 is the launching of the Hermes space shuttle which is also
44Personal Communication, Mr. Weinreich, Arianespace, 1/10/90.
under development. However, Arianespace also plans to offer Ariane 5 as a
commercial launch vehicle. The first launch of Ariane 5 is presently scheduled for
1995. In 1988, ESA funding for space transportation systems, including the
development of Ariane 5, was about $700 million.45
Other Countries
In the case of all other countries which currently sell launch services for
commercial and foreign government satellites, or which may offer them in the
near future, the launch vehicles are procured and launched by government
agencies. Thus, research, development and implementation costs of all
technological improvements are funded by the government. Efforts are underway
in Japan, China, and the Soviet Union to improve existing launch vehicles and
facilities, and to design new launch systems.
45ESA Annual Report '88, Europe and Space Agency, 1988, p. 210.
3.0 POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS FOR MAINTAINING
A COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
If the government is going to take actions specifically to enhance the
competitiveness of the CLI, then the industry should hold some importance for the
nation. What does the nation have to gain from a competitive CLI? Answering this
question is essential because different motivations will yield different sets of
reasonable alternatives for government action. For instance, if the primary
motivation for building a new launch vehicle was to provide transportation to
Mars, it would look very different than one built to reduce launch costs. Arguments
which have been used in support of government action for the CLI have covered all
the bases including national security, national prestige, government cost
reductions, and international trade. The objective of this chapter is to evaluated
each of these in turn to determine their credibility as reasons for maintaining the
competitiveness of the CLI and in doing so provide a framework for evaluating any
government action.
3.1 NATIONAL PRESTIGE
The space program has historically had high visibility and has been a source
of national prestige. The first launch of U.S. satellites by a foreign entity,
Arianespace, presented a blow to that prestige as the nation and Congress realized
that America no longer held a monopoly in the western space launch business. But
it was the U.S. government which held that monopoly, and not a commercial
industry. The bruise to national prestige resulted primarily because the launch
industry was still being looked at in the light of a national space program. In a
competitive commercial environment, the other company will win sometimes. If
the nation is to have a commercial launch industry this must be accepted.
In formulating government policy for the commercial launch industry, a
differentiation must be made between the political goal of national prestige and the
economic goal of competitiveness. In general, the political objective of national
prestige is achieved through engineering successes, such as placing a man on the
moon. Commercial success, on the other hand, relies on making a profit. While
national prestige may be an acceptable motivation for developing new
technologies, it is a weak one, and in many cases one incompatible with enhancing
the competitiveness of an industry.' For example, development of a supersonic
transport by France brought national prestige to the country but it has proven to
be a poor commercial airplane. Since national prestige in space is driven by
engineering success rather than profit, such prestige can be more efficiently
obtained through a government program (where profit is irrelevant) than
through the private sector. Improving the competitiveness of the CLI may increase
the market share of U.S. companies but its impact on national prestige would not
even approach that obtained through an Apollo, Space Shuttle, or Space Station
program. If launching western payloads is critical to national prestige then the
U.S. could return to subsidized government launches and recapture much more of
the market than will be possible with a CLI.
3.2 NATIONAL SECURITY
In the aftermath of the Challenger accident the government quickly realized
that it was a poor idea to place all of its faith in one launch vehicle. As a result a
"mixed fleet" strategy, using the shuttle and ELVs, was adopted. With the
commercialization of the launch industry, some have argued that a competitive CLI
is important for ensuring access to space. This is just not the case. Even if the U.S.
CLI went out of business (i.e., did not offer any commercial launch services) this
would not mean the U.S. would lose its ability to build ELVs -- government
procurement of ELVs alone could maintain a viable industry. This was clearly
demonstrated following the Challenger accident when large orders from the Air
Force were the only reason launch companies were able to afford the cost of
restarting previously closed production lines.2 If DOD needs to place a payload in
orbit and wishes to do so on an ELV then it can procure the ELV as it has done in the
past whether a CLI exists or not. Thus, a competitive CLI is not required to ensure
that ELVs are available for national security needs.
Another national security issue which has been raised is the potential for
technology transfer to non-western nations from launches of U.S. satellites by
those nations. Ostensibly such technology transfer would occur because the
launching nation would be able to inspect the payload during integration with the
ELV. Special security measures were included in the recent Chinese licensing
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to improve competitiveness, then the situation is really no different than that
which existed before the creation of the CLI when government financed all
improvements to launch vehicle technology. Whether government invests to
reduce the cost of ELV's it procures or those it purchases commercially, the end
result for government costs would be the same. The government would only save
additional money from new technology if the competitive environment drove
industry to invest some of its own funds towards technological improvements.
Government efforts to enhance industry competitiveness through technological
development would not necessarily result in increased private contributions for
similar measures. In fact, government funding to improve launch vehicle
technology could have the opposite effect by reducing the incentive for companies
to invest on their own (see Chapter 4.0).
Yet, ensuring the competitiveness, and thus the existence, of a CLI still might
save the government money by providing a means to avoid the inefficiencies in
government procurement of ELVs. This savings would come from reduced
oversight, and increased incentive within the industry to reduce cost. There is
strong evidence that companies under government contract to build an ELV have
little incentive to reduce cost because "their profit/cash flow is reduced when they
perform under budget." 5  In addition, the government requires expensive
documentation for oversight. All of these factors drive costs above those that might
be commercially available. Experts estimate that the government could save 10%-
20% of the total cost of a launch by purchasing commercial launch services rather
than procuring ELVs. 6
The government could, in theory, obtain similar cost savings simply by
procuring ELVs in a "commercial" manner (i.e., without extensive oversight). The
CLI merely provides an avenue by which the government can do so, but the
existence of a commercial launch industry is by no means required to obtain such
cost savings. Nor does the existence of a CLI guarantee that government will take
advantage of the opportunity for reduced costs. The Air Force, which accounts for
the bulk of large government payloads, has contracted for very few commercial
launches and this trend is likely to continue. The Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force recently stated that "the Air Force would like to provide all launch services
5Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 20.
6Personal Communication, Ed Blond, Aerospace Corporation, 11/15.
[for Air Force Payloads] and will continue to attempt to do that".7  Ostensibly this is
because of the unique technical and security requirements for Air Force payloads.
Even for supposedly commercial launches of government payloads evidence
exists that much oversight will continue to be required negating potential cost
savings. For example, an upcoming commercial Titan III launch of a NASA payload
will cost $40 million (or 35%) more than a typical Titan III launch as a direct result
of government requirements and oversight.8 Thus, the mere existence of a CLI does
not guarantee that government will take advantage of this avenue for reducing
costs. With or without a CLI, if the government continues to require extensive
production oversight it will pay the cost of that oversight.
3.4 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The large U.S. trade deficit has been a drag on the economy and a focus of
much attention. With commercial launch prices ranging from $40 to $120 million9
for all but the smallest of payloads, launching satellites is big business. In 1990
alone 24 satellites are slated to be launched commercially at a value of about $1.3
billion. 10 Prior to 1984 the U.S. enjoyed a monopoly over the launches of western
payloads. Even though the U.S. Government carried out all of the launches during
the monopoly years, payments for the service fully benefited the American
economy because the government paid launch facility workers and bought U.S.
ELVs with the funds. But, ever since 1984 the U.S. market share has been steadily
decreasing primarily as a result of competition from Arianespace. Of the 24
commercial satellites to be launched in 1990 only nine will be launched by U.S.
companies." While the launch manifests for 1991 and beyond are not firm yet,
preliminary indications show little improvement for the U.S. industry over the next
few years.
With the high cost of launches, overseas launch competition can have a
significant impact on the trade deficit. To put this impact in perspective, Senator
Bensten noted that "every three satellite launches lost by U.S. companies is equal to
7
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10,000 imported cars". 12  Ariane's launch service contracts for 1990 represent lost
business opportunities for the U.S. worth approximately $750 million.' 3  Improved
technology could allow the U.S. CLI to better compete with its primary competitor
Arianespace resulting in improved sales of domestic commercial launch services.
However, improved technology is unlikely to allow U.S. companies to compete with
the subsidized and therefore extremely inexpensive prices being offered by China
and the Soviet Union anytime soon, if ever. Since nearly all commercial launches
place U.S. manufactured satellites into orbit, present U.S. trade restrictions will
prevent extensive competition from these nations. But for the Soviet Union such
restrictions may soon become difficult to maintain due to the changes occurring
within the nation. If restrictions are lifted then the U.S. government would need to
reach some sort of a pricing agreement with the Soviets to enable the U.S. CLI to
compete.
3.5 SUMMARY
The clearest motivation for a government effort to enhance the
competitiveness of the CLI through technological development are the potential
economic benefits of increased domestic launch contracts. If government foots the
entire bill for new technologies, the net result for government costs will be no
different than if a Commercial Launch Industry did not exist. The government
would save additional money from new technologies for the CLI only if industry
invests some of its own funds for technological development. The existence of a CLI
also provides an avenue by which the government can purchase launch services
without extensive oversight resulting in considerable cost savings. But with or
without a CLI if the government requires extensive oversight it will pay the price
for it. The government could, in theory, obtain similar savings even without a CLI
simply by procuring launch vehicles in a "commercial" manner. Finally, neither
national security nor national prestige provide a sound basis for government
action to maintain a competitive CLI through technological development.
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4.0 ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Under most circumstances a commercial industry would be left to operate
without direct government intervention to enhance its competitiveness allowing
the free market to drive innovation. But having been born as a government
program, and having government as a primary customer, the CLI is far from your
typical commercial industry. The unique nature of the industry lead many to
argue that the market fails to provide the environment necessary to ensure
efficient allocation of resources, or that the potential benefits to society are
greater than private benefits leading to under investment from a societal point of
view. Due to these market failures it is argued that the government must take
action. These arguments inevitably fall into one of three categories. First,
economic barriers exist to private development of technology. Second, the CLI
represents a "strategic" industry necessary for future economic growth. And
finally, the CLI faces government financed foreign competition.
4.1 BARRIERS TO PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
Private industry bases any decision to research or develop a technology on
the potential profitability of the venture in comparison to other alternatives for
investment. The potential profitability of any investment in technology is
influenced by the expected return on investment, the technical and market risk
associated with that expectation, and the cost of capital to finance the venture.
Each of these elements factors into a company's decision and each influences the
other. For example, ventures which are perceived as high risk will generally
have high capital costs and thus will require large returns on investment.
Just because industry elects not to develop a technology does not
automatically imply that some sort of barrier exists. Often a technology may just
be a bad investment with little potential for a profitable return. A barrier to
private development of a technology may exist when either the expected profit,
the risk, or the capital cost, is skewed as a result of factors external to the market
for the technology or flaws in the market itself. Such a distortion decreases the
overall potential profitability of a technology reducing or eliminating the
incentive for private investment. Since the question at hand is whether the
government should take actions specifically to enhance the competitiveness of the
CLI through technological development, and not whether broader macro-
economic steps are needed for the nation's industries as a whole, the important
factor is whether the CLI faces barriers which other industries do not. For the CLI,
financial market failure and non-appropriability of the products of R&D are often
fingered as the primary causes of such distortions. In reality they present much
less of a barrier than two other areas which are frequently overlooked:
government policies & programs, and industry segmentation.
Financial Market Failure
Financial market failure occurs when financing is unavailable for a project
even though it appears to exhibit the potential for returns commensurate with the
risk. It is often argued that the high risk, extremely long lead times, and
enormous investments, associated with space ventures incapacitates the financial
market's ability to supply financing for projects even if they appear commercially
viable.
Does technological development for the commercial launch industry exhibit
high risk, long lead times and large investments? Incremental improvements to
existing launch vehicles or facilities rarely exhibit all of these features and often
exhibit none of them. Historically, most incremental improvements have involved
implementation of existing or slightly improved technology with little technical
risk, and relatively short lead times. For example, the recent MLV contracts, while
government financed, resulted in improved Delta and Atlas ELVs in just a few
years. More exotic improvements to existing launch vehicles, such as development
of a highly efficient engine, would be more likely to exhibit high cost, high risk
and long lead time. Likewise, development of an entirely new launch vehicle
would tend to exhibit such features. In general, the greater the level of technical
improvement desired, the greater the risk, cost, and lead time will be.
Does the financial market refrain from financing projects which are high
risk, long lead time or high cost? Numerous examples exist of projects exhibiting
these features which have been privately financed. In the 1960's IBM virtually
bet the company by risking billions of dollars on development of its highly
innovative System 360 design. 1  Every year pharmaceutical firms invest roughly
1"The Government's Role in the Commercialization of New Technologies: Lessons For Space
Policy", Rose, Economics and Technology in U.S. Space Policy Symposium, 6/86, p. 99.
$1 billion on R&D for new drugs with distant and uncertain returns.2  Examples
even exist within the aerospace industry. In the early 1950's Boeing invested a
quarter of the company's net worth to develop the 707 aircraft prototype3 and has
spent billions since to develop other commercial aircraft. Hughes spent over $75
million (1990 $'s) to develop its commercial 376 satellite series with highly
uncertain returns.4 Over the next five years Hughes plans to invest more than $1
billion on satellite equipment.' Even small companies such as Orbital Sciences,
which has spent $50 million to develop its Pegasus vehicle, have found it possible
to obtain funding.6  Chemical processing plants, baseload electric generating
units, off-shore oil platforms, and recent investments in biotechnology all
demonstrate the financial market's ability to finance projects exhibiting high
risk, long lead, high cost, or all three. No evidence was found which would
indicate that the financial market systematically fails to finance such projects
whether space related or otherwise.7
This is not to say that the financial market will finance all development of
technologies. Rather, it will provide capital for those technologies which appear
to have returns commensurate with their risk and with other alternatives for
investment. Exotic technologies which appear feasible may be passed over by the
financial market because they do not appear profitable. This does not represent a
failure of the financial market, in fact it shows that the market is working
properly by allocating resources to the projects which are most profitable.8
Whether financing can be obtained at reasonable interest rates is another
question. Much has been written about the high cost of capital which may be
preventing private investment in the United States. But there is no indication that
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the financial market systematically increases interest rates for space projects
simply because they are space projects. In general, if space projects experience
higher interest rates, it is because the project involves high risk, and not because
the financial market has failed. If there is a problem of high capital cost then the
problem generically effects all industries, and will require macro-economic
actions which are not specific to the CLI.
Thus, even though more exotic launch vehicle technologies may exhibit high
risk, long lead time, and high cost, it does not appear that this presents a barrier to
private development when those projects offer returns commensurate with their
risk and other alternatives for investment. Failure of the financial market to
provide capital for a launch vehicle technology would be a good indication that
the technology does not represent a profitable venture, and not that the financial
market has somehow failed.
Non-Appropria bility
Appropriability affords a company exclusive or nearly exclusive use of any
beneficial result of R&D for some length of time. Non-appropriable R&D is
unattractive to private firms because other companies could benefit from any
beneficial results without having to pay for the R&D. The more basic the research
the more distant and unclear the application to a commercial technology will be
making it difficult to secure exclusive use of the results. At the other extreme,
development of highly applied technology used in a commercial product would be
easily appropriable through patents or trade secrets. In general, the more applied
the R&D the more appropriable the result.9
For the CLI most incremental technology development would be highly
applied and therefore highly appropriable. Incremental improvements to
existing ELVs could not only be patented but in many cases would be so specific to
the launch vehicle that other companies couldn't use them if they wanted to.
Appropriability of technology does not appear to have hindered development of
new small launch vehicles by numerous companies. For example, Orbital Sciences
independently developed an innovative winged launch vehicle. Nor has it kept
larger launch companies from making some investments in technical
9
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improvements such as General Dynamics' recent investment to improve the
insulation on its Atlas ELV. 10
The situation would be different for development of highly advanced, or
"leading edge", technologies. Such technologies would likely require extensive
basic R&D. For example, development of the National Aerospace Plane is
demanding extensive basic R&D in materials, combustion, and aerodynamics.
While the technology of the vehicle itself could be easily appropriated through
patents or trade secrets, the basic research performed to gain the knowledge
necessary to build it could not. However, the difficulty associated with
appropriating the results of basic R&D are not unique to the CLI. As with all
industries the more basic the R&D the less appropriable the result will likely be.
Government Policies & Programs
For large ELVs, government policies & programs represent one of the
primary barriers to private development of technology. One way in which the
government deters private investment in technology development is through the
seemingly harmless act of purchasing launch vehicles. When the government
procures launch vehicles it monitors quality and cost through stringent reporting
requirements. Since commercial launches use the same vehicles (or same
assembly line in the case of Titan) and facilities as government launches,
commercial launch vehicles are subject to those regulations established for
government procured vehicles." Along with these regulations comes
requirements for extensive documentation and reporting of changes in
technology or procedures which must be approved by the government. This
increases the time required to implement a new technology or procedure and
incurs additional cost to the company. This problem is particularly pertinent to
launch operations because the government owns the launch facilities. Not only
are companies constrained by government procedures, but they have even less
control over the technical characteristics of the facilities themselves. The Office
of Technology Assessment noted that unless the government encourages
investment in launch facilities and operations "by removing unnecessary
barriers of documentation and reporting and rewarding innovation, launch firms
10
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are unlikely to assume such risks on their own." 12  The complications and added
costs incurred from government oversight make companies reluctant to deviate
from the present status quo.
In addition to the barriers created by government reporting and
documentation requirements, the method by which government establishes the
price it will pay for launch vehicles can create economic penalties to innovation.
The normal incentive for a company to reduce cost comes from the ability to sell a
product at reduced price (to obtain more customers) and/or increased profit
margin. But when government procures large launch vehicles, companies often
have little inducement to develop technology to reduce cost because they cannot
expect significantly increased numbers of government payloads if prices are
lowered or obtain increased profit. Reducing prices to the government would
have little impact on the number of launch vehicles it purchased because
government needs are controlled primarily by politics and policy. Since the large
U.S. launch vehicles have discrete and unique payload capabilities most
government payloads are confined to the use of an individual ELV (see section 2.4).
This means that the government cannot competitively procure launch services for
the majority of its payloads. In a non-competitive procurement the government
allows the company to make a reasonable percentage profit beyond costs. If the
company reduces cost then the government often demands reductions in price.
Even after a contract is signed the government may renegotiate in order to
capture any cost savings for itself.13  As a result, government contractors have
found that efforts to reduce cost can actually result in decreased profit on the
project because the same percentage profit on lower costs yields lower profit.' 4
Some recent government procurement contracts for launch vehicles have made
efforts to be more innovative in providing incentives for companies to reduce
costs. But as the Vice President of General Dynamics Commercial Launch Services
noted, "...cultural and institutional changes are far from total in their acceptance
and implementation."ls
12Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 80.
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The new launch companies offering small ELVs do not face many of the
disincentives experienced by large launch companies from government
procurement of ELVs. For these companies government is the only customer, and
for the most part, when government purchases launch services from them it
carries out much less oversight than with large ELVs. This results primarily
because the payloads being launched on these ELVs are almost always inexpensive
experimental payloads rather than expensive satellites fulfilling a defense or
NASA mission. In addition, several companies are offering small ELVs with similar
payload capabilities, so the government has the ability to competitively procure
vehicles creating competition among the companies for these contracts. 16
Another way the government deters private investment in launch vehicle
technology is by spending money on R&D. Aerospace firms receive 80% of all
government R&D funding that goes to industry. 17  As was discussed in section 2.6
the government has historically provided all R&D for launch vehicle technology,
and continues to spend large sums of money. Over the years the well established
launch companies have grown accustomed to this government support for their
industry. When government invests in R&D for space technology the company
has a virtually guaranteed profit margin. As a result, the corporate culture in the
space industry tends to be extremely risk averse with respect to private spending
for R&D of new technologies.' s Why should a company risk its own capital when it
can lobby government to obtain a contract which yields a comfortable return on
investment with no risk? By offering a low-risk path, government support of R&D
in the space industry acts to deter private investment even into technologies
which appear to offer returns commensurate with their risk. 1 9
It appears then that government policies and programs represent significant
barriers to private development of technologies for the CLI. Yet, the deterrent
created does not call for direct government support of R&D. In fact, such support
represents one of the primary ways government creates a disincentive for private
investment.
16See"U.S. Government Ready to Place Orders for Small Launchers",Space News,3/12/90, p 8.
17 Using Federal R&D to Promote Commercial Innovation, Congressional Budget Office, 4/88, p.
41.
18Personal Communication, Bud Wheelon, Former CEO Hughes, 1/25/1990.
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Industry Segmentation
Competition among firms offering similar products or services drives much
of the private innovation which occurs in a free market economy. It would seem
then that having multiple launch companies within the U.S. would provide added
impetus for private development of launch vehicle technologies. For the small
launch companies offering launch vehicles with similar payload capabilities,
competition for government contracts appears to be working very effectively in
driving private innovation. These companies have individually invested to
develop the small launch vehicles they are offering. Unfortunately, the launch
vehicles being offered by the large launch companies each have different payload
capabilities (see section 2.4). This prevents extensive competition between these
companies because many payloads can only be launched efficiently on one of the
vehicles (it would be uneconomical to fly a small satellite individually on a large
ELV). In fact, the only competition which could reasonably occur between U.S.
companies comes from the ability of Titan III (the largest commercial ELV) to
launch two smaller payloads, each of which might be launched individually on a
smaller ELV. But as was mentioned in section 2.4, Martin Marietta, which makes
Titan III, has won very few commercial launch contracts and may be withdrawing
from the commercial business. If this occurs then the small amount of
competition between large U.S. launch companies for commercial contracts will
virtually disappear.
The main driving force behind any private innovation in the large U.S.
launch companies lies in foreign competition. Arianespace, the U.S. industry's
primary competitor, offers a series of launch vehicles with capabilities spanning
those offered by the three large U.S. launch companies and can effectively
compete for almost all satellite launch contracts. Segmentation of the U.S. industry
narrows the potential market for each individual company. This reduces the
benefit any individual company would obtain from a new technology because any
investment must be recovered through cost savings on future launches, or an
increase in the number of launch contracts won. As a result, some technologies
for improving launch vehicles and facilities which might be economical at higher
launch rates will be passed over by the U.S. companies. If a single large U.S.
launch company existed which offered a full range of payload capabilities, it could
economically invest greater amounts in new technology since it could expect
higher launch rates and thus a more rapid return on its investment. In addition, a
single company would have almost as much incentive to invest in new technology
as the three current U.S. companies which do not compete extensively with one
another. Thus, the segmentation of the large launch vehicle industry reduces the
economic viability of private investments in new technology, but yields little of
the increased incentive for investment which would normally come from
increased competition.
Conclusions
Appropriability and the ability to obtain financing represent no more of a
barrier to private investment for the CLI than in other industries. The real
barrier to private development lies in the procurement practices and R&D funded
efforts of the government. For large ELVs, contracts from the government can
cause a disincentive to reduce cost while oversight and reporting requirements
make changes in technology difficult. In addition, the segmentation of the large
launch vehicle industry decreases the potential return to individual launch
companies from any investment in new technology, without significantly
increasing the incentive for investment which would normally come from
competition.
4.2 THE STRATEGIC INDUSTRY ARGUMENT
The prospect that an industry is somehow "strategic" to the future economic
well being of the nation has often been used by proponents of government
support for industry specific technology development. The concept of strategic
industries is itself highly controversial, and various definitions of what
constitutes a strategic industry have been put forth. In general the definitions all
encompass the concept that a strategic industry yields economic benefits to the
nation beyond those generated by other industries with similar levels of activity. 20
A strategic industry does this through technological advances which create
opportunities for innovation in related industries and which in turn generate
further economic benefits. Due to the benefits generated external to the industry
itself it is argued that government support is warranted. Assuming one accepts
the theory it must be asked whether it is likely that the CLI represents a strategic
industry?
20Federal Financial Support for High-Technology Industries, Congressional Budget Office,
6/85, p. 3.
While the CLI is only a few years old, the launch industry itself has been
around for thirty years. As a result, the service that it offers is far from new to
the market place. A truly strategic industry would spawn other new industries and
innovations in existing industries. Yet, over thirty years only one commercial
industry has sprung up as a direct result of the ability to place payloads in orbit --
communications satellites. This can be compared with integrated circuits, which
are commonly used as an example of a strategic industry, and the innumerable
products which they have made possible.
Some argue that significant reductions in launch costs would spawn many
new space industries. Yet, even if the cost of launch services dropped
significantly, today it would still be difficult to find many commercial uses for
operations in space beyond communications (see section 2.5). Some commercial
navigation or remote sensing might become feasible, but the demise of the
commercialization of Landsat, which was put in service at government expense,
makes one skeptical about the latter. Low gravity materials processing has
received much attention, but there has yet to be a break through which resulted
in a material or processing technique which has a commercial application. While
there can be no way to tell with certainty what would happen if launch prices
decreased dramatically it appears that opportunities for vast expansion of
commercial activities in space are presently quite limited.
It might be argued that the innovations in other industries which have
resulted from the launch industry are not directly related to the act of placing a
payload in orbit, but rather to innovations which were required to achieve the
task. This is the "spin-off"' argument. Certainly some spin-off has occurred as does
from any industry and especially one which has been supported by billions of
dollars in government funds. But the amount of spin-off is generally over stated.
Most technologies developed for launch vehicles are highly specific and have no
use in other industries. Only the more generic technologies such as materials or
automation would generally find use outside the launch industry. Yet, the space
industry often lags behind in the application of just such technologies."2  The
reason for this is linked to the need for high reliabilities which results in the
desire to use proven technology which meets previous specifications. Due to this
the launch industry might be better described as "high spec" than "high tech".
21Launch Options For the Future, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 13.
Given the questionable ability of the launch industry to spawn innovations in
other industries, and the presently limited opportunities for expanded commercial
uses of the space environment, the strategic nature of the industry must be
doubted. Certainly other industries more clearly demonstrate the attributes of a
strategic industry than the CLI. Thus, even if one accepts the controversial notion
of strategic industries, justifying government support of the CLI on this basis
would be dubious at best.
4.3 GOVERNMENT FINANCED COMPETITION
The U.S. CLI faces the spectre of government supported competition from
every country with launch capabilities. Foreign government support ranges from
financing of R&D for new technologies to complete government ownership and
operation (see section 2.6). Given a similar situation in most other industries the
U.S. response would be to attempt a resolution through trade negotiations. But the
tradition of government support for technological development in the launch
industry has kept the focus on R&D efforts. While some trade discussions on
commercial launch vehicle pricing have taken place between the U.S. and Europe,
the topic of government support for technology development in the industry has
yet to be raised. In reality, even if the point were raised it would likely be dead on
arrival because commercial launch providers are so closely linked to national
space and defense programs. Some of the foreign competitors are essentially the
governments of non-market countries themselves. As a result, foreign
competitors will almost certainly continue to receive government support for
development of new launch vehicle technologies for the foreseeable future.
Whether foreign government support for R&D of commercial technologies
justifies similar actions within the U.S. remains an area of debate among
economists. 22  However, even if one accepts that some support is justified on this
basis, it does not justify unlimited expenditures. Would it be worthwhile to spend
billions of dollars just to ensure a few millions in additional domestic launch
contracts? If national prestige, or national security depended on the expenditure
then it may, but the only reasonable motivations which have been identified for
taking action to increase the competitiveness of the CLI are economic. While
22See Leyard, "Economic Issues in the Development of New Technology: The Role of
Government in Satellite Communications RD&A", Symposium on Space Communications R&D,
National Research Council, 3/88.
expenditures might increase industry competitiveness, and thus the number of
commercial launch contracts won by U.S. companies, at some point the additional
contracts would cost the nation more than they are worth. Just because a foreign
government elects to spend billions of dollars to develop new launch vehicle
technology, would not automatically mean that it is in the interest of the U.S. to
follow suit. In fact it may be more in the economic interest of the nation to simply
take advantage of inexpensive subsidized foreign technology rather than
matching the large subsidies.
The exact amount which might be reasonably spent on new technology would
be nearly impossible to calculate accurately due to considerable uncertainty in the
impact any technology would have on U.S. market share, uncertainties in future
demand, and disagreement among economists on how to gauge the effect of such
government expenditures on the economy. Writing on the topic one economist
noted that "At best the numbers calculated will be statistics which bear minimal
relationship to the real facts; at worst the numbers will be misleading."23
However, realization that such a limit exists should temper any proposed
government spending on launch vehicle technology for the CLI.
4.4 SUMMARY
For the large launch companies the primary barriers to the private
development of launch vehicle technology are government policies and programs,
and the segmentation of the U.S. industry. Government procurement can provide
a disincentive to reduce cost, and oversight requirements can restrict the ability
of companies to implement new technologies. The segmentation of the large
launch vehicle industry presents a barrier to private development of technology
by reducing the economic viability of private investments in new technology,
without yielding the increased incentive for investment which would normally
come from increased competition among multiple companies. Government R&D
programs themselves also provide a disincentive to private investment by
providing a low risk path to development of new technology.
Even if one accepts the controversial notion of strategic industries the CLI
represents an unlikely candidate for such a distinction. Justifying government
23Leyard, "Economic Issues in the Development of New Technology: The Role of Government in
Satellite Communications RD&A", Symposium on Space Communications R&D, National
Research Council, 3/88, p. 140.
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spending on this basis would be dubious at best. Government support for foreign
launch providers may represent a reasonable economic rationale for government
efforts to improve launch vehicle technology, but any spending on this basis must
be tempered by the realization that excessive government expenditures could
reduce the net benefit to the nation of increased commercial launches.
5.0 ENHANCING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF
EXISTING LAUNCH SYSTEMS
Whether a technology will enhance the competitiveness of a company
depends not only on the economic benefit obtained, but also on how much it would
cost the company. For a commercial launch company the sunk cost of developing
and manufacturing (or purchasing) a technology must be amortized over the
ensuing launch vehicles and recovered in the form of cost savings or increased
customers from reduced prices. The higher the launch rate, the greater the benefit
from a new technology will be each year. Low launch rates would require larger
savings on each ELV to make an investment in a new technology profitable.
However, if government covers some of the cost, then a technology can be
beneficial with smaller cost savings. Thus, the net benefit to a company of a
technological improvement depends on the cost of obtaining the technology, the
economic benefit from it per ELV, the realized launch rate, and the level of
government support.
Ideally, the costs and benefits associated with a proposed technology would be
quantified to guide government policy. But estimates of the net benefit which
might be obtained from new launch vehicle technologies are extremely inaccurate
and highly variable. For example, development cost estimates for ALS and NASP
have ranged from $3 billion to over $15 billion.' Estimated operating costs for NASP
have ranged from $1 million to $9 million per launch. 2 Previous estimates of the
potential benefits from various sub-system level launch vehicle technologies are
no different, often varying by more than an order of magnitude.3  The poor nature
of all these estimates results from the "subjective and unreliable" methods used for
estimating the cost to develop a new technology,4 and the equally poor predictions
of long term launch demand which were discussed in section 2.5. Technological
risk, or the chance that the development or application of a technology will fail to
meet it specified technical goals, also contributes to the uncertainty of such
I"USAF Cuts Vehicle Design Work", AW& ST, 12/18/89, p. 112. and "The Aerospace Plane:
Technological Feasibility and Policy Implications", Korthals-Altes, MIT-PSTIS, Report #15,
5/86.
2Round Trip To Orbit, OTA-ISC-419, 8/89, p. 68. and "The Aerospace Plane: Technological
Feasibility and Policy Implications", Korthals-Altes, MIT-PSTIS, Report #15, 5/86.
3See the various Space Transportation Architecture Studies and Reducing Launch Operations
Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, p. 70.
4Launch Options for the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p.14.
estimates. In general, the more exotic the proposed technology, the worse the
estimates become.
The Office of Technology Assessment has noted that "The Aerospace field is rife
with examples of technologies that took much longer to develop and implement and
cost much more than originally anticipated...." In fact, in two of OTA's recent
launch vehicle studies, one of the primary findings was that better cost estimating
methodologies need to be developed.6 Until better methods are developed,
attempting to quantify the potential costs and benefits from new launch vehicle
technologies would only lead to inaccurate and misleading results. Over
dependence on such poor estimates in developing government policy would likely
lead to improper conclusions.
Rather than attempting to explicitly quantify the costs and benefits from any
new technology, this chapter will identify those technologies which are key to
improving the competitiveness of the CLI. This will be achieved in part by
exploring where costs come from and by identifying the known technical and
economic trade-offs associated with proposed technologies. The emphasis will be on
identifying what is known and accepting what remains uncertain. Previous
estimates of the net benefit which might be obtained from proposed technologies
will only be used with extreme caution and, when possible, on an ordinal (i.e.,
comparison) rather than cardinal (i.e., absolute) basis to avoid erroneous
conclusions about what the actual net benefit may be.
Before evaluating any technologies, it must be realized that competitiveness
entails more than just the price of a launch. Competitiveness can also be increased
by reducing the cost of risk management (such as insurance), the potential for
launch delays, and the cost of financing the launch.7 The first three items might
potentially benefit from improved technology. However, the cost of financing a
launch is controlled almost exclusively by the world money market, and is
independent of factors related to the launch. 8  Improvements in technology would
have little or no impact on financing costs for commercial launches. Thus, it would
not make sense to explore the financial market in the context of this thesis.
5Launch Options For the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 47.
6Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-ISC-TM-28, 9/88 and Launch Options For the Future,
OTA-ISC-383, 7/88.
7
"The Selection of a Launch Vehicle", Greenberg and Christensen, 25th Space Congress.8
"Space Transportation--The Commercial Users Perspective", Simanis, AIAA 88-3492, p.2.
The remaining three areas are explored in the following sections where it is
shown that one group of technologies holds the key to reducing launch costs, and
that important disparities exist between the needs of government and the
commercial launch industry. The next chapter then turns to entirely new launch
systems.
5.1 LAUNCH PRICE
The terms "launch price" and "launch cost" have been used in many different
contexts to mean many different things. No "right" definition of these terms exists
per se, but it is important to have a clear and common understanding of how these
terms will be used. In this study "launch cost" is the total cost to the commercial
launch company of manufacturing and launching an ELV. It does not include the
cost of items such as insurance, financing, or launch delays. "Launch price" is
simply the launch cost plus the profit margin added by the commercial launch
company.
When comparing prices of different launch vehicles the total cost or price of a
launch has little meaning because larger ELVs will inevitably cost more. As in
other transportation industries where cargo rather than people are being
transported, the useful basis for comparison is the specific price (i.e., price per
unit mass). In addition, the destination of the cargo influences price since some
destinations are further away or more difficult to reach. As noted in Chapter 2,
commercial payloads predominantly go to geosynchronous orbit (GEO). However,
when a satellite goes to GEO, the ELV usually only takes it a portion of the way to its
destination to what is called a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). From that point
the satellite's own rockets propel it to its final destination. Thus, for satellites going
to GEO, transportation costs are usually compared on the basis of dollars per
kilogram to GTO. In cases where comparisons between launch vehicles incapable of
reaching GTO are needed, the cost per kilogram to low earth orbit (LEO) is most
often used.
To create reductions in launch price through technological development.
specific launch cost must be reduced. Neglecting for the moment the cost of
obtaining and utilizing a new technology, the specific launch cost of existing ELVs
can be lowered by reducing the cost to manufacture and launch the ELV, or by
improving performance. Improvements in performance can take three forms.
First, the mass of ELV hardware can be reduced. Second, booster engine efficiency
can be increased. And third, for reasons that will be discussed later, sometimes
simply increasing the ELV's size can yield benefits.
Reducing Manufacturing and Operations Cost
Any effort to reduce manufacturing and launch operations cost should begin
by examining where cost comes from. Figure 5-1 shows the cost for three recent
U.S. launch vehicles broken down into five categories. The cost data shown is the
result of a compilation of government costs for ELV procurement and launch
operations performed by the Aerospace Corporation in 1984. Aerospace Corporation
also simultaneously performed a similar compilation of expected commercial
launch costs. However, the commercial data is considered proprietary. Can this
data be taken as representative of current launch systems? While none of the
current commercially available ELVs are represented explicitly in this data, the
current ELVs resulted from incremental modifications to them and are very similar
in design to those shown in Figure 5-1. Also, the author of the report noted that
many of the tasks falling into the categories of "Government Services" and "Other
Government" would need to be performed by commercial launch companies
anyway, and while commercial costs were estimated to be 10% to 20% lower, the
savings were spread fairly evenly among the categories represented. The cost
breakdown of the currently available U.S. commercial ELVs should therefore be
comparable to the data presented.
Looking at Figure 5-1, manufacturing is the largest fraction of each launch
vehicle's cost. Breaking manufacturing cost down further into labor cost and
materials reveals that about 60% of manufacturing cost can be attributed to the cost
of labor. 9  The reason for this high percentage lies in the fact that each ELV is
virtually hand made.' 0 The other costs shown in Figure 5-1 are also almost entirely
labor related. As a result, the cost of labor represents about 70% of total launch
cost. With such a large portion of launch costs coming from labor, technologies
which reduce the number of man-hours required to manufacture and launch an
ELV would appear to have the potential for reducing launch costs. Even a small
percentage reduction in labor cost would outweigh much larger fractional cost
reductions in other areas.
9Personal Communication, Ed Bock, General Dynamics, 11/17/89.
10
"Big Dumb Boosters: A Low Cost Transportation Option?", OTA Background Paper, 2/89, p.25.
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It is not surprising then that studies focused on reducing launch cost have
consistently identified labor reducing technologies as the top prospects for the
near term. The most extensive such studies have been the multi-million dollar
Space Transportation Architecture Studies (STAS) performed by three separate
contractors and the Air Force in the early 1980's. STAS was an effort to create a
framework for meeting the nation's future space transportation needs at low cost.
The STAS studies ranked technologies on the basis of reduction in life cycle cost or
internal rate of return, both of which account for the full cost and benefits of the
technology. All four studies identified various labor reducing technologies such as
automation, and new information systems as the most promising technologies for
reducing costs in the near term." Some examples of the specific technologies
explored include computer integrated manufacturing, expert systems, paperless
management systems, and applications of existing and new automation equipment.
Although the estimated net benefit of such technologies varied enormously among
the various studies, technologies which reduced the cost of labor consistently
ranked the highest.
Do the conclusions reached in STAS apply to the CLI? STAS assumed a very
high launch rate averaging almost 500,000 kg to orbit per year, and thus large total
costs savings each year. 12 In the unusually busy year of 1985 the U.S. placed only
275,000 kg into orbit -- about half of what STAS has projected.13 STAS also assumed
that all investments would be made in a single launch system which would launch
all payloads. In the CLI each company has its own manufacturing and launch
facilities so each would require separate investments and each company only
launches a portion of each years payloads so it would receive only a fraction of the
annual benefit. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that at present launch rates
the net benefit to any individual company would be significantly less than those
estimated in STAS. However, since the reductions in the return on investment from
the lower launch rate would be common to all of the technologies evaluated in
STAS, the ranking of the technologies would remain unchanged.
While many of the technologies explored in STAS require further R&D before
they could be used, some of the technologies which could reduce labor costs in the
CLI are already in use in other industries. 14  Many aerospace experts argue that
11Martin Marietta, General Dynamics, Boeing, and Air Force, STAS.
12Martin Marietta, STAS, X88-10258, p. 3-13.
13
"Getting Into Space: Rockets and Shuttles", Wheelon, unpublished manuscript, 4/11/89, p. 9.
14Launch Options For the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 13.
significant cost savings could be achieved simply by "modernizing manufacturing
facilities". 15  Thus, the technological risk associated with some technologies for
reducing labor cost is very low. Whether such technologies can actually reduce
manufacturing and operations costs will be highly dependent on the cost of the
technology to the company, and the launch rate. However, it seems reasonable to
conclude that technologies which reduce labor costs, have the greatest potential for
reducing manufacturing and operations costs.
Reducing ELV Hardware Mass
The specific launch cost of an ELV can also be reduced by reducing the mass of
the launch vehicle's hardware allowing the vehicle to carry more payload instead.
Even though ELV hardware constitutes only about 10% of the Gross Lift-Off Weight
(the rest is almost entirely propellant), its mass can be 10 times greater than the
payload. 16  Thus, even a small percentage reduction in hardware mass can have a
significant impact on payload capability.
Current ELVs appear to have nearly reached the economic limit of reducing
weight through design with current manufacturing techniques. Efforts to produce
lighter weight hardware from standard materials requires labor intensive
precision manufacturing as part thickness or size is reduced. 17  This may be why
studies such as STAS have focused on weight reduction through use of advanced
light weight materials. Some of the top advanced materials candidates currently
under study include new aluminum alloys such as Aluminum-Lithium offering a
10% density reduction, and carbon composites such as graphite epoxy with up to
40% density reductions.1 8
On a dollar per kilogram basis advanced materials are much more expensive
than their traditional counterparts sometimes costing as much as 300% more. 19
However, the value of increased payload capability is enormous. For example, the
specific launch cost of an Atlas/Centaur is about $29,000 per kilogram to GTO, and
thus an additional kilogram of payload capability would be worth $29,000. Current
specific costs for the structural materials which would be the top candidates for
15Launch Options For the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 47.
16
"Commercial Atlas Launch Systems", Matsumori, IAF 88-170, 10/8/88, p.5.
17
"Big Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option?", OTA Background Paper,
2/89, p. 13.
IsGeneral Dynamics, Martin Marietta, and Air Force STAS.
19Advanced Materials By Design, OTA-E-351, 6/88, p. 123.
replacement with advanced materials are well under $20 kg. Thus, if advanced
materials could simply be substituted for their traditional counterpart the 300%
increase in materials cost (about $60 per kg) would be insignificant when
compared to the benefit. Even the modest 10% density reduction offered by
Aluminum Lithium would yield a benefit of $2900 for each replaced kilogram of
traditional material -- far greater than the increased materials cost.
The problem with advanced materials lies in the difficult and labor intensive
task of fabricating with them. Most advanced materials require unconventional
fastening and forming techniques. As a result, designing with advanced materials
can sometimes lead to more complex parts. This complexity reduces the benefit of
lower density by requiring a greater amount of material. Some attempts to use
composites in the aerospace industry have actually resulted in heavier parts. 20  The
complexity of design also increases the difficulty of fabrication. In the aerospace
industry, composite structures are commonly fabricated by slow and labor
intensive means. 2 1  As a result, labor costs for composites can be much greater than
for standard materials. Most cost information on the use of advanced materials is
proprietary, but one set of data from OTA showed that not only do materials costs
increase by hundreds of percent, but so can labor costs.2 2
The economy derived from using advanced materials on launch vehicles
depends much less on the cost of the material than on the ability to design and
manufacture efficiently (i.e., with low labor cost) with them. For some materials
overcoming the complications of fabricating with advanced materials would be
aided by improvements in fastening and forming techniques. But in general,
economical use of advanced materials will be driven by simpler designs and
automation of repetitive or complex tasks to reduce the cost of labor required to
manufacture with them.2 3  It should be no surprise then that the STAS never
ranked improvements in materials higher than technologies for reducing labor
costs. Advanced materials will be unlikely to economically reduce ELV mass without
measures to reducing the cost of fabricating with them.
2 0
"Economic Issues in Composites Manufacturing", McLane, American Society for Composites,
1988, p. 26.
21Advanced Materials By Design, OTA-E-351, 6/88, p. 79.
22Advanced Materials By Design, OTA-E-351, 6/88, p. 80.
23
"Economic Issues in Composites Manufacturing", McLane, American Society for Composites,
1988, p. 27.
Improving Booster Engine Efficiency
A more efficient booster engine would allow the mass of propellant required at
lift-off to be reduced. The engineering efficiency (i.e., efficiency which does not
consider cost) of a rocket is generally measured by the specific impulse which is
the thrust of the rocket divided by the weight flow rate of propellant. The highest
specific impulse engines of current launch vehicles are those fueled with liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen (LOX-H2) such as the Centaur upper stage, and the
Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) while the lowest are solid boosters such as those
used on Delta, Titan and the Shuttle.
Even though high specific impulse engines can increase the fraction of the
gross lift-off weight dedicated to the payload, they may not improve the specific
launch cost (i.e., $/kg). The ideal engine has high performance, high thrust-
weight ratio, and is inexpensive. But high engine performance requires tight
design margins, and more complex designs with more parts.24  This drives up the
cost and weight of the rocket engine. Thus, a trade-off exists between
improvements in the engineering efficiency of rockets, and the cost of the rockets
which causes the optimum engine to lie somewhere between those which are
expensive with high efficiency, and inexpensive engines with low efficiency.
Exactly where this optimum lies is currently a matter of debate (and would be
different for different ELVs anyway), but regardless of the optimum, the high cost
of the most efficient engines can be prohibitive for ELVs where they will literally
be thrown away after one launch.
Why are higher specific impulse engines so much more complex and
expensive? If we take the extreme comparison between solid and LOX-H2 rockets
the reason becomes clear. Solid rockets are basically a fuel filled shell with a nozzle
on the end, while LOX-H2 engines are intricate mechanical devices requiring
plumbing, pumps, and many other parts. Engine complexity also increases when
striving to improve the performance of liquid engines. Higher performance liquid
engines generally operate at higher temperatures and pressures requiring tighter
design specifications and the addition of complex mechanical systems such as
turbopumps and cooling systems. High pressure pump fed engines, such as the
shuttle main engines, may have 15000 parts compared to 100 for more simple
pressure fed engines like the Transtage used to power to upper stages of Delta II and
24
"Space Transportation Booster Engine Selection", Meisl, AIAA 87-1852, p. 3.
Titan III.25 The turbopump alone is made of hundreds of rapidly moving parts and
can account for 20% of the engines costs.26  Also, in higher performance liquid
engines the fuel nearly always requires cryogenic cooling yielding more complex
designs. The increased complexity of the engines translates directly into increased
labor cost because, like the rest of the launch vehicle, the rockets are basically
hand made.27  In fact labor cost represent about 70% of liquid rocket production just
as it did for the entire launch vehicle.28
Incremental improvements to existing launch vehicles could be made to
improve the engineering efficiency of the rockets, but the majority of these
improvements would require increased complexity resulting in increased
manufacturing costs. In addition, some engineers believe current liquid rockets
are approaching the peak of their development potential in terms of specific
impulse. 29  Therefore, significant improvements in specific cost from improved
rocket efficiency will require more efficient manufacturing processes. A recent
article on prominent rocket engine company's R&D efforts (Rocketdyne), noted
that "Instead of focusing on the engine, the thrust of the technical advances are
aimed at increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing process." 30  Increasing
manufacturing efficiency could be achieved through simpler designs, automation
of some manufacturing processes, and use of some advanced information system
technologies. 31  The economic viability of applying such technologies will be
dependent on their cost and the launch rate, but without attention to reducing
labor costs, higher efficiency rocket engines are unlikely to improve the specific
launch cost of existing ELVs.
Increasing Payload Capability -- Bigger Isn't Always Better
Over the thirty year history of the launch industry the principal factor
leading to reduced specific launch price has been the increasing size and resulting
25
"Big Dumb Boosters", OTA Background Paper, 2/89, p. 12.
26
"Big Dumb Boosters", OTA Background Paper, 2/89, p. 11.
27
"big Dumb Boosters", OTA Background Paper, 2/89, p. 25.
28"Life Cycle Cost Considerations for Launch Vehicle Liquid Propellant Rocket Engines", Meisl,
AIAA 86-1408, p.5.
29"Propulsion for Economic Space Transportation Systems", Bond, Aerospace, 8/88, p. 9
30"Rocketdyne to Use Simple Designs", AW&ST, 6/12/89, p. 29.
31
"Life Cycle Cost Considerations for Launch Vehicle Liquid Propellant Rocket Engines", Meisl,
AIAA 86-1408, p. 8.
increase in payload capability of ELVs. 2  Figure 5-2 shows how larger ELVs yield
reduced specific price if the entire capability is utilized. Why does larger payload
capability yield reduced specific costs? First of all, no matter how large the ELV,
some sub-systems will remain virtually the same size. For instance, the guidance
system for a large ELV does not need to be much larger than that for a small ELV.
Also, if the fuel tanks are made larger, then the ratio of surface area to volume
decreases allowing the tank to carry more fuel per kilogram of tank mass. These
have the net effect of increasing the fraction of the gross lift-off weight which
can be dedicated to the payload.
However, increasing the payload fraction of gross lift-off weight does not
represent the only, nor the predominate factor leading to reduced specific cost. For
example, the Ariane 44L has a greater payload capability and lower specific price
than its predecessor the Ariane 3, but has a lower payload fraction of gross lift-off
32Handbook of Space Technology Status and Projections, Hord, CRC Press, 1985, p. 6.
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weight.3 3 The other driver of reduced specific cost with increasing ELV size again
lies in the cost of labor. Large ELVs benefit from economies of scale in production -
- an ELV which is twice as large does not require twice the man-hours to
manufacture. In addition, launch and range operations cost increase only slightly
as the ELV size increases, but the launch places a greater payload into orbit.34
However, it must be remembered that the benefits afforded by increased ELV
size can only be obtained if the payload capability is fully utilized. Thus, it only
makes sense to increase capability if demand exists for larger payload capabilities,
or if the payload increase is large enough to allow for the launch of multiple
smaller satellites. In the past, increasing the size of ELVs has not been driven as
much by the desire to reduce launch cost as by the government's desire to launch
larger payloads into orbit (remember that launch vehicles used to be exclusively
government programs). But commercial satellites have generally been built to
conform to the size of existing payload capabilities of ELVs in order to utilize its full
capability. As discussed in section 2.5, most commercial satellites have been built to
fit in the smaller ELVs and the largest commercial ELVs (Titan III and Ariane 44L)
have routinely launched dual payloads. Future commercial payloads may actually
become smaller as demand for satellite communications decreases and as companies
and governments opt for the increased reliability and flexibility of having several
small satellites as opposed to a single large one. For instance, even though every
previous Intelsat communications satellite has been larger than its predecessor, the
newest Intelsat satellite is 25% lighter than its predecessor. Thus, larger payload
capabilities would almost certainly require launching multiple commercial
payloads.
Launching multiple payloads has several drawbacks. First, such launches are
difficult to coordinating efficiently. 35  Also, launching multiple payloads leads to
increased difficulty in obtaining inexpensive insurance because the potential loss
is much higher.36  Finally, if one payload experiences a problem then none of the
payloads can be flown causing a delay and added costs for all users. The more
payloads that are being flown, the more severe these problems become. Thus, when
33"Cost Reduction Potential for Communications Satellite Systems and Services", Koelle, AIAA
88-0838, p. 467.
34
"Space Launch Vehicle Costs", Blond and Knittle, Aerospace Corporation, ATR-84(4460-03)-
IND, 7/84.
35Launch Options For the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 39.
36Launch Options For the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 39.
multiple payloads must be flown the decrease in specific price may not necessarily
lead to increased competitiveness because other costs may be incurred.
In addition, because economies of scale are also obtained via higher
production rates, a trade-off exists between ELV size and launch rate . As ELV size
increases, and multiple payloads are flown on a single ELV, fewer launches will be
needed each year. This leads to an increase in the unit cost of each ELV in part
because fixed costs must be spread over fewer vehicles. In addition, less
opportunity exists to benefit from the higher efficiency of high production rates
such as increased opportunity for automation and increasing effectiveness of
employees with repetition of tasks. If production rates drop too low, the benefit
obtained from ELV size will be offset by the added cost of low production rates.
Figure 5-3 demonstrates this trade-off using cost data from the Aerospace
Corporation. As demonstrated in section 2.5 nearly all non-military satellites over
the last several years have had launch masses below 2250 kg. A satellite with a
launch mass of 2250 kg going to GTO could be launched individually on an
Atlas/Centaur or together with another similar size payload on a Titan. Figure 5-3
shows the variation in specific launch cost for various numbers of such satellites to
be launched annually. (One could also think of a 2250 kg payload as two individual
1225 kg payloads with no change in specific launch cost). When launching less
than ten such payloads per year the smaller Atlas/Centaur rocket may actually be
more cost effective than the larger Titan. Over the next several years General
Dynamics will launch at most eight Atlas vehicles per year, and will likely launch
less. Martin Marietta will be launching at most two and more likely one or none
Titan IIIs in coming years. Launching all of these payloads on a larger ELV could
actually result in increased specific cost. (This might also help explain why Martin
Marietta, which makes Titan, is considering leaving the commercial launch
business). Thus, with the current launch rates and sizes of most non-military
payloads, bigger would not necessarily be better, and the optimal payload capability
of future launch vehicles in terms of specific price will be highly dependent on
the number and size of future payloads.
Ideally, the user would be able to select from a menu of launch vehicle to suit
their needs and desires. This would allow them to select the simpler and more
flexible individual launch, or a multiple launch at lower price. It would also allow
them greater flexibility in selecting the size of their satellite. Currently
Arianespace has its launch vehicles configured in just this way. The diversity of
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launch capabilities offered by the three large U.S. companies as a group mimics
closely the capabilities offered by Ariane. Significant increases in the payload
capabilities of U.S. ELVs would narrow the variety of launch options offered by U.S.
companies as a group unless the companies continued to offer the smaller
predecessors of these new ELVs. Unfortunately, because U.S. ELVs were not
originally designed to offer incremental payload capabilities, enlargement usually
entails increasing tank and engine size rather than strapping on additional solids
as is done on Ariane. Maintaining the capability of manufacturing the smaller
predecessors is an expensive and complicated task because assembly lines must
manufacture multiple sizes of parts. As a result, the launch companies cease
production of the old ELV as demonstrated by the recent enlargements of the three
major commercial ELVs and the corresponding discontinuation of their
predecessor.
At present, each major U.S. launch company is filling a market niche
resulting in a full range of launch options to be offered by U.S. companies as a
group. Further incremental increases in launch capability would lead to a decrease
in product diversity because the smaller ELVs would no longer be offered. In
Required
Titan launches/yr
Required
Atlas launches/yr
addition, unless launch rates or payload sizes increase significantly, larger ELVs
may not result in decreased specific cost. Thus increasing ELV size would be
unlikely to result in increased competitiveness of the U.S. CLI as a whole.
Conclusions
Reducing the specific launch cost of current ELVs will require efforts to
reduce the labor intensiveness of manufacturing and launch operations. In order
to make improvements in performance through higher efficiency rocket engines
or advanced lightweight materials cost-effective, they will need to be coupled with
efforts to prevent the increase in labor cost which normally accompanies their use.
The technological means for reducing labor costs lie in simplified designs,
automation, and advanced information systems. Since the cost-effectiveness of
each specific technology will be dependent on its cost and launch rates, individual
studies would be necessary for each specific technology, and for each proposed use,
to determine which ones might have a potential net benefit. However, for the
purpose of developing a broad based government policy for technological
development in the CLI it is adequate to identify technologies which reduce labor
cost as the key to reducing specific launch cost through incremental improvements
to existing ELVs.
5.2 RISK MANAGEMENT
Every rocket launch faces the specter of failure and the loss of millions of
dollars invested in the ELV and payload. In addition to this loss, the potential exists
for the launch vehicle to cause damage to the launch facility, and to persons and
the property of uninvolved third parties. These financial liabilities contribute to
the cost of every launch.
Failures can occur as a result of launch vehicle or payload malfunction, but
only those caused by the launch vehicle will effect the competitiveness of the
commercial launch company. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, "launch failure"
is defined as failure to achieve the desired orbit or trajectory as a result of launch
vehicle malfunction. This section identifies the key factors associated with
improving competitiveness through technologies aimed at reducing the cost of risk
management. In doing so some important disparities between government and
commercial needs are discovered.
Methods for Managing Risk
Managing risk essentially means making a decision about the most economical
way to cover the cost of potential financial losses. Individuals and companies
practice risk management every time they decide whether or not to purchase an
insurance policy. Satellite owners must make risk management decisions for each
launch. For many years now some commercial satellite owners have purchased
insurance to cover the hazards of launch including loss of payload, cost of re-
launch, loss of expected revenues, and third party liability. Launch companies on
the other hand have only had to concern themselves with launch insurance since
the industry was commercialized. Before then, the government owned and
operated the ELVs and the launch companies had no launch liability. With the
commercialization of the launch industry, launch companies have had to obtain
third party liability insurance, and in order to remain competitive, to offer
innovative risk management packages to customers.
As was discussed in section 2.1, third party liability was the subject of much
debate in Congress. The resulting legislation indemnifies third party liability for
commercial launch companies for damages over $500 million or a less amount
specified by the Secretary of Transportation. DOT requirements for the first
commercial Delta and Titan launches were set at only $80 million."3  Despite all of
the attention it has received, third party liability insurance is only a small portion
of the cost of risk management with premiums running well below 1% of the
policy's value.38  There has never been damage or injury to a third party as a result
of a launch failure. Managing the potential loss of payload and launch vehicle are
much more costly.
For many years insurance premiums to cover these losses ran about 5% of the
policy's value. A spate of launch failures from 1984 to 1985 caused enormous losses
in the insurance industry and premiums soared to above 25% of policy value. 39 As a
result of these high insurance premiums, alternative means of managing risk have
been sought. In some cases this has simply meant accepting the financial risk of a
launch failure, sometimes referred to as self-insurance. For example, Intelsat,
which has insured all previous launches of its satellites, elected to self-insure the
launch of its first Intelsat VI satellite because of dissatisfaction with the high
37
"U.S. Sets Insurance Minimums for Commercial Space Launches", AW&ST, 1/30/87, p. 69.
38Personal Communication, Alden Richards, Johnson & Higgens Insurance Brokers, 10/26/89.
39
"Insurance, Risk Sharing, and Incentives for Commercial Use of Space", Doherty, Explorations
in Space Policy, Resources for the Future & National Academy of Engineering, p. 81.
rates. 40  Another form of self-insurance has been started by some launch
companies which, for an additional charge, offer free re-flights in the event of a
failure. For example, General Dynamics offers this option for an additional 10% of
launch price. 4 1  Arianespace has gone so far as to create a subsidiary company
called S3R to provide launch insurance for its customers.
The cost of risk management, and the selection of the most economical means
for doing so is based in part on the perceived likelihood of failure. But how is this
perception formed?
Measuring Reliability -- Uncertainties in Uncertainties
The perceived risk associated with any launch comes from estimates of the
vehicle's reliability. Estimates of reliabilities for launch vehicles can been
obtained in several different ways. For existing launch vehicles with significant
launch histories, the crudest and most common method involves simply dividing
the number of successful launches by the number attempted. The problem with
this method is that the large launch vehicles of today have evolved into very
different machines from there ancestors of thirty years ago. Throughout this
evolution the frequency of launch failures has decreased. The failure histories
shown in Figures 5-4a thru 5-4c demonstrate this improvement. So the question
then becomes how many, and which, of the launches does one use to determine the
success rate? Different numbers of launches will yield very different reliability
estimates.
No single means for selecting the number of launches to be used in estimating
reliability is the "right" method. However, some are less arbitrary than others. The
lower success rates experienced by launch vehicles during earlier launches
resulted from the learning period during which the technology was still being
perfected, and the higher success rates experienced by todays ELVs has resulted, in
part, from changes that were made to correct for design flaws. Incorporating the
learning period into the reliability estimate would arguably lead to estimates
unrepresentative of current vehicles. The point at which learning ceased to
contribute significantly to improved reliability might be approximated by
40
"Intelsat Expected to Self-Insure February Titan Launch", Space News, 12/11/89, p. 18.
4 1
"Commercial Atlas Users Conference", proceedings, 3/89, p. 557.
74
Delta Failure History
Compiled From TRW Space Log
8-
: -6
S5-
114-3-
2-
1-
A.
0 25 50 75 100 125 142
Launches
Delta Historical Failure Rate
0.150
Each Data Point Represents
a Launch Failure.
Failure Rates Include All
0.125 a Previous Launch History
-
* 0.100
a
0.075
0.050
0 25 50 75 100 125 142
Launches
FIGURE 5-4A
13a
9a
I
Titan 111/34D Failure History
Compiled From TRW Space Log
I " I " I " I
25 50 75 100
Launches
Titan Historical Failure
1
125
Rate
I II
Each Data Point Represents
a Launch Failure.
Failure Rates Include
All Previous Launch History.
-
00 1250 25 50 75 1
Launches
FIGURE 5-4B
In
8-
El
a[
143
0.125 -
0.100-
0.075 -
0.050
143
Il ·~··u
I ' I ' I
m 
Im
-- - 1T ... ... lr "lr T - - t t--- - I--- - TT- - T -- - --
-
Atlas/Centaur Failure History
g1 V
I I I
0 20 40 60
Launches
Atlas/Centaur Historical Failure Rate
n 500
0.175-
0.150 -
0.125
0.100- 0.100* I
40
Launches
FIGURE 5-4C
H
H
13
13
Data Points Represent
Launch Failures.
Failure Rates Include All
Previous Launche History
,1
7
U R
n.1VV I- -
breaking the launch failure histories into two linear parts as shown in Figure 5-5.
The slope of the first line represents the approximate failure rate when learning
was prevalent. The reliability estimate can then be made from the point of
intersection of the two lines (the "break-point").
Once the number of launches to be used for the reliability estimate has been
determined, a success rate can be found. However, with a limited number of
launches it can not be said with 100% certainty that the failure rate represents the
launch vehicle's reliability. For instance, if a new launch vehicle were to
experience several successful launches with no failures, the success rate would be
100%, but the reliability would undoubtedly be less. Given a number of launches
the best that can be done is to estimate the probability that the reliability lies
within some range of values, or the probability that the reliability lies above some
value. The former is formally called a "confidence interval", and the latter a "one-
sided confidence interval". For reliabilities of launch vehicles, the one-sided
confidence interval (i.e., the probability that the reliability is above some value) is
of the greatest interest. Estimates of the success rate, and the one-sided 90%
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confidence interval (i.e., 90% probability that the reliability is above this value)
taken after the break point, and over the full launch history, are shown in Table 5-1
for the three large U.S. ELVs. In addition, Table 5-1 contains reliability estimates for
Ariane, Long March, and the Soviet Zenit. However, for these vehicles the launch
histories are so short that they do not demonstrate a discernable break-point. As a
result, estimates are made only over the full launch history (see Appendix A for
derivation).
Another method for estimating reliability focuses on the launch vehicle
subsystems rather than the entire vehicle and is the only method for estimating
the reliability of a new vehicle which has not been launched. For each subsystem
reliability estimates are made for each of the many individual parts or sub-
assemblies. These estimates are based on the observation of failure modes in tests
and any launches of previous vehicles which used that technology. For a
completely new technology, the estimate can only be based on any tests that may
TABLE 5-1
Reliability Estimates of Large ELVs Based on Historical Data
United States
(From Break-Point)
Success Minimum Reliability
ELV Launches Failures Rate at 90% Confidence
Atlas/Centaur 34 2 94.1% 85.4%
Delta 79 3 96.2% 91.7%
Titan III/34D 67 3 95.5% 90.3%
(Full Launch History)
Atlas/Centaur 67 7 89.6% 83.2%
Delta 142 9 93.7% 90.3%
Titan III/34D 143 10 93.0% 89.4%
Foreign
(Full Launch History)
Ariane 32 4 87.5% 77.7%
Long March 21 2 90.5% 78.4%
Zenit 11 1 91.7% 70.6%
have been run on it, or in many cases simply on an engineers best guess based on
experience with similar technology. Once the reliability of the subsystem parts
have been estimated, the reliability of the entire subsystem can be determined, and
then ultimately an estimate for the overall launch vehicle reliability.
Launch vehicle manufacturers often estimate reliability by subsystem. For
existing ELVs with long launch histories this method may very well be the most
comprehensive because it incorporates knowledge from tests, and knowledge from
previous launches where similar subsystems or parts were used. Of course, such
estimates are now considered proprietary because they have a direct impact on the
company's competitiveness. While this method may yield fairly accurate results for
launch vehicles with long launch histories, for completely new launch vehicles
which use new technology such estimates are prone to large errors because
extensive testing is very expensive, and therefore the estimates are usually made
from a limited, or non-existent, test sample.
So what can be said about the reliability of current U.S. ELVs with long launch
histories? While the exact reliability of launch vehicles can not be determined
with certainty, statistically for any given launch history the failure rate
represents the most likely actual reliability. And based on the historical data
shown in Table 5-1 there is high confidence that the reliabilities of the large U.S.
ELVs are higher than their foreign competitors, especially when the early launch
history during which learning occurred is removed from the estimate.
Improving Launch Vehicle Reliability
Failures can occur as the result of a poor design, the poor quality of parts or
fabrication, improper management decisions or an act of God. The Challenger
accident is an excellent example of both poor design and improper management
which led to launch failure. The lightning which struck a recent Atlas/Centaur
launch is an example of an act of God, and parts which are not made to specification
have caused failures in launch systems. Technological improvements do not hold
much promise for reducing failures caused by God or managers. However, design
and quality both can be improved with better technology.
As previously mentioned, over the years large launch vehicles have
experienced significantly improved success rates. The higher failure rate
experienced in earlier years resulted primarily from poor design. As greater
knowledge of the launch system was obtained through additional launches, designs
were improved. The newer launch vehicles being offered by small
entrepreneurial firms will inevitably undergo a similar learning experience. For
these vehicles most failures will likely result from design flaws, and improvements
in reliability will come primarily from eliminating those flaws. Finding these
design problems will require subsystem tests and actual launches.
For the large ELVs, the majority of design problems have already been
resolved. As a result, most failures occur as the result of faulty parts or
fabrication.4 2 For example, the most recent Titan failure resulted from improper
wiring and the most recent Ariane failure from a forgotten cloth in a water pipe.43
The likelihood of a failure from faulty parts or fabrication can be reduced in two
different ways. First, parts and subsystems can be tested more thoroughly before
the launch to control quality. Technology can aid in quality control by developing
more efficient and effective means for testing components. Second, parts can be
manufactured and fabricated with greater consistency and accuracy. This can be
done by requiring tighter design specifications. In addition, automation may be
able to produce more exact and consistent work quality than a hand made part.
When it comes to the failure of a launch vehicle not all sub-systems are
created equal. The propulsion system accounts for the vast majority of launch
failures because this system has the most mechanical parts, the most moving parts,
and experiences temperature and pressure extremes.44  In addition, the rocket
engines which will actually propel the ELV cannot be put through a test run
because they weaken and in many cases destroy themselves in the process. The
complexity of the propulsion system leads directly to decreased reliability. An
excellent example of this is the up to ten times greater reliability demonstrated by
relatively simple solid rocket engines as opposed to more complex liquid engines.4 5
This suggests another means for improving the reliability of existing ELVs -- by
decreasing, through simpler designs, the number of parts which can fail.
Thus, for newer launch vehicles improvements in reliability will result
primarily from better understanding of the launch system which will be obtained
from additional launches. Launch vehicles with proven designs could improve
reliability through greater and more effective quality control, tighter design
specifications, simpler designs, and possibly through the use of automation.
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Interestingly, the latter two methods were also identified in section 5.1 as key
means for reducing launch costs.
The Value of Improved Reliabhility
After the Challenger accident, reliability became quite a catch word. But
whether reliability can improve the competitiveness of the CLI depends both on the
cost to the company of the improvement, and on the benefits it obtains. The cost of
improving reliability is extremely difficult to gauge, and cost estimates vary
enormously.4 6  In general however, the cost of improved reliability increases
rapidly at extremely high reliabilities as more testing, and higher quality parts
become necessary.47  The benefit from improvements in reliability would be a
decrease in the likelihood of failures and their associated cost. In theory an
optimum reliability should exist above which the cost of reliability improvements
exceed the benefits. But due to the high variability of cost estimates, and the fact
that launch vehicle reliabilities can not be determined with certainty, attempting
to explicitly identify this optimum would likely lead to improper conclusions for a
government policy. However, some very important factors associated with the costs
and benefits of improved reliability can be identified without relying on highly
uncertain cost models.
Influencing Insurers and Customers
In order for improved reliability to enhance the competitiveness of a launch
vehicle, customers and insurers must be convinced that an improvement has
occurred. The reliability estimate used by customers and insurers comes not from
the estimates made by launch company engineers, but from demonstrated successes
of the launch vehicle. 48 For those launch vehicles with few or no demonstrated
successes, such as the new small ELVs being offered in the U.S., obtaining
insurance at any reasonable rate can be difficult. This reliance on demonstrated
success results from the large asymmetry of information which exists -- launch
companies know much more about their ELVs, and thus are able to apply both
46See for example, Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 27. and Martin
Marietta STAS, X88-10254.
47Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 27.
48
"Insurance Risk Sharing, and Incentives", Doherty, Explorations in Space Policy, Resources of
the Future & The National Academy of Engineering, 1987, p. 88.
82
historical and subsystem information to more accurately estimate reliability,
whereas insurers and customers do not have this option. 49  Therefore, for improved
reliability to lead to reductions in insurance premiums, or to effect the decisions of
customers, the launch company will have to demonstrate the improvement through
successful launches.
For launch vehicles with long launch histories demonstrating improvements
in already high reliabilities can take a long time. For example, one could imagine
the difficulty in demonstrating a 99% reliability (1 failure out of 100 launches) in
any reasonable amount of time at current launch rates of about 10 per year. Figure
5-6 shows hypothetical improvements in estimated reliability for the Delta ELV for
a best case scenario of a string of successes. Each increase in estimated reliability
takes more successes to demonstrate than the one before it. A two percent increase
in the 90% confidence minimum reliability would take over 30 consecutive
successes, or three years at present launch rates. To demonstrate a two percent
increase in failure rate would take over 80 consecutive successes or eight years at
present launch rates. If even one failure occurred the estimated reliability would
decrease significantly, and the earlier this failure occurred the greater its impact
491nsurance Risk Sharing, and Incentives", Doherty, Explorations in Space Policy, Resources of
the Future & The National Academy of Engineering, 1987, p. 88.
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would be. It could be reasonably argued that after several years of successes the
previous launch history would be given less weight in the estimate. While this
would increase the estimated failure rate, it could cause a decrease in the 90%
confidence minimum reliability.
In addition to the drawback of having to demonstrate reliability to insurers,
the estimated reliability is not the only, nor the predominate, factor in determining
insurance premiums. For example, General Electric recently obtained identical
insurance rates (16.5%) for two upcoming launches of identical satellites one of
which will be launched on Ariane and the other on Delta, even though the Delta
has demonstrated significantly higher reliability. 5o Similarly, Hughes obtained
identical rates for upcoming launches of similar satellites on Ariane and Atlas
vehicles, and Eutelsat which will be launching a satellite on each of these ELVs also
obtained the same insurance rate for both launches."5  Insurance is a commodity,
and as such, market forces play the dominant role in determining insurance
rates. s2  When the insurance market is "soft" more capacity exists to insure than
demand for insurance, and as a result rates drop. When a "hard" market exists
there is an under capacity of insurance and premiums will increase. After the
large insurance claims of 1984 and 1985, available capital for covering launch
insurance policies became scarce, dropping from a high of $300 million to $80
million. s3  This hard market caused rates to soar by as much as 600%,54 even though
the statistical reliability estimates of the ELVs which failed changed by only a small
amount. One might speculate that the decrease in available capital was due to
increased fears of insurance investors, but the enormous drop in capital could not
be justified simply on the basis of reliability estimates. It was pure chance that
those launch failures occurred so close to one another. If they would have been
more evenly spread over time (say some earlier, some later) then insurance rates
would not have soared so dramatically.
Thus, for launch vehicles which have demonstrated high reliabilities, such as
the large U.S. ELVs, a significant amount time will be necessary to demonstrate
improvements to insurers and customers through successful launches. This delays
5 0
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Brokers, 10/26.
53"A Report on Spacecraft Insurance", Johnson & Higgins, 1987, p. 7.
54A Report on Spacecraft Insurance", Johnson & Higgins, 1987, p. 7.
the potential benefit to the launch company from improving reliability. In
addition, market forces are the predominant factor controlling insurance rates for
ELVs with demonstrated high reliabilities, so improving reliability may only have a
small impact on insurance rates. Finally, as was shown earlier, the large U.S. ELVs
have demonstrated higher reliabilities than any of their competitors. All of these
factors will tend to decrease the value to the launch company of improving
reliability for commercial payloads.
Disparate Government and Commercial Needs
The theoretically optimum reliability of a launch vehicle would depend
heavily on the value of the launch. The higher the value of the launch the greater
the cost of failure and the more willing one would be to spend money in an attempt
to increase reliability. The monetary value of an individual launch includes the
launch cost, payload cost, and for a commercial satellite, the expected sales
revenues. The cost of commercial satellites range from about $35 million to $95
million, and launch services run from about $50 million to $65 million. If the
payload was lost, it might take from two to absolutely no more than four years to
rebuild and launch a new satellite. In this case the cost of the delay in sales
revenue could run from $15 to $40 million (assuming 15% discounting). 55 Thus the
total cost of a typical commercial launch failure would range from about $100
million (35+50+15) to $200 million (95+65+40).
For many government payloads the total cost of a launch failure would be
similar to costs for a commercial payloads. For example, the Air Force's twenty one
Global Positioning satellites cost about $65 million each. However, the value of some
government launches can be much greater than typical commercial launches. For
instance, a typical photoreconnaissance satellite and Titan IV launch can cost well
over $1 billion. In addition, some government payloads are one of a kind, or
essential to a particular mission which may be important for the public welfare,
the value of which can not be easily quantified. Such "critical" government
payloads demand higher reliabilities than commercial payloads.
In an effort to achieve the highest reliability possible for critical payloads the
government requires stringent quality control and tight specifications which
incur additional costs. Since the same production lines are used for commercial and
55"Scheduling Commercial Launch Operations at National Ranges", Department of
Transportation, OCST, 5/89, p. 45.
government launches, all launch vehicles are subject to these additional costs. 56
Yet, for commercial payloads these additional costs may not be worthwhile. Because
of the government oversight required to ensure the highest reliability possible for
critical payloads, commercial launch companies are extremely limited in their
ability to select the procedures or technologies which they believe would lead to the
optimum reliability for commercial customers. 57 The Office of Technology
Assessment noted that "Excessive Government oversight and reporting
requirements generally develop incrementally as a response to real problems of
quality control, a concern for safety, and the desire to complete high cost projects
successfully. Over time these small increments of personnel or paper build to the
point that they impede efficient operations, limit contractor flexibility, and add
unnecessary costs. " s  From government's point of view such requirements are
essential to ensure the highest reliabilities for critical payloads. From a
commercial point of view their cost may not justify the increased reliability they
might bring.
Small ELVs
A very different situation exists for the new entrepreneurial launch
companies which have very limited or non-existent launch histories. First, the
government and government financed payloads which presently represent all of
the demand for their vehicles are not critical, in fact they are generally very
inexpensive scientific payloads (see section 2.5). Therefore, since government is
the only real customer, and the government payloads do not require the highest
reliabilities possible, no conflict in desired reliability exists. Possibly as a direct
result of this, the government has not carried out extensive oversight of most small
launch vehicles obtained recently. However, these launch vehicles do not have
demonstrated high reliability. Nor do these companies generally have the
resources to self insure without risking the company's existence. One failure
without insurance could be the end of the company as demonstrated by the demise
of the American Rocket Company which exited the launch business after its launch
failure. The lack of demonstrated success poses these companies with a dilemma.
56
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They need successful launches to demonstrate reliability, and demonstrated
reliability to make insurance available to them.
Conclusions
For the large ELVs with long launch histories, improvements in reliability
could be achieved through greater quality control, tighter specification, more
effective testing, automation, and simpler designs. However, improvements will
only be worthwhile if the benefits exceeds the cost. Unfortunately, estimates of the
cost to improve reliability are extremely uncertain so that attempting to identify an
optimum reliability and technologies for achieving that reliability would very
likely lead to improper conclusions for government policy.
What can be said with certainty is that the large U.S. ELVs have demonstrated
higher reliabilities than their competitors. Also, any improvement in already
high reliabilities for the large ELVs will take a long time to demonstrate to
customers and insurers, delaying the benefit from any improvement. And even if
improvements are made, they may have only a small impact on the insurance
premiums paid by the company. Finally, a disparity exists between the extremely
high reliability required for critical government payloads and the reliabilities
required for commercial payloads. In order to achieve the highest possible
reliability for critical payloads the government requires stringent quality control
and tight design specifications which affect the cost of all launch vehicles. Due to
this oversight, launch companies are extremely limited in their ability to select the
procedures or technologies which they believe would lead to the optimum
reliability for commercial launches.
The newer ELVs being offered by small launch companies do not experience
the disparity in reliability requirements which large ELVs do because relatively
inexpensive government and government financed experimental payloads
presently represent the only demand. For these ELVs improvements in reliability
will come primarily through additional launches which allow them to find and
correct design flaws. In addition, because these ELVs have extremely limited
launch histories, they need successful launches to demonstrate reliability to
insurers in order to make insurance available to them.
5.3 LAUNCH DELAYS
Probably nowhere does the adage "time is money" ring more true than in the
space industry. For the large U.S. ELVs, launch delays are both commonplace and
costly. But while technology may be able to enhance competitiveness by reducing
delays it is not a silver bullet capable of achieving the job alone. This section
explores the cause of launch delays, and the key factors associated with reducing
delays through technological development. Once again a disparity is found
between government and commercial needs.
For all ELVs essentially two types of launch delays occur. First are those
caused by pre-launch anomalies in the ELV or payload and then there are delays
caused by the suspension of launches after a launch failure. Because very
different situations exist for the large ELVs, and the smaller launch vehicles being
offered by new entrepreneurial companies, the latter will be discussed separately
at the end of the chapter.
Pre-Launch Anomalies of Large ELVs -- Regular Irregularities
Calling pre-launch complications "anomalies" is almost a misnomer because
they are common occurrences. Anomalies result from complications in payload
integration, or pre-launch test failures which require corrective action. 59  Large
ELVs experience an average delay of 5 to 10 days from pre-launch anomalies on
every launch.6 0 These delays can be very costly to the launch company. As the
launch approaches, the number of people dedicated to launch operations increases
dramatically. During a delay this entire "standing army" must be paid at a cost of
about $10,000 to $15,000 per hour of delay. So a typical five to ten day delay can cost
between about $1 and $4 million.6 1
Ideally an economic analysis of various alternative technologies for reducing
the delays from pre-launch anomalies would be performed in an effort to steer
government policy. But as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, models
estimating the economic returns from proposed technologies have proven to be
extremely poor. This is especially true with respect to launch operations where the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) noted that much of the data needed to build
and verify such models has yet to be gathered. OTA found existing cost models
59Scheduling Commercial Launch Operations at National Ranges, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, 5/89, p. 15.60"Compiled Launch Slip Data", Lt. Col. Jerry Johnson, ETR.
61Personal Communication, Mike Holguin, General Dynamics, 11/90.
"grossly inadequate in estimating [launch] operations costs".6 2  The Space
Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) looked at many different technologies for
enhancing present launch operations. (See section 5.1 for a complete discussion of
STAS) However, bearing out the concerns of OTA, the estimated rate of return
which might be obtained from investments in various technologies varied
significantly between the different contractors performing studies.63  More
importantly, the order in which these technologies were ranked also varied,
making them extremely suspect. Thus, once again, it would be imprudent to attempt
to explicitly quantify the potential economic benefits associated with different
technology options. However, some important factors associated with efforts to
reduce delays from pre-launch anomalies with improvements in technology can be
identified without relying on such cost models.
A Complex Process Reauiring Available Technologies
One might think that after thirty years of space launches integrating the
payload to the launch vehicle would be old hat. Regrettably todays ELVs suffer
from the legacy left by their birth as missiles which were not originally designed
to be easily integrated to payloads, or to be easily serviced. The operability, or ease
by which routine assembly and testing is performed, of today's ELVs is extremely
poor. As a result, assembling, testing, and servicing todays ELVs is complicated and
time consuming. For example, a Titan ELV will spend an average of 5 to 9 months at
the launch site, and 8 to 9 weeks actually on the launch pad.6  The complexity of
launch operations leads directly to increased likelihood of pre-launch anomalies
and the associated delays.
The technologies which have been explored for improving operability
included simplified designs, improved information systems, and increased use of
automation. 65  In other words, the same general groups of technologies identified
for reducing launch cost in section 5.1. Because launch vehicles and their ground
facilities are highly interdependent and integrated, many efforts to improve
operability will require coordinated improvements to both launch facilities and
62Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 79.
63Martin Marietta, General Dynamics, and Air Force, Space Transportation Architecture
Studies.
64Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 35.
65Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88
launch vehicles.66  However, improvements will not, in general, require extremely
advanced technologies. Rather, just like the technologies identified in section 5.1,
many of the technologies under consideration for improving operability already
exist today or are under development.67
Disparate Government and Commercial Needs
An inherent conflict exists between the desire to obtain extremely high
reliabilities and the desire to increase the efficiency of launch operations.
Striving for extremely high reliabilities requires greater pre-launch tests and
tighter standards which inevitably leads to lengthier launch operations, and added
delays caused by the need to correct the additional anomalies discovered. As
discussed in section 5.2, the government has much greater incentive than
commercial companies to ensure the highest reliability possible because some of its
payloads are extremely expensive or one of a kind. As a result, the government
places enormous emphasis on pre-launch testing and quality control. When
launch failures occur, the response of government has often been to further
increase pre-launch requirements. The value of such increases depends directly
on the perceived value of higher reliability. For example, after a Titan launch
failure of 1985, the Air Force initiated new pre-launch non-destructive testing of
Titan solid rocket motors which added time a cost to launch operations. Use of these
tests revealed a number of minor imperfections in Titan solid rocket motors, which
were corrected. Air Force personnel would likely claim that the added cost of the
tests was justified to ensure mission success. However, the anomalies were so small
that company engineers doubted they would have caused a launch failure,6 8
making one wonder whether a company launching much less expensive
commercial payloads, and desiring to launch on time to save money, would find the
tests worthwhile.
For commercial launches, the launch company does have greater flexibility
over choosing the pre-launch testing and quality control procedures it will use.
For instance, Martin Marietta could elect not to test its Titan solid motors so
stringently for commercial launches. However, the selection of new technologies
for improving operability will be highly influenced by the value of achieving
6Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 6.
67Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 4.
68Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 27.
extremely high reliabilities. While the government found it necessary to invest in
the new test equipment for the Titan solid motors, Martin Marietta may have chose
instead to develop a technology to improve efficiency. The value of reliability will
drive many of the decisions made about technologies for improving operability,
including such items as the amount of built in test equipment desired, the need for
fault tolerance, and the desirability of automating various operations procedures.
If the selection of technologies for improving operability is driven by government
needs, the resulting improvements may not be the most beneficial for improving
the competitiveness of the CLI because government will place a higher value on
reliability and a corresponding lower value on operational efficiency, than a
commercial company likely would.
The Problems of Common Facilities Operating Near Capacity
Every scheduled commercial launch of a large ELV will take place at the Air
Force's Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESMC) in Florida, where launch facilities
exist for the Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles. These facilities are also used for
government launches of these ELVs. Each launch vehicle uses separate and unique
integration facilities and launch pads. However, certain resources such as tracking
and some communications are common not only to all the launch facilities at ESMC,
but also to neighboring Kennedy Space Center where the Shuttle is launched. After
the launch of any vehicle, these common resources must be reconfigured before
launch of a different vehicle can occur.
At present launch rates, all ESMC launch facilities operate very near capacity
leaving little buffer between launches for potential delays.69 As a result, ESMC
launch facilities almost operate on a "one slip all slip" basis whereby the delay of
one launch vehicle can cause delays for vehicles on other pads waiting to use the
facilities common to all of ESMC. 70 For example, the delay of the Space Shuttle
launch of the Hubble Space Telescope also caused a three day delay for an awaiting
commercial Delta launch at ESMC.71  Thus, the limitations of present launch
facilities common to all vehicles can cause delays from pre-launch anomalies of
one vehicle to affect other vehicles awaiting launch.
69Scheduling Commercial Launch Operations at National Ranges, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, 5/89, p. iv. and "Launch Options for the Future", OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 20.
70Personal Communication, Mike Vanscoy, McDonnell Douglas, 1/30/90.
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"Hubble Holds up Delta-2 Launch", Space News, 4/9/90, p. 2.
Post-Launch Stand Downs of Large ELVs -- The Policy of Delay
After a launch failure a suspension of launch activity for the vehicle which
failed routinely occurs. The suspension after a failure, called the "stand down"
period, is created by a decision to determine the cause of failure, and correct the
problem, before proceeding with other launches. Stand downs from ELV launch
failures have historically averaged from four to five months." With launch
facilities for large ELVs operating near capacity, a stand down inevitably causes
delays for upcoming launches. Such delays can cost launch companies millions of
dollars. For example, Arianespace estimates that its recent one month stand down
will cost the company between $35 and $53 million.73 Delays from stand downs can
also be extremely expensive for commercial satellite owners. A launch delay
postpones the revenues that will be earned from sales of the satellites services, and
a one month delay can reduce the value of that revenue stream by as much as $1 to
$2 million. 74  In addition, if the communications satellite is already constructed it
must be stored and maintained during the delay which can cost about $100,000 to
$200,000 per month.7 5
Technology has an extremely limited ability to reduce down time after launch
failures. Quite simply, standing down after a launch failure represents a policy
choice. For example, while the U.S. government has chosen to implement stand
downs, the Soviets generally continue with launches as scheduled after a failure
occurs. 76  The decision to implement stand downs is based on the perceived value of
reliability. Because the U.S. government periodically launches one of a kind and
expensive payloads it places an extremely high value on reliability and requires
stand downs to ensure higher reliability for future launches. Commercial launch
companies attempting to compete in the market place will inevitably have a greater
incentive to reduce stand down time than the government. Not only is the value of
reliability lower for commercial payloads (see section 5.2), but the company must
consider the impact delay costs will have on itself and customers.
The problem is that even with the creation of a commercial launch industry,
launch companies will likely have little control over the decision to have a stand
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"Space Launch Systems Resiliency", Bernstein, Aerospace Corporation, P. 8-10.
"7Ariane Accident Cause Found", Space News, 4/6/90, p. 44.
74Scheduling Commercial Launch Operations at National Ranges, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, 5/89, p. 15.
75Personal Communication, Bill Tosney, Aerospace Corporation, 1/30/90.
76Launch Options for the Future, OTA-ISC-383, 7/88, p. 23.
down, or government involvement in the ensuing investigation. For commercial
launch failures which do not threaten the safety of third parties, no legal
requirement exists for government involvement in an investigation, and even
when statutes mandate a government investigation, no legal requirement exists for
a stand down period." However, since the government places such high value on
reliability, it will continue to desire the resolution of any problem which causes a
launch failure before proceeding with scheduled government launches of the same
vehicle. 7 s  In addition, to ensure that the problem is properly taken care of,
government will very likely continue to be involved in failure investigations. For
example, after an accident with a crane that damaged an Indian satellite being
prepared for a commercial Delta launch, an investigation was carried out by
McDonnell Douglas, India, and the Air Force.79  Government involvement in launch
vehicle investigations will inevitably restrict the ability of the company to hasten
investigations if for no other reason than more people and agencies will be
involved. In addition, since both commercial and government launches use the
same launch facilities, any postponement of government launches will inevitably
cause delays for upcoming commercial launches. Therefore, even though a launch
company may not wish to stand down after a launch failure, and even though they
are not required by law to do so, it is reasonable to expect that the government will
require, and be involved in, investigations of launch failures causing similar
downtimes as experienced in the past.
Although improvements in technology can not significantly reduce the
length of a stand down, the existence of stand downs has a direct impact on the need
for improvements in launch facilities. A stand down creates a backlog of payloads
awaiting launch. If no capability exists to launch at a higher rate (called a "surge
rate") in order to clear this backlog, then every satellite awaiting launch will
experience a delay equal to the stand down time. A surge after a stand down allows
the backlog of payloads to be cleared so that satellites further back on the manifest
will experience less delay, or no delay at all. For example, after its recent failure
and one month stand down, Arianespace plans to increase its launch rate from nine
77Personal Communication, Eric Gabler, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, 1/23/90.
78Personal Communication, Mike Vanscoy, McDonnell Douglas, 1/30/90.
79"U.S. Reenters Commercial Launch Arena With Private Delta Mission", AW&ST, 9/4/89, p. 25.
to twelve per year (the maximum capability of its facilities). Arianespace estimates
this will clear its backlog within 18 months. s0
To get an idea of the sensitivity of launch delays after a launch failure to surge
capability, a dynamic model was built simulating the flow of launches, creation of a
backlog after a failure, and the clearing of this backlog with a surge rate (see
Appendix B). It should be stressed that this type of model differs significantly from
the cost models which have proven to be so inaccurate. This model does not require
the establishment of cost trends which may be incorrect, or educated guesses about
unknown factors. The model simply simulates the flow of launches and tallies the
time each payload will be delayed after a failure. In addition, the objective of this
model is not to explicitly quantify the value of improved surge capability because
even if the value of improvements could be found accurately, it is not clear that the
cost of such improvements could be accurately estimated. Rather, the objective is to
demonstrate how the existence of stand downs after launch failures can drive the
need for improved launch capability.
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Figure 5-7 shows how, in general, the total delay experienced will vary with
different launch rate capabilities and down times at a launch rate of 10 per year
(approximately that experienced by the Delta ELVs). The total delay is just the some
of the delays experienced by each satellite awaiting launch. One might be hesitant
to believe the graph at first because it appears that the total delay would proceed to
infinity if no surge capability existed and obviously this would be unrealistic
because it would mean that delays occurred even for payloads which are not yet
planned. In actuality the total delay will reach a maximum value equal to the total
delay experienced by all satellites currently awaiting launch. However, this
maximum will be very high. For example, typical launch manifests cover the next
18 to 24 months. With stand downs of 13 weeks, a nominal launch rate of 10 per
year, and no surge capability the total delay experienced by the next 18 months of
the scheduled manifest would be 195 satellite-weeks (10 satellites per year X 1.5
years X 13 weeks delay for each satellite). This is higher than any data shown on
the graph for 13 week stand downs.
Two important features are demonstrated by the graph. First, the impact of
surge capability on delays depends highly on the downtime, and is limited by the
length of stand downs in its ability to reduce delays. In other words, no matter how
great the surge capability, a delay will be experienced by those spacecraft
manifested to launch during the stand down. Second, if virtually no surge
capability exists, initial increases will result in significant reductions in the total
delay experienced by payloads awaiting launch. Thus, with ESMC operating near
capacity even a small increase in launch capability could significantly reduce the
delays that will be experienced by satellites awaiting launch assuming stand downs
will continue to run about four to five months. Increased launch capability could
be brought about by simple expansion of facilities, or by increasing operational
efficiency (as discussed in the previous section) reducing the amount of time
required for each launch. Significantly reducing or eliminating the stand down
time would reduce or negate the need for increased launch capability.
Small ELVs
The small commercial ELVs are launched out of DOD facilities in New Mexico
and California. Unlike ESMR these facilities are not overwhelmed with launches,
and launches are sparsely scheduled. As a result, delays generally only effect the
vehicle at hand. Pre-launch anomalies of the small ELVs currently being offered
commercially predominantly arise from the fact that they are new devices.
Unfamiliarity with the vehicle, and design "bugs" cause pre-launch anomalies and
payload integration complications. Such problems will remain common events
until these vehicles become well-tested and proven. In the near term, reduction of
launch delays for small ELVs will be obtained almost exclusively through further
launches which increase knowledge of the vehicle.
Conclusions
The technologies for reducing launch delays fall in the same general category
as those for reducing launch costs: simplified designs, information systems, and
automation. Many of the technologies which have been explored for making
improvements to launch facilities already exist. Because launch vehicles and their
facilities are so integrated and interdependent, most improvements in operations
will require changes in the vehicle as well as facilities. Selection of the
technologies which might be most advantageous for improving launch operations
will be strongly influenced by the value placed on reliability. Because the
government places extremely high value on reliability, the technologies it would
select may not be the most advantageous for increasing the competitiveness of the
CLI.
The length of stand downs after launch failures can have a significant impact
on the delay experienced by satellites awaiting launch. Continued government
involvement in launch failure investigations, and postponement of government
launches after such a failure, will cause lengthy delays from stand downs to
continue for commercial launches. The need to increase the capacity of the ESMC
launch facilities is directly linked to the length of stand downs. At present launch
rates and stand down lengths of four to five months, even a small increase in
launch rate capability could significantly reduce the delay experienced after a
stand down by allowing for an increased rate of launch. In addition, if increased
capacity included improvements to launch facilities common to all vehicles it could
aide in the prevention of "one slip all slip" delays caused by pre-launch anomalies
on other launch pads.
Finally, launch delays for small ELVs usually only effect the vehicle at hand
since launches are sparsely scheduled, and the delays which do occur result
primarily from inexperience with the vehicle.
5.4 SUMMARY
Reducing the specific launch cost of current ELVs will require efforts to
reduce the labor intensiveness of manufacturing and launch operations. The key
technologies for achieving this have application deeply rooted in the
manufacturing and launch operations process. These technologies generally fall
into the categories of improved information systems, automation, and simplified
designs, and many of the technologies which have been explored for reducing
labor costs do not require extensive R&D because they are already available or
under development. Efforts to improve performance through advanced
technologies such as, higher efficiency rocket engines, or advanced lightweight
materials will need to be coupled with efforts to prevent the increase in labor cost
which usually accompanies their use. Also, simply increasing payload capability
may not lead to reductions in specific launch cost at current levels of demand, and
even if it did, it may not increase the competitiveness of the launch industry if it
requires commercial satellites to be launched together with other payloads.
Improvements in the reliability of the lar.g ELVs could be achieved through
greater quality control, tighter specifications, more effective testing, automation,
and simpler designs. However, it is not clear that the added cost of efforts to
improve reliability would be justified for commercial payloads. The large U.S. ELVs
have demonstrated higher reliabilities than their foreign competitors, and for any
improvement to have an impact on competitiveness it must be demonstrated to
insurers and customers which can take a long time. In addition, even if
improvements are made, they may have only a small impact on the insurance
premiums paid by the company because premiums are controlled primarily by
market forces.
Regardless of the level of reliability which might be considered optimum for
commercial launches, a disparity exists between the extremely high reliabilities
required for critical government payloads, and the reliabilities required for
commercial launches. In order to achieve the highest possible reliability for
critical payloads, the government requires stringent quality control and tight
design specifications which affect the cost of all launch vehicles. In addition, the
government oversight to ensure specifications are met limits the ability of launch
companies to select the procedures or technologies which they believe would be
most efficient and lead to the optimal reliability for commercial launches.
The technologies for reducing launch delays fall in the same general
category as those for reducing launch costs, and many of the technologies which
have been explored for making improvements to launch facilities already exist.
Because launch vehicles and their facilities are so integrated and interdependent,
most improvements in operations will require changes in the vehicle as well as
facilities. However, the selection of technologies most advantageous for improving
launch operations will be strongly influenced by the value placed on reliability.
Because the government places extremely high value on reliability, the
technologies it would select may not be the most advantageous for increasing the
competitiveness of the CLI. The extremely high value placed on reliability by the
government will also lead to the continuation of stand downs after launch failures,
and government involvement in the ensuing investigation. This will inhibit the
ability of companies to shorten or eliminate stand downs which lead to costly
launch delays. The need to increase the capacity of the ESMC launch facilities is
directly linked to the length of stand downs. At present launch rates and stand
down lengths of four to five months, even a small increase in launch rate
capability could significantly reduce the delay experienced after a stand down by
allowing for an increased rate of launch. In addition, if increased capacity
included improvements to launch facilities common to all vehicles it could aide in
the prevention of "one slip all slip" delays caused by pre-launch anomalies on
other launch pads.
Thus, for the La.rg launch vehicles enhancing competitiveness through
technological development does not, in general, require extremely advanced or
leading edge technologies. Rather, it requires technologies which can improve the
efficiency and quality of manufacturing and launch operations. Also, important
disparities exist between government and commercial needs from large launch
vehicles centering around the extremely high value placed on reliability by the
government to ensure successful launch of critical payloads. These disparities lead
to government procedures which inhibit the selection of technologies and
procedures which would lead to the most efficient and competitive commercial
launch vehicles.
For the small launch vehicles being offered commercially to the government,
such a disparity does not exist because government represents the only customer.
These companies are competing among one another for small government and
government financed payloads which are generally inexpensive and often
experimental. For these vehicles, increased competitiveness is almost synonymous
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with increased successful launch attempts. These vehicles need launches to
demonstrate reliability, improve efficiency, and decrease costs through economies
of scale.
6.0 ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS WITH
NEW LAUNCH VEHICLES
Being the most colorful type of technological development for the launch
industry, proposals for entirely new launch vehicles generally receive much
public attention. Many different designs have been proposed and touted as the
best launch vehicles for the future. The two vehicles which have been talked
about most often are the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) and the Advanced
Launch System (ALS). Even within these two programs a plethora of designs have
been proposed, often with engineers arguing about the most effective way to
reduce costs. Estimates of the development costs for these launch systems vary
enormously. For example, R&D cost estimates for NASP have ranged from $3
billion to over $17 billion with operations cost estimates ranging from a tenth to a
hundredth of present ELV launch costs.' Development cost estimates for ALS have
ranged from $3 billion to $10 billion.
It would be foolish to believe that in the space of one chapter the
innumerable arguments about the best design for, and ability of, new launch
vehicles to reduce launch costs could be resolved. Rather than attempting to do so,
this chapter addresses two questions which are very important for developing a
government policy to enhance the competitiveness of the CLI. First, could private
companies economically develop a new large launch vehicle on their own which
would be more cost-effective than todays large launch vehicles? Second, what are
the main factors which drive the most economical design of any new launch
vehicle?
6.1 THE ECONOMICS OF LAUNCH DEMAND
If the cost of R&D were ignored then it seems likely that a properly designed
new launch system of some kind could reduce launch costs. After all, the three
large ELVs used in the U.S. today were originally designed as missiles, and thus
were not optimized as launch vehicles. When claims are made about the potential
of a new launch system to reduce launch cost they usually refer only to the
reduction in incremental cost (i.e., the cost of a launch or flight) and ignore sunk
R&D and overhead costs. But incremental costs are only a portion of the picture.
1
"The Aerospace Plane: Technological Feasibility and Policy Implications", Korthals-Altes,
MIT-PSTIS, report #15, 7/86.
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Whether government or industry invests in a new launch vehicle, the sunk cost of
R&D and overhead must be amortized over ensuing launches to determine the
vehicle's economic viability.
When industry invests in any project it expects to obtain a return on its
investment. The rate of return required to make a project feasible varies from
company to company, however the return rate is almost never below the cost of
capital, and in general the higher the perceived risk of the project the higher the
rate of return required.2 With the present cost of capital hovering around 10% it
seems reasonable that a company investing in a new launch system would expect
to get at least 15%, and in fact due to the risk involved they would probably require
more. Investment in a new launch vehicle would be recovered by the launch
company as an annuity in the form of profit on each launch of the vehicle during
the year. The charge per kilogram of payload required to obtain a 15% return on
the investment will therefore be highly dependent on the the amount of payload
launched into orbit by the new vehicle each year. The greater the amount placed
into orbit annually, the lower the profit required on each kilogram of payload to
obtain the return on investment.
Figure 6-1 shows the profit per kilogram necessary to recover various levels
of investment at a 15% rate of return for different annual launch rates as a
fraction of the presently available Titan III specific launch cost. The figure
assumes that the lifetime of the new launch vehicle will be 20 years, and that no
further investments will be necessary. Presently the large U.S. launch companies
each place the equivalent of 20,000 to 40,000 kg into LEO annually.3 For a $3 billion
investment (the lowest predictions for NASP and ALS) and 40,000 kg per year, the
company would need to make a profit on each kilogram greater than the price
available today! To make that profit the company would also have to charge for the
incremental cost of the launch including the cost of operations and in the case of
an expendable, the cost of producing the vehicle itself. Clearly even if a new
launch vehicle cost only $3 billion to develop, at present launch rates it would not
be economical for a company to individually invest in one.
Some argue that reduced incremental costs would allow a company to charge
less in expectation of vastly increased launch demand. If a company reduced its
launch price significantly, it makes sense that launch demand for the company
2Essentials of Engineering Economics, Riggs & West, McGrawHill, 1986, p.126.
3Compiled from company manifests.
" $1B
* $3B
a $5B
* $1OB
x $15B
Recovery of Sunk Investment
In a New Launch Vehicle
(15% Return over 20 Years)
200
E =
175
es
0 0 150
> D 125
o.
S 100
so0
0e 75
eo o
25
o 0
0.~Cfl 0
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
Annual Payload (kg to LEO)
FIGURE 6-1
would increase as some commercial projects became economically viable and as
the company obtained a greater market share. However, it must be remembered
that presently well over 60% of launch demand comes from the government.
While government demand for launches might increase very slightly with
reduced cost, increases in government space programs are driven primarily by
politics and policy, not economics. Thus, even if present commercial demand were
to double, total demand would only increase by 40%. Even if an individual
company expects to double its total launch rate in the future to 80,000 kg to LEO
annually, on a $3 billion investment it would have to make a profit on each
kilogram launched equal to 75% of current launch costs. If a company could
captured all present launch demand (120,000 kg per year to LEO), a $3 billion
investment would require a profit on each kilogram launched equivalent to about
50% of presently available launch prices. This means that even if the new launch
vehicle could reduce incremental costs by 50%, the company would have to charge
prices comparable to today's to make a modest 15% return on investment. With
higher (and thus more realistic) return rates and sunk costs a new launch vehicle
becomes even more uneconomical for an individual company.
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What if government covers R&D expenses? It would seem then that the
company would only have to incur the incremental costs associated with the
vehicle. However, many of the launch vehicles being explored today would be
partially or fully reusable. Depending on the arrangements made by the
government these vehicles may require the company to purchase the reusable
parts and amortize their cost over ensuing launches. The cost of these parts could
be enormous. OTA estimates that the reusable portions of ALS might cost $1.7
billion. This large sunk cost would lead to significant increases in the projected
launch costs, which only include incremental costs. At present launch rates even
a $1 billion dollar investment in reusable parts (or in development of a new
vehicle for that matter) would result in an amortization cost approaching present
specific costs. Even at double present launch rates, the profit required on each
kilogram of payload for a $1 billion investment would be over 25% of present
launch cost. That profit alone would be three times the projected incremental cost
of ALS. Thus, even if government pays the R&D cost of a new launch system, if the
new vehicle requires large investment in reusable parts by the private company
incremental launch costs may not be reduced significantly.
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In addition to the initial costs of R&D and reusable parts, there would
inevitably be expenditures required to correct problems which develop in early
launches. For that matter, any new vehicle will require numerous test launches
adding more cost, and making them more uneconomical for private development.
For a commercial launch vehicle, reliability would have to be demonstrated to
customers and insurers (see section 5.2). This would take many successful
launches especially if extremely high reliabilities are being strived for. Figure 6-
2 shows the confidence that a launch vehicle's reliability is at least the predicted
reliability after a string of successful launches (see Appendix A for derivation).
Demonstrating a 95% reliability to 90% confidence would take a over 40
consecutive successful launches. To obtain just a 50% confidence in a 99%
reliability would take over 65 consecutive successes. One failure and the
confidence in the predicted reliability would decrease significantly.
Between the cost of development, the cost of any reusable parts, the cost of
launches for testing the vehicle, and the need to demonstrate reliability to
customers and insurers, a new launch vehicle would not be economical for private
companies to develop at present or even significantly increased launch rates
without considerable government funding.
6.2 DESIGNING TO SUIT DEMAND
It may seem almost trivial to say that the most economical design of any new
launch vehicle will be driven by the number and type of payloads to be launched
on it each year. But this is a very important point which is sometimes overlooked
in formulating policies about future launch vehicles. Since government will
represent the vast majority of launch demand for the foreseeable future (see
section 2.5), government's planned use of a vehicle will drive the design. If a new
expendable launch vehicle were to be built then certainly many of the lessons
from the previous chapter, such as simple designs to reduce labor costs, could be
applied to its design. However, the most economical selection of the major design
choices such as degree of reusability, payload capability, and reliability, will
depend on the expected use of the vehicle.
Degree of Reusability
The previous section demonstrated very clearly that higher launch rates are
required to make larger up front costs economical. This also holds true for
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government investments although they are usually evaluated at much lower
discount rates. In general, the greater the reusability of any new launch vehicle
the higher the R&D costs will be. In addition, reusable vehicles will require large
initial investments in reusable parts. Ideally, a reusable vehicle will have lower
incremental costs than an expendable. Thus, depending on the expected launch
rate, there will be a trade-off between vehicles with high sunk R&D and capital
costs, but low increment costs, and those with lower sunk cost but higher
incremental cost. Selection of the most economical vehicle will depend highly on
the future launch rates expected for the vehicle as shown graphically in Figure 6-3.
At lower launch rates it would be more economical to select a vehicle with lower up
front costs (i.e., more expendability), while at higher launch rates vehicles with
lower incremental cost (i.e., more reusability) would be more cost-effective.
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Another important factor which would influence the degree of reusability
desired would be the need to return payloads to Earth. If humans are to be
launched on the new vehicle then some portion of it must come safely back to
earth. This part does not have to be reusable per se (take Apollo for example), but
the need to have a returnable portion of the vehicle will influence the economy of
having some reusability.
Payload Capability
The expected demand for any new launch vehicle will also effect the desired
payload capability. In section 5.1 it was noted that at current launch rates and
commercial payload sizes, a vehicle significantly larger than todays largest ELVs
would probably not be cost-effective for commercial use. However, if launch
demand were expected to increase significantly (for example as a result of SDI
deployment) then larger launch vehicles would become more cost-effective in
terms of dollars per kilogram to orbit. Also, the type of payloads to be launched,
and the destination must be considered. If a new vehicle was going to be used to
launch larger payloads, or send them further (for example to Mars), then greater
payload capabilities would be required.
Reliability
Attempting to achieve higher reliabilities will inevitably incur added costs as
redundant systems, tighter design specifications, and greater quality control are
required (see section 5.2). The level of reliability desired from any new vehicle
will be driven by the value of payloads to be launched, and the value of the vehicle
itself if it is reusable. For example, a vehicle with reusable parts costing billions
of dollars which will be used to launch astronauts would justify greater
development and incremental expenditures to achieve high reliability than an
expendable launching inexpensive payloads.
6.3 SUMMARY
Development of a new large launch vehicle will likely require a significant
investment on the order of billions of dollars. At present or even significantly
increased launch rates, billion dollar investments by private launch companies in
development, or purchase of billion dollar reusable portions of a new launch
vehicle would not be economical. Thus, the ability of future launch vehicles to
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enhance industry competitiveness will depend directly on government funding of
such vehicles.
The selection of the most cost-effective design for a new launch vehicle will
depend highly on the type and number of payloads to be launched on it. Since the
government will account for the vast majority of launch demand for some time to
come (see section 2.5), expected government use of any new vehicle will be the
driving factor in the most cost-effective design for future launch systems.
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7.0 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The government can play many different roles in the development of
technology. Efforts to improve technology can be very direct such as through
funding of a specific R&D project, or indirect such as by providing incentives for
private innovation. For the launch industry, government can influence the
development of technology in four broad ways: as developer of technology, as a
customer for launch vehicles, as a catalyst to private innovation, and by providing
infrastructure. Coupling the lessons of the previous chapters with the realities of
government operation these roles are evaluated to formulate appropriate and
feasible government actions for developing, or influencing the development, of
technology to enhance the competitiveness of the CLI.
7.1 GOVERNMENT AS DEVELOPER
The government plays the role of developer when it selects specific
technologies for development, manages the necessary R&D, and funds the project.
When developing technologies sometimes the government will perform the R&D
itself, but often it contracts the work out to a private company. Throughout the
years leading up to the creation of the CLI, the government acted as developer of all
launch vehicle technology. When the government needed a bigger or better
launch vehicle it set the requirements, managed, and funded the project. The
launch vehicles being used today by the large commercial launch companies are
the direct result of those improvements.
In general, the government has been very effective at developing
technologies for its own use. But government needs are fulfilled primarily
through technical success rather than cost-effectiveness or commercial viability.
For example, the Apollo program achieved success by placing a man on the moon,
and defense projects are successful if the equipment operates to specification. On
occasion the technologies developed for government use have resulted in
technologies useful to the private sector. For example, the early computer, jet
engine, and launch vehicles all resulted from government programs with
technical goals aimed at fulfilling national security needs. However, while
government was instrumental in the development of these technologies, the
commercial applications were unexpected side benefits ("spinoffs") and not the
impetus for the programs which created them. The concept of a commercial launch
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industry did not even reach the political agenda until twenty-five years after the
development of launch vehicle technology. The question of this thesis is whether
the government should develop technologies specifically for enhancing the
competitiveness of the CLI. So, it must be asked how effective government has been
in directed development of technologies for commercial use.
Historically the government has been extremely poor at selecting and
developing commercially viable or cost-effective technologies. For example, in the
1960's the federal government funded a program to develop a strictly commercial
supersonic aircraft in order to maintain U.S. dominance of the world aircraft
market. Yet, American aircraft manufacturers were dubious about the commercial
viability of such a vehicle and translated this into an unwillingness to share in the
costs of the program. This, coupled with rapidly increasing cost estimates, led to the
cancellation of the project after the government sunk $700 million into it.' The
British and French governments then proceeded to develop a supersonic aircraft
(the Concorde) which has proven to be a commercial failure. A more recent
example of government's inability to target and develop commercially viable
technologies is the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS)
program. 2  This satellite has been touted as essential for keeping American
preeminence in the communications satellite industry. Yet, now that it is
approaching completion, the government can't find any commercial companies
interested in performing experiments using its capabilities.3  The Space Shuttle,
although not intended for commercial operation, stands as an excellent example of
the government's ineffectiveness at developing cost-effective technologies since
the Shuttle has never come close to meeting its targeted launch cost goals. These
examples are far from unique, and studies which have explored government
support of R&D have consistently found government poor at selecting and then
developing commercially viable or cost-effective technologies.4
1
"The Government's Role in the Commercialization of New Technologies: Lessons for Space
Policy", Rose, Economics and Technology in U.S. Space Policy Symposium, 6/86, p. 106.
2For an in depth discussion of the ACTs program see "Misreading History: Governments
Intervention in the Development of Commercial Communications Satellites", Cunniffe, MIT
Thesis, 6/90.
3
"NASA Having Trouble Finding Users for ACTS", Space News, 3/12/90, p. 7.
4See "Industrial Innovation Policy: Lessons from American History", Nelson and Langlois,
Science, Vol. 219, pp. 814-818. and "The Government's Role in the Commercialization of New
Technologies: Lessons for Space Policy", Rose, Economics and Technology in U.S. Space Policy
Symposium, 6/86, pp. 97-126.
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Why is the government so poor at developing commercial technologies? In
part because government does not inherently possess knowledge of the needs that
commercial customers and suppliers have. Unlike procurement related technology
development where the government knows its needs, for commercially viable
technologies the government must evaluate the needs of customers and suppliers.
While the government scientists and engineers who manage or carry out the
projects are good at identifying what may be technically feasible, they often lack
the expertise to evaluate the cost-effectiveness or market potential of technologies
for commercial use. s  As a result they tend to focus on what is technically possible,
rather than what is profitable, forgetting that one does not necessarily guarantee
the other. Meanwhile, Members of Congress and heads of government agencies
react more to political than market forces. As a result they are attracted to
technical achievements where success is relatively easy to gauge and very visible
to the public. The visibility of technical successes can in turn generate more
attention and needed political support. The need for political support can also lead a
program to take on a broader role than strictly enhancing competitiveness in order
to bring in a greater constituency. These additional goals create additional
technical requirements which can interfere with the commercial viability of the
technology. 6
In retrospect then it should not be surprising that the Civilian Space
Technology Initiative (CSTI) and the proposed Advanced Launch Technology
Program (ALTP) focus on leading edge technology demonstrations, nor that these
programs have objectives broader than maintaining the competitiveness of the CLI
(i.e., developing systems for manned missions to Mars, or SDI). Both programs focus
on developing large high performance engines which may not be the most cost-
effective for the CLI (see section 5.1). Likewise, NASP has national security and
national prestige goals which will inevitably conflict with its putative role as a
commercial launch vehicle. For example, present designs call for NASP to be
manned. This will require additional systems that are unnecessary for placing
payloads into orbit which will add weight and cost to the vehicle. All of these
efforts merely follow in the footsteps of previous government technology
development programs by striving for leading edge technology and assuming
SUsing Federal R&D To Promote Commercial Innovation, Congressional Budget Office, 4/88, p.
40.
6High Technology Policies: A Five Nation Comparison. Nelson, American Enterprise Institute,
1984, p. 72.
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multiple roles to build constituencies. Unfortunately this approach rarely leads to
development of the technologies most needed for enhancing industry
competitiveness.
Often the impetus for government technology development programs,
especially those which are space related, comes from the threat of a foreign
country developing the technology first and the fear that this will place the U.S. at
a competitive disadvantage in the future. National technology development
programs aimed at improving competitiveness seem to proceed from an implicit
assumption that leading the world in advanced technology at the R&D stage
guarantees operational and commercial success.7  Not only does such an assumption
further focus the objective of any government program on technical rather than
commercial success, but it has usually proven to be incorrect.
Being first to demonstrate a technology, even when commercially viable, does
not guarantee commercial success,8 Integrated circuits, VCRs, and televisions are
just a few examples of products developed in the U.S. and now manufactured almost
exclusively by foreign companies. The companies which dominate these markets
have done so primarily through incremental improvements in quality and price.
The same is true in the launch industry where the company which dominates the
commercial launch market, Arianespace, is the newest to the launch scene. Yet, the
Ariane launch vehicles do not have extraordinarily efficient engines, extremely
light weight materials, or any other break away technology. Rather, Ariane was
designed using the base of technology created in the 1960s by the U.S. government
and Arianespace has focused its attention on reducing the cost of constructing and
launching Ariane. 9  While revolutionary development may instigate a new product,
continued commercial success requires being at the forefront of evolutionary
improvements in quality and price.10
The detailed evaluation of Chapter 5.0 demonstrated that the key technologies
for improving the competitiveness of existing launch systems are not the
extremely large high performance engines of ALTP, nor the esoteric technologies
being explored in CSTI for NASA's manned missions (see section 2.6). Rather, the
7
"Government Policy: Technology Demonstration or Service Delivery?", Brooks, Technology in
Society, vol. 11, 1989, p. 49.
sSee "Government Policy: Technology Demonstration or Service Delivery?", Brooks, Technology
in Society, Vol 11, 1989.
9Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 85.
10See "The Technological Factor in U.S. Competitiveness", Brooks, JFK School of Government,
Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Discussion Paper 89-03.
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key technologies are those which increase the quality and efficiency of
manufacturing and launch operations -- such as improved automation, information
systems, and simplified designs. Some of the technologies in these areas which
might be most beneficial to the CLI already exist in other industries and do not
require significant technical breakthroughs (see section 5.1). Thus. if the
government wishes to develop technologies which would be most beneficial to
improving the competitiveness of current launch systems it will have to focus on
cost-effective technologies deeply rooted in the commercial process of
manufacturing and operating launch vehicles rather than leading edge
technologies -- something government has been poor at doing in the past.
Similarly, one must be skeptical about the ability of government to develop a
completely new cost-effective launch vehicle specifically aimed at enhancing the
competitiveness of the CLI. Such a launch vehicle will inevitably require attention
to manufacturing and operational efficiency if it is to be cost-effective. But even
aside from this, the primary driver of the economic viability of any new launch
system will be the type and number of payloads to be launched each year (see
section 6.2). Any new government developed vehicle will inevitably be designed to
fulfill government needs. To the extent that government needs match commercial
needs, a new government developed launch vehicle might aide the competitiveness
of the CLI. But as has been shown, government requirements often differ
significantly from commercial needs especially in terms of payload capability and
reliability. In addition, any government program to develop a new launch vehicle
will be expensive requiring it to take on multiple roles to build a constituency.
Many of these roles, such as manned capability, or a vehicle for a voyage to Mars,
will inevitably be disparate from commercial needs. As a result. even if the
government could successfully develop a cost-effective launch vehicle for
government payloads. it probably would not be of a design which is optimum for
commercial use.
Finally, the most reasonable economic rational for direct government support
of technological development to enhance the competitiveness of the CLI are the
expenditures foreign governments are making on launch vehicle technology, and
even this justification is debatable (see section 4.3). As previously discussed in
Chapter 4.0, even if one accepts this rationale at some point the economic benefit
from increased domestic launch contracts would be outweighed by the cost of
technology development regardless of the level of expenditures by other nations on
launch vehicle technology. If national security or national prestige were
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reasonable justifications for government expenditures to increase the
competitiveness of the CLI, then expenditures beyond the economic benefit might
be justified. But the only reasonable motivations identified in Chapter 3.0 for
taking steps to enhance the competitiveness of the CLI are economic. Because
government technology development programs tend to take on multiple roles, and
to focus on leading edge technologies and technical success, they are prone to be
very costly and to experience cost overruns. Therefore, a government development
program would be apt to call for spending that may be beyond the value any
technology produced will render to the economy in increased launch contracts. In
addition, government technology development programs were identified as a key
barrier to private development of launch vehicle technologies. The more the
government invests in launch vehicle technology development, the less private
industry will invest. This detracts from cost savings the government might obtain
from private expenditures on innovation in the CLI (see section 3.3). Thus. a
government technology development program specifically aimed at enhancing the
competitiveness of the CLI would likely reduce or eliminate the economic benefit to
the national economy and to the government from a competitive CLI.
7.2 GOVERNMENT AS CUSTOMER
Government is not your normal customer, especially in the launch industry.
The government has and will continue to represent the majority of the demand for
the launch industry (see section 2.5). Without this demand, launch companies
would be hard pressed to continue commercial service. Since the role of
government as customer differs for small and large ELVs, each will be discussed
separately below.
Lar.g ELVs
The substantial government demand for Large ELVs is not all a bed of roses.
Government needs often differ considerably from commercial customers. The
procedures used by government to meet these needs can interfere with the ability
of, and incentive for, launch companies to develop and implement new
technologies (see section 4.1). This drives the technology of launch vehicles away
from what might be commercially optimal and increases cost. Certainly
government should attempt to mitigate the negative impact it has on the launch
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industry as a customer, but at the same time, as the primary user of launch
vehicles, the government must ensure that its needs are met.
Government places an extremely high value on reliability to ensure successful
launches for critical government payloads (high cost or one of a kind and essential
to the public welfare). This quest for extremely high reliabilities causes the
government (primarily the Air Force and NASA) to require very tight design
specifications and quality control for large ELVs which add to the production and
operations cost of the launch vehicle. Because all launch vehicles are built on the
same assembly lines using interchangeable parts, all vehicles, including those used
for commercial launches, must meet the strict government requirements. Yet, the
added costs may not always justify the potential improvements in reliability for
commercial payloads (see section 5.2). And in any event, companies are restricted
in their ability to select the most cost-effective technologies and procedures to
obtain reliable vehicles.
Government's desire for high reliabilities also leads to government
investigations of launch failures which require resolution of the problem before
continuation of launches. Such stand downs cause lengthy launch delays costing
the launch companies and their customers millions of dollars in expenses and lost
revenues (see section 5.3). Government involvement in such investigations
inevitably adds inefficiencies that increases their length. In addition, companies
do not have the freedom to make the decision about whether a stand down is
necessary after a launch failure.
The restrictions and added costs imposed by government procurement of
launch vehicles, coupled with the low incentive launch companies often have to
reduce costs on government procured vehicles (see section 4.1) have led many to
call for government purchase of commercial launch services without production
oversight, and with limited oversight of operations. But such a move is fraught
with problems. The logic generally presented argues that commercial purchases
would remove the barriers of oversight and provide economic incentive for
companies to reduce cost. While this is true, the argument fails to remember that
one of the primary reasons for such an action should be to increase industry
competitiveness not to pad the pockets of launch companies. Imagine a launch
company faced with this purchasing situation. If the company develops a
technology which reduces cost, the only incentive to translate the savings into
reduced price comes from the potential for increased customers. The problem lies
in the inelasticity of government demand. In other words a change in price will
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result in little increase in government demand. Ideally the company would like to
charge a lower price to commercial customers to obtain more sales while
maintaining a high price to government. Would the government accept such a
differential price? Certainly not. The government would demand fair prices and
would establish its definition of fair by examining the prices paid by the few
commercial customers. This means that any effort to increase sales to commercial
customers would result in significant reductions in profit on government contracts
which represent the majority of the company's demand. As a result the company
would maintain higher prices inhibiting its competitiveness.
In addition to the problem of providing incentive for launch companies to
reduce price, launching critical government payloads commercially makes no
more sense than launching commercial payloads on vehicles required to strive for
extremely high reliabilities. The government must ensure that launch vehicles
used for critical payloads achieve the highest reliability possible. Thus. while
procurement of commercial launch services by the government would increase the
incentive for private industry to invest in technology development, any cost
reductions would result primarily in increased profits for launch companies
rather than increased competitiveness. and would result in the launches of critical
government payloads without oversight needed to ensure high reliability.
Is there a way out of this quagmire? There are several actions which could
help alleviate the problem. First, the government could launch all critical payloads
on NASA's Space Shuttle or the Air Force's Titan IV (which is not being sold
commercially). While non-critical government payloads could be launched on the
ELVs which are being offered commercially. Explicitly defining a "critical"
payload would be a somewhat tricky matter. Congress could mandate a payload cost
above which any payload would be launched on Shuttle or Titan IV. A reasonable
value might be any payload valued above $200 or $300 million, but such a move
would not be flawless. Some payloads have importance to the nation beyond their
explicit cost, and gauging this value would not be easy. So it might make sense to
designate an official to make such a determination, or who can overrule the
established regulations in exceptional cases. The exact method would require
careful study and would inevitably be subject to political compromises, but
regardless of the exact method such a system is certainly feasible. In addition, it
would probably be easier to achieve than strictly commercial purchases because
the Air Force would retain its coveted role as launch provider (see section 3.3) with
Titan IV. Since most critical payloads are already being launched on Shuttle or
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Titan IV, such a move would only effect a few payloads each year leaving the bulk
of government demand for the commercial launch companies. For example, in 1989
two to three payloads launched on commercially available vehicles might have
been classified as critical. 1"
Non-critical government payloads would not require extremely high
reliabilities, so the government could reasonably reduce or even eliminate its
stringent oversight of specifications and quality control. This would allow
companies to select procedures and technologies that are more in line with the
needs of commercial customers. In addition, the government could allow companies
to individually manage and carry out reviews of any launch failures which did not
endanger public safety, thereby giving them the freedom to determine whether
such an investigation is even warranted, and removing the inefficiencies incurred
by government involvement.
However, one of the reasons government carries out oversight of launch
vehicles is because launch companies have little incentive to ensure successful
launches of government payloads. For commercial payloads the launch company's
incentive to have a successful launch lies in the potential for future commercial
launch contracts. However, it would be unlikely that the government would turn to
foreign launch providers to obtain launches for its non-critical government
payloads. Thus, to provide sufficient incentive for the companies to ensure
successful launches of government payloads, bonuses could be awarded to launch
companies for each successful launch. Such a measure is not unprecedented in
government contracting arrangements and has even been used by the Air Force in
its recent Medium Launch Vehicle (Delta II) contract.
Using Titan IV for critical government payloads is not a perfect solution
because the commercial Titan III's are built on the same assembly lines and use
many of the same launch facilities. As a result the Titan III's would be subjected to
much of the oversight required for the Titan IV's to ensure high reliability for
critical government payloads. Ideally all critical government payloads would be
flown on the Shuttle because, as a manned vehicle, it will likely be the most reliable
launch vehicle available. However, the Shuttle is unlikely to be able to launch all
critical government payloads, especially if the Space Station is built. Also, the
Challenger accident taught an important lesson about placing all faith in a single
launch system. A complimentary heavy lift launch vehicle such as Titan IV is
"Space Log, TRW, 1989.
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essential for assuring access to space for critical government payloads. Thus, the
Titan IV would also be needed to meet government launch demand for critical
payloads. While this is not a perfect solution, the Titan III has the lowest
commercial launch demand of the three big U.S. companies, and there is some
indication that Martin Marietta may in fact decide to withdraw from the commercial
market.' 2 Thus. the government could eliminate much of the negative impact it has
as a customer on the commercial launch industry. and ensure the highest
reliabilities for critical government payloads by launching critical payloads
exclusively on the Shuttle and Titan IV. coupled with significantly reduced
production and operations oversight of other ELVs.
What remains is the complex problem of providing incentives for launch
companies to not only reduce cost, but also to translate this into reduced price. As
previously mentioned, this cannot be achieved simply by government purchases of
commercial launch services. Somehow the government must provide incentives
for the company to reduce prices to commercial customers. One simplistic solution
would be to allow the launch companies to charge a greater price to government
users, effectively freeing them to compete for commercial payloads at lower prices.
While this might make rational sense it is in essence an indirect subsidy of launch
prices, and as such would raise an uproar from Arianespace, which combined with
Congress' general distaste for outright subsidies, makes it an improbable solution.
In reality. solving the dilemma of providing incentive for the CLI to reduce both
cost and price will require very innovative purchasing arrangements. With the
labyrinthine complexities of government procurement practices any solution will
require detailed study. Suggesting specific action here is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
SmalL & LVs
For the new launch companies offering small launch vehicles the
government represents the only real customer, without whom the companies would
cease to exist (the few other entities which have contracted for these vehicles all
receive government support for their projects, see section 2.5). Thus, at present
there is no "competitiveness" to be effected by government purchases because no
truly commercial customers exist. But as the sole user, the method by which
12
"Energizing the Space Launch Industry", Berkowitz, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter
1989-90, p. 78. and Space News, "Future Clouded for Commercial Titan", 3/26/90, p. 4.
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government purchases these launch vehicles can create an environment which
promotes innovation. Not only could this save the government money, but on the
off chance that commercial customers do surface the industry will be better
prepared to serve them. Creating such an environment represents much less of a
dilemma than with large launch vehicles for two simple reasons. First, the
government presently uses these launch vehicles for inexpensive experimental
payloads which are by no means critical. Second, several launch companies
currently offer launch services with very similar capabilities. Thus. the
government can competitively procure small launch vehicles on the basis of price
and quality without extensive oversight allowing the competition for government
contracts to drive improvements in technology which increase quality and
decrease cost. In fact. this is exactly what the government is presently doing.' 3
7.3 GOVERNMENT AS CATALYST
One of the more traditional roles for government in technological
development has been to create an environment which promotes private
innovation. This has been done through patents, tax laws, regulations, and more
recently joint ventures. There are innumerable actions which the government
might take to spawn greater private innovation in all industries, such as tax reform
or actions to lower the cost of capital. But the germane question here is whether
the government should take action specifically to increase private innovation in
the CLI.
Since government is such a poor developer of the technologies which would
be most beneficial to the CLI, private innovation will be very important for
enhancing the competitiveness of the industry. To increase private innovation in
the CLI, government efforts should focus on removing the barriers to private
development which are unique to the industry. Recalling the conclusions of
Chapter 4.0, two primary barriers were identified to private development of
technology in the launch industry. The first was government itself through its
role as developer and customer which have been previously discussed. In a nut
shell, to reduce the barrier government presents to private development of launch
vehicle technology, it must refrain from funding technologies which industry
might develop alone, and must purchase launch vehicles in such a way as to
provide incentive for companies to reduce costs. The other barrier identified was
13See "U.S. Government Ready to Place Orders for Small Launchers", Space News, 3/12/90,p. 8.
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the segmentation of the large U.S. ELV industry which divides relatively low launch
demand among several companies and prevents significant competition among
these companies which might drive innovation. It should be stressed that this
barrier is unique to the large ELV industry, and that the small ELVs being offered
privately compete for government contracts which appears to be driving private
innovation. The division of launch demand among the large ELV providers reduces
the benefit an individual company might receive from an innovation, deterring
private investment. Without increasing launch demand the only way to reduce this
barrier is by lowering the cost to individual companies of developing technologies.
One way in which government might take action specific to the launch
industry to reduce the effect of industry segmentation, would be to encourage the
formation of a consortium among launch companies. This would allow the
companies to share in the cost of technology development generic to all launch
vehicles. If government desired to reduce the cost of R&D to these companies even
more then it could jointly fund the consortium. The development of launch vehicle
technologies by a jointly funded consortium rather than directly through a
government development program has several advantageous. First, since the
companies would have a financial stake in such a consortium, they will have strong
interest in ensuring that the technologies developed are commercially viable.
Second, development of technologies by a consortium will ensure that the R&D
program is not forced to take on roles which conflict with developing commercially
viable technologies. Third, a consortium could increase private contributions to
technology development by making research expenditures viable which would not
be on an individual basis for the companies. The technologies developed from these
additional private expenditures could yield cost reductions for the government.
Unfortunately, many of the technologies identified in Chapter 5.0 for
improving the competitiveness of existing launch systems do not require extensive
R&D and would be unique for each launch system. As a result they would be of little
interest to a consortium of all launch companies. However, the analysis of Chapter
5.0 focused on broad groups of technologies and did not exhaustively explore the
R&D needed for specific individual technologies (to do so would take a lengthy study
of its own). It may be that there are enough common technology interests which
require some R&D to merit formation of a consortium. The only way to determine
with certainty if enough common technological interests exist among launch
companies to merit formation of a consortium would be to discuss the possibility
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with those companies. If enough interest exists. such a consortium could be very
beneficial to the launch industry and possibly even to the government.
Any effort to form such a consortium would only be effective if
government, as their primary customer, takes steps to purchase its launch vehicles
in such a way that provides incentive for the companies to reduce cost. Without
such steps the companies would be uninterested in investing significantly in any
new technologies. Also, simultaneous government development of technologies
specifically aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the CLI would eliminate the
incentive for companies to be involved in any consortium. Thus. for any
consortium to be successful. the government must refrain from developing similar
technologies on its own. and must purchase launch vehicles in such a way that
provides incentives for the launch companies to reduce cost.
One way to eliminate the problem presented by having several unique launch
vehicles with unique technology needs would be to develop a single new
commercial launch vehicle. If developed through a consortium of launch
companies, most of the problems associated with direct government development
could be mitigated. However, as discussed in Chapter 6.0, a new launch vehicle will
likely require such large investments that at current or launch rates even a
consortia of all U.S. launch companies probably would not find it economical to
invest in one. As a result, government would almost certainly have to jointly fund
the consortium to make development of a new launch vehicle viable. An enormous
amount of uncertainty exists about the economic costs and benefits of government
expenditures on a new commercial launch vehicle. The willingness of launch
companies to contribute to such a project would be a good measure of the need for a
new commercial ELV. Creation of a single launch consortium would, however,
eliminate even the small amount of competition which presently exists between the
large U.S. launch companies. Yet, such a consortium would not be monopolistic
because it would face extensive foreign competition. Thus. development of a new
launch vehicle through a Jointly funded consortium would prevent many of the
pitfalls experienced in government development of commercial technologies, and
industry's willingness to fund such a project could offer a means to gauge the need
for such a vehicle.
As was discussed in section 6.2, the level and type of demand drives the design
of any new launch vehicle, and since government will continue to represent the
majority of demand, the design of any new vehicle will be driven by government
use. If government developed a new launch vehicle on its own, the vehicle would
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inevitably be required to take on roles requiring a design disparate from what
would be commercially optimal (see section 7.1). For the development of a new
launch vehicle through a consortium to result in the most commercially
competitive design. the government could not plan to use it to fulfill roles which
are government unique and would require special design measures to accommodate.
such as manned missions or launches of critical payloads.
7.4 GOVERNMENT AS INFRASTRUCTURE
From roads, to airports, to launch facilities, the government has historically
provided essential infrastructure for transportation industries. But the current
situation with launch facilities differs significantly from those of roads or airports.
The primary users of airports and roads are the private sector, and the public. The
primary user of launch facilities is government itself. As a result, the upkeep of,
and improvements to, launch facilities are driven primarily by government, not
commercial needs.'14  For small ELVs where launches are relatively sparse and
government represents the only customer, this does not present a significant
problem. But the situation for large ELVs being launched commercially out of the
Eastern Space and Missile Center is very different.
The launch delays caused by inefficient government owned launch facilities
cost large commercial launch companies and their customers millions of dollars.
directly effecting the industry's competitiveness (see section 5.3). As a result,
commercial launch companies have considerable incentive to improve the
efficiency and capabilities of launch facilities. If government took steps to
purchase its vehicles in a manner which provided incentives for launch
companies to reduce costs, then the impetus for private improvements would be
even greater. Unfortunately, the necessity to keep in line with established
procedures and facilities used for launching government payloads constrains the
ability of companies to institute new technologies and practices. 15 This does not
mean that the rules and regulations which have been established are incorrect per
se. Rather, government and commercial needs are often not one in the same with
the government emphasizing extremely high reliability at the cost of operational
efficiency (see section 5.3). While some government launch operations procedures
14Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TMISC-28, 9/88, p. 8.
1sReducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 80.
1Reducing Launch Operations Costs, QTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 80.
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and facilities may be superfluous, many are in place to ensure the extremely high
reliability required for critical government payloads.
But even in those places where improvements in efficiency could be made
without sacrificing necessary reliability in the eyes of government, the ability of
government to manage and implement those changes is doubtful. Most of the
technologies needed to make such improvements already exist or are under
development. In addition, many improvements in launch operations will require
coordinated improvements to both facilities and launch vehicles because of the
highly interdependent nature of launch operations. For the most part,
improvements in efficiency will be brought about by cost-effective
implementation of existing technology. After the discussion of section 7.1., one
must be skeptical about the ability of government to effectively carry out such
improvements. Thus. unless the government changes the way in which it manages
the Eastern Space and Missile Center launch facilities used by commercial
companies. significant improvements in efficiency will be unlikely.
Certainly the government should attempt to mitigate the negative impact it has
on the CLI, but as the primary customer for launch vehicles it must also ensure that
its needs are met. Several alternative management structures have been suggested
for these launch facilities including turning management over to the private
sector and establishing a government launch operations division with sole
responsibility over the facilities. 1" But as long as the commercially available
launch vehicles are used to launch critical government payloads which require
extremely high reliability, government and commercial needs will be at odds
making it difficult to reasonably implement changes in the management structure
that might lead to improved efficiency. If the government were to take the steps
discussed in section 7.2, and launch critical payloads only on the Shuttle and Titan
IV, it would resolve this conflict for the Atlas and Delta ELVs. (Commercial Titan III
uses the same launch facilities as Titan IV). For those launch vehicles this would
open the door for reasonable consideration of the sweeping management changes
which have been suggested. However, after 30 years of managing the ESMC launch
facilities, the Air Force will not be quick to relinquish its role. Any drastic changes
will likely require an Executive Order or an act of Congress.
Changes in the management structure of the ESMC launch facilities which
allow launch companies greater freedom in selecting and implementing
16See Reducing Launch Operations Costs, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 9/88, p. 7.
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technologies and procedures would lead to improved competitiveness of the CLI.
Making the necessary changes, and at the same time ensuring that government
needs are met, will not be a simple matter, especially if the commercially available
ELVs continue to launch critical government payloads. Any specific
recommendation for changing the management structure will require detailed
study and is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, inaction would certainly
have a deleterious effect on the competitiveness of the CLI.
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Presently for the small launch vehicles being offered by several new
entrepreneurial companies, there is no "competitiveness" which might be
improved because government represents the only true customer. For these
launch vehicles improvements will come primarily through the learning obtained
from additional launches. Thus, the greatest way government can improve these
vehicles is simply by being a customer for them. As the sole purchaser of these
privately offered launch vehicles, government can create an environment which
promotes innovation. Not only could this save the government money, but on the
off chance that commercial customers do surface, the industry will be better
prepared to serve them.
For large launch vehicles the interdependence between launch companies
and national defense and space programs often clouds discussions about the need
to enhance the competitiveness of the Commercial Launch Industry. A vigorous
Commercial Launch Industry is neither needed, nor is it necessarily the best
means, for ensuring national security or promoting national prestige. In fact, the
technical and procedural needs of the Commercial Launch Industry are often at
odds with those of government programs. Even if launch companies ceased to
offer commercial launch services, the government could continue to procure
launch vehicles as needed just as has been done in the past. The only reasonable
motivations for government action to enhance the competitiveness of the
Commercial Launch Industry are economic -- the potential for increased domestic
launches, and the possibility of cost savings for the government.
Under most circumstances a commercial industry would be left to operate
without directed government intervention to enhance its competitiveness,
allowing the free market to drive innovation and improvements. But the launch
industry is quasi-commercial at best, and market flaws exist which prevent
efficient allocation of resources by the private sector. However, the primary flaws
do not lie in financial market failure, or appropriability of the results of R&D. The
Commercial Launch Industry experiences no more of a barrier to private
development in those areas than other industries. Rather, for large ELVs,
government itself represents a primary inhibitor of private development through
the methods it uses to purchase launch vehicles and the oversight it carries out of
their production. In addition, government funding of launch vehicle R&D deters
investment by providing a low risk alternative to private development. Another
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barrier to private development lies in the segmentation of the large launch
vehicle industry which divides already low demand among three companies. This
reduces the economic viability of private investment, but yields little of the
increased incentive for investment which would normally come from increased
competition because the large launch companies do not compete extensively with
one another.
Sometimes it is argued that the Commercial Launch Industry represents a
"strategic" industry important for the future economic well-being of the nation.
Even if one accepts the controversial notion of a strategic industry, the
Commercial Launch Industry is an unlikely candidate having spawned very few
other commercial industries or innovations. The government support received by
the industry's foreign competition may represent a reasonable economic rationale
for government support although economists debate this reasoning. However,
even if one accepts foreign government support as a rationale for domestic
government spending, a limit to expenditures exists beyond which the net
economic benefit to society from increased domestic launches would be eliminated.
Improving the competitiveness of existing large launch vehicles will require
the cost-effective application of technologies deeply rooted in the process of
manufacturing and launch operations which reduce labor intensiveness, many of
which do not require extensive R&D. While government has been generally good
at developing leading edge technologies, it has proven notoriously poor at
developing commercially viable or cost-effective technologies. This results
primarily because government lacks the knowledge of customers' and suppliers'
needs, and reacts more to politics than profit. This inevitably leads to programs
which focus on leading edge technologies, and take on roles broader than just
enhancing competitiveness. This would be especially true of an expensive
program to develop a completely new launch vehicle. These additional roles, and
the focus on leading edge technology, make government programs prone to being
costly and to experience cost overruns. The high costs in turn make government
development programs apt to exceed the amount which might be reasonably spent
to ensure a greater number of domestic launch contracts.
In addition, the needs of government payloads are often different from those
of the Commercial Launch Industry. These disparate needs lead government to
select different technologies and procedures than might be optimal for
commercial launches. For example, a new government developed launch vehicle
would inevitably take on many non-commercial roles (such as providing
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transportation to Mars, launching SDI, or high speed intercontinental
transportation) which would lead to a launch vehicle which was not commercially
optimum and may not be commercial viable. For existing launch vehicles,
government places an extremely high value on reliability, often without regard
for manufacturing or operational efficiency, because some of the payloads it
launches are extremely costly, one of a kind, or essential to national security.
Government's drive for the highest possible reliabilities leads to implementation
of new technologies and procedures, the delays and added costs of which, may not
be optimal for commercial launches. Because government is the primary
customer for large ELVs, and carries out extensive oversight of them, its drive for
the highest reliabilities restricts the ability of launch companies to select the
technologies and procedures which would be the most efficient for commercial
launches. This is particularly true at the launch facilities which are government
owned and managed.
Thus, a government technology development program would be unlikely to
be successful in introducing the technologies most needed to improve current
launch systems or in building a commercially viable and cost-effective new
launch vehicle. In addition, a government led effort would be apt to exceed the
value any technology produced would yield through additional domestic launch
contracts. And finally, a government development program would tend to
discourage private investment in launch vehicle technologies. Meanwhile,
although government demand is essential to the existence of the Commercial
Launch Industry, the methods used by government to meet its launch
requirements directly effects the competitiveness and the opportunity for
innovation in the Commercial Launch Industry.
Therefore. the greatest opportunities, and most appropriate actions. for
government to enhance the competitiveness of the Commercial Launch Industry
with improved technology lie. NOT in government development of technology, but
in government's role as customer for launch vehicles, catalyst of private
innovation, and provider of infrastructure,
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The government should NOT initiate a technology development program
snecifically to enhance the competitiveness of the Commercial Launch Industry.
Manufacturing and launching current ELVs is an extremely labor intensive
process. The key to improving the competitiveness of existing large launch
systems lies in cost-effective application of technologies which reduce labor costs.
Any effort to improve the competitiveness of existing launch systems through
advanced in materials,or rocket engines, will require close attention to
manufacturing and launch operations efficiency. In addition, many of the
technologies which might be most beneficial for reducing labor costs already exist
or do not require extensive R&D. Because government represents such a poor
developer of cost-effective or commercially viable technologies, and tends to focus
on leading edge technologies, a government development program would be
unlikely to develop the technologies most needed for enhancing competitiveness.
Any new commercial launch vehicle will also require attention to efficiency
in manufacturing and launch operations. In addition, any new government
developed launch vehicle will inevitably be designed to fulfill government needs
and will be required to take on multiple roles to build the necessary constituency
for political support. Government needs, and the additional roles beyond a
commercially viable launch vehicle, are often disparate with commercial needs
especially in terms of payload capability, reliability, and the need for manned
spaceflight. Thus, any new government developed launch vehicle would be
unlikely to be optimal for commercial use, and it may even be uneconomical as
with the Space Shuttle.
Finally, the only possible economic rationale for government expenditures is
the threat of foreign government support, and even this rationale is questionable.
Even accepting this rationale, it must be remembered that at some point the cost of
a technology development program would outweigh the economic benefits from
increased domestic launches. Because government development programs tend to
take on multiple roles and focus on leading edge technologies they are prone to be
costly and to cost overruns. Therefore, a government development program would
be apt to call for spending which may be beyond the value of domestic launches to
the nation.
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A procedure for identifying "critical" government payloads which will only be
launched on Titan IV or the Space Shuttle should be established. This should then
be coualed with significantly reduced oversight of the large ELVs being offered
commercially.
Many of the barriers that government presents to private development of launch
system technologies center around government's push for the highest attainable
reliability. Striving for such reliabilities makes sense with critical government
payloads which are extremely high cost, one of a kind, or essential to the public
welfare. But for those non-critical government payloads which are less expensive
or part of a constellation, striving for such reliabilities may not be worth the cost.
Commercial launch companies must balance the drive for manufacturing and
operational efficiency with the drive for high reliability. By removing critical
government payloads from the commercially available launch vehicles the
government could reasonably make significant reductions in the oversight of
launch vehicle manufacture and operations without sacrificing the reliability
needed of critical payloads. In addition, the government could allow commercial
launch companies to fully and independently manage launch vehicle failure
reviews except when the failure endangered public safety. This would enable
launch companies to implement the most efficient and effective technologies and
procedures for commercial payloads. Since most critical government payloads
already are launched on Titan IV or the Shuttle this would only effect a few
payloads each year leaving most government demand for the commercially
available launch vehicles. The exact method used to to designate critical payloads
will not be a simple matter and will inevitably require careful study. But such a
system could eliminate many of the conflicts of interest between the government
and commercial launch companies.
Innovative nurchasing arrangements for the commercially available large ELVs
should be established by the government which provide incentive for the
companies to reduce both cost and price.
If the government launches critical payloads only on Titan IV and the Space
Shuttle then it would be reasonable to purchase all commercially available large
launch vehicles with significantly reduced oversight. However, moving to
completely commercial purchases of launch services for government payloads
would not be the most effective in promoting competitiveness of government cost
reductions. Because government demand is very inelastic and represents the
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majority of launch vehicle demand, commercial launch companies will be inclined
to maintain high prices. Reducing prices to win more commercial contracts would
lead to lost profits on government payloads without a significant, if any, increase
in government demand. Thus, while procurement of commercial launch services
by the government would increase the incentive for private industry to invest in
technology development, any cost savings would result primarily in increased
profits for launch companies rather than increased competitiveness. Solving the
dilemma of providing incentive for commercial launch companies to reduce both
cost and price will require very innovative purchasing arrangements. Simply
moving to commercial purchases of launch services would not be adequate.
The government should purchase small ELVs competitively as needed to fulfill
government needs.
Government presently represents the only real customer for small ELVs, and thus
there is no "competitiveness" to be effected by government purchases. But as the
sole user government has the opportunity to create an environment which
promotes private innovation. This could lead to government cost savings, and on
the off chance that commercial customers do surface, the industry will be better
prepared to serve them. Several launch companies exist which offer small ELVs
with similar payload capabilities allowing government to competitively procure
these launch vehicles. This competition should continue to drive innovation, and
ensure that companies strive for successful launches of government payloads.
Since the payloads being launched on these vehicles are almost exclusively
inexpensive experiments, there should be no need for extensive government
oversight. The government has already begun to procure small ELVs
competitively, and should move to exclusive purchase of commercial launch
services once all previously procured small ELVs have been used.
The government should explore and expedite changes in the management of the
Eastern Space and Missile Center launch facilities which would provide greater
incentive and opportunity for commercial launch companies to implement new
technologies and Practices. while ensuring that government needs are met.
Inefficient launch operations cost commercial launch companies millions of
dollars in additional costs and delays. In addition to being antiquated, current
launch facilities and procedures are geared towards ensuring successful launches
of critical government payloads, emphasizing extremely high reliability at the
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cost of operational efficiency. The necessity of launch companies to stay within
established procedures and facilities used for launching government payloads
constrains their ability to institute new technologies and practices. Significant
improvements in efficiency are unlikely to be made by government because they
will come primarily from cost-effective implementation of technologies which do
not require extensive R&D. However, changes should not be made which
jeopardize the highest reliabilities possible for critical government payloads. If
steps are taken to launch critical payloads only on the Space Shuttle and Titan IV,
then this conflict of interest would be resolved for Atlas and Delta which are the
primary large commercial ELVs. This would make it possible to more easily
implement innovative management of the launch facilities for these vehicles
while meeting government needs. However, for Titan III (which uses the same
launch facilities as Titan IV), or if critical payloads continue to be launched on
Atlas and Delta, making management changes and ensuring that government
needs are met will be complex. Careful study will be required to determine
appropriate and feasible actions. But unless the government changes the way in
which it manages the Eastern Space and Missile Center launch facilities used by
commercial companies, significant improvements in efficiency will be unlikely.
The government should explore the interest of launch companies in forming a
consortium to research and develop new launch technologies.
The segmentation of launch capabilities in the large ELV industry divides
relatively low launch demand among several companies and prevents significant
competition among these companies which might drive innovation. A consortium
would allow these companies to share in the cost of R&D generic to all launch
vehicles allowing the companies to develop technologies which might otherwise
be uneconomical. Because many of the technologies needed for improving
current launch systems do not require extensive R&D or are unique to each launch
system there may not be enough interest in formation of a consortium. However,
if enough interest exists, a consortium could be very beneficial to the launch
industry. Because the companies would have a financial stake in any consortium,
the technologies developed would be more likely to be commercially viable than
those developed by government. In addition, the government could directly
benefit from the increased private expenditure which may yield cost reductions.
But for any consortium to be successful, the government must refrain from
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developing similar technologies on its own, and must purchase launch vehicles in
such a way that provides incentives for launch companies to reduce cost.
If the government desired to develop a completely new commercial launch
vehicle, a consortium could provide an avenue for avoiding many of the pitfalls
presented by direct government development of commercial technologies.
However, for the development of a new launch vehicle through a consortium to
result in the most commercial competitive design, the government could not plan
to use it to fulfill roles which are government unique and would require special
design measures to accommodate such as manned missions or launches of critical
payloads. The government would almost certainly have to jointly fund such an
effort to make it economically viable for a consortium, but the willingness of
companies to contribute to the effort would be a good measure of the need for a
new commercial launch vehicle.
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APPENDIX A
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Based on historical data, the reliability of a launch vehicle can not be specified
with certainty. However, given a set number of launches and failures it is possible
to determine the probability that a launch vehicle's reliability lies within a certain
range. This is referred to as a confidence interval. To calculate the confidence
intervals for launch vehicles from historical data a Bayesian approach was used.
The Bayes method formally combines the uncertainty associated with the estimation
of reliability with the inherent variability of when launch failures will occur.
With this approach the statistical information obtained from prior launch history
is incorporated systematically with new observations of launches.
Given any prior probability distribution f'(B) where B is the reliability, and a
set of observed launches, the new probability distribution can be found from':
f"(B)=kL(B)f'(B)
Where L(B) is the likelihood of observing the given combination of failures and
successes assuming that the reliability of the launch vehicle is 8. For a binomial
series of successes and failures the likelihood of observing any specific number of
failures given a number of launches and an assumed reliability can be found by:
L(B)=(:) (1-8])x (n-x)
where:
n=number of launches
x=number of failures
and,
(n) n!
x x!(n-x)!
IProbability Concepts in Engineering Planning and Design, Ang and Tang, John Wiley & Sons,
1975, p. 337.
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The variable k is a normalizing constant given by:
-1
k=[f L(o)'()dB]
which ensures that the area under the probability distribution integrates to one.
Thus, given a prior probability distribution and a set of observed launches,
L(B) and k can now be calculated followed by the new probability distribution
f"(B). Once the new probability distribution is found the confidence in any
reliability interval is just the area under the probability distribution between the
boundaries of the interval. Since we are interested only in lower bounds of the
reliability, the interval can be taken from a selected reliability to a perfect
reliability of one. Thus, the confidence that the reliability lies above some value,
say r, would be given by:
Confidence in Minimum Reliability of r = f"()dB
Since the reliability is to be estimated strictly from historical data, before the
first launch the reliability is completely unknown. Thus, there is equal probability
that the launch vehicle's reliability is any value. The probability density
distribution prior to any launches will therefore be flat between a reliability of
zero and one, and zero everywhere else (Figure A-i). The area under the curve
must be one so the prior probability density is constant at a value of one.
To carry out the confidence interval analysis for the various launch histories
a spread sheet was created which numerically integrated the normalizing constant
and the area under the probability density curve. An example of the output from
this spread sheet for the case of the Atlas launch history with 32 successful
launches and 2 failures is contained on the following pages. Also, figure A-2 shows
a plot of the probability distribution generated from the data.
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FIGURE A-2
Prob.dens.2.1
A B C D E F G H I J
1 Altas/Centaur Reliability Calculation From Break Point
2 Posterior Probability Density/No prior knowledge
3
4 Launches: 34
5 Successes 32
6 Normalizing Normalized Confidence Check Minimum
7 Probability Density Integration K Density Integration Should =1 Reliability Confidence
8 0.7 9.9398E-07 2.0685E-09 5.0905E-05 0.01952617 4.0635E-05 1 0.701 0.99995937
9 0.702 1.0745E-06 2.2357E-09 0.0211085 4.392E-05 0.703 0.99991545
10 0.704 1.1612E-06 2.4156E-09 0.02281107 4.7453E-05 0.705 0.99986799
11 0.706 1.2544E-06 2.6091E-09 0.02464236 5.1254E-05 0.707 0.99981674
12 0.708 1.3547E-06 2.817E-09 0.02661137 5.5339E-05 0.709 0.9997614
13 0.71 1.4624E-06 3.0405E-09 0.02872767 5.9729E-05 0.711 0.99970167
14 0.712 1.5781E-06 3.2806E-09 0.03100145 6.4445E-05 0.713 0.99963723
15 0.714 1.7025E-06 3.5384E-09 0.03344353 6.9509E-05 0.715 0.99956772
16 0.716 1.8359E-06 3.8151E-09 0.03606539 7.4945E-05 0.717 0.99949277
17 0.718 1.9792E-06 4.112E-09 0.03887923 8.0777E-05 0.719 0.99941199
18 0.72 2.1328E-06 4.4305E-09 0.04189799 8.7033E-05 0.721 0.99932496
19 0.722 2.2976E-06 4.7719E-09 0.04513538 9.3741E-05 0.723 0.99923122
20 0.724 2.4743E-06 5.1379E-09 0.04860596 0.00010093 0.725 0.99913029
21 0.726 2.6636E-06 5.5301E-09 0.05232512 0.00010863 0.727 0.99902165
22 0.728 2.8664E-06 5.95E-09 0.05630918 0.00011688 0.729 0.99890477
23 0.73 3.0836E-06 6.3997E-09 0.0605754 0.00012572 0.731 0.99877905
24 0.732 3.3161E-06 6.8809E-09 0.06514205 0.00013517 0.733 0.99864388
25 0.734 3.5648E-06 7.3957E-09 0.07002843 0.00014528 0.735 0.9984986
26 0.736 3.8309E-06 7.9462E-09 0.07525496 0.0001561 0.737 0.9983425
27 0.738 4.1153E-06 8.5347E-09 0.08084318 0.00016766 0.739 0.99817484
28 0.74 4.4194E-06 9.1636E-09 0.08681584 0.00018001 0.741 0.99799483
29 0.742 4.7442E-06 9.8353E-09 0.09319693 0.00019321 0.743 0.99780162
30 0.744 5.0911E-06 1.0553E-08 0.10001176 0.0002073 0.745 0.99759432
31 0.746 5.4615E-06 1.1318E-08 0.10728701 0.00022234 0.747 0.99737198
32 0.748 5.8567E-06 1.2135E-08 0.11505074 0.00023838 0.749 0.9971336
33 0.75 6.2783E-06 1.3006E-08 0.12333254 0.0002555 0.751 0.9968781
34 0.752 6.7278E-06 1.3935E-08 0.13216348 0.00027374 0.753 0.99660436
35 0.754 7.207E-06 1.4924E-08 0.14157628 0.00029318 0.755 0.99631118
36 0.756 7.7175E-06 1.5979E-08 0.15160528 0.00031389 0.757 0.99599729
37 0.758 8.2612E-06 1.7101E-08 0.16228655 0.00033594 0.759 0.99566135
38 0.76 8.8401E-06 1.8296E-08 0.17365794 0.00035942 0.761 0.99530193
39 0.762 9.4561E-06 1.9568E-08 0.18575915 0.00038439 0.763 0.99491754
40 0.764 1.0111E-05 2.092E-08 0.19863176 0.00041095 0.765 0.99450659
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41 0.766 1.0808E-05 2.2357E-08 0.21231934 0.00043919 0.767 0.9940674
42 0.768 1.1549E-05 2.3884E-08 0.22686747 0.00046919 0.769 0.99359821
43 0.77 1.2336E-05 2.5507E-08 0.24232381 0.00050106 0.771 0.99309715
44 0.772 1.3171E-05 2.7229E-08 0.25873818 0.0005349 0.773 0.99256225
45 0.774 1.4058E-05 2.9057E-08 0.27616259 0.00057081 0.775 0.99199143
46 0.776 1.4999E-05 3.0997E-08 0.29465128 0.00060891 0.777 0.99138252
47 0.778 1.5998E-05 3.3053E-08 0.31426084 0.00064931 0.779 0.99073321
48 0.78 1.7056E-05 3.5233E-08 0.33505019 0.00069213 0.781 0.99004108
49 0.782 1.8177E-05 3.7542E-08 0.35708064 0.0007375 0.783 0.98930358
50 0.784 1.9365E-05 3.9988E-08 0.38041596 0.00078554 0.785 0.98851804
51 0.786 2.0623E-05 4.2577E-08 0.40512238 0.00083639 0.787 0.98768165
52 0.788 2.1954E-05 4.5316E-08 0.43126866 0.00089019 0.789 0.98679146
53 0.79 2.3362E-05 4.8212E-08 0.45892607 0.00094709 0.791 0.98584436
54 0.792 2.485E-05 5.1274E-08 0.48816844 0.00100724 0.793 0.98483712
55 0.794 2.6424E-05 5.4509E-08 0.51907216 0.00107079 0.795 0.98376633
56 0.796 2.8085E-05 5.7925E-08 0.55171618 0.0011379 0.797 0.98262844
57 0.798 2.984E-05 6.1531E-08 0.586182 0.00120874 0.799 0.9814197
58 0.8 3.1691E-05 6.5335E-08 0.62255367 0.00128347 0.801 0.98013623
59 0.802 3.3644E-05 6.9347E-08 0.6609177 0.00136228 0.803 0.97877395
60 0.804 3.5703E-05 7.3576E-08 0.70136312 0.00144534 0.805 0.9773286
61 0.806 3.7873E-05 7.803E-08 0.7439813 0.00153285 0.807 0.97579576
62 0.808 4.0157E-05 8.272E-08 0.78886597 0.00162498 0.809 0.97417078
63 0.81 4.2563E-05 8.7656E-08 0.8361131 0.00172193 0.811 0.97244884
64 0.812 4.5093E-05 9.2847E-08 0.88582076 0.00182391 0.813 0.97062493
65 0.814 4.7754E-05 9.8304E-08 0.93808905 0.00193111 0.815 0.96869383
66 0.816 5.055E-05 1.0404E-07 0.99301989 0.00204374 0.817 0.96665009
67 0.818 5.3487E-05 1.1006E-07 1.05071689 0.002162 0.819 0.96448809
68 0.82 5.657E-05 1.1638E-07 1.11128514 0.00228612 0.821 0.96220197
69 0.822 5.9805E-05 1.23E-07 1.17483097 0.00241629 0.823 0.95978568
70 0.824 6.3197E-05 1.2995E-07 1.24146171 0.00255275 0.825 0.95723293
71 0.826 6.6751E-05 1.3723E-07 1.31128542 0.0026957 0.827 0.95453723
72 0.828 7.0474E-05 1.4484E-07 1.38441052 0.00284536 0.829 0.95169188
73 0.83 7.437E-05 1.5281E-07 1.46094551 0.00300194 0.831 0.94868993
74 0.832 7.8445E-05 1.6115E-07 1.54099853 0.00316568 0.833 0.94552426
75 0.834 8.2705E-05 1.6986E-07 1.62467694 0.00333676 0.835 0.9421875
76 0.836 8.7154E-05 1.7895E-07 1.71208686 0.00351542 0.837 0.93867208
77 0.838 9.1799E-05 1.8844E-07 1.80333265 0.00370185 0.839 0.93497023
78 0.84 9.6644E-05 1.9834E-07 1.89851634 0.00389625 0.841 0.93107397
79 0.842 0.0001017 2.0865E-07 1.99773704 0.00409883 0.843 0.92697515
80 0.844 0.00010696 2.1939E-07 2.10109026 0.00430976 0.845 0.92266539
Page 2
Prob.dens.2.1
A B C D E F G H I J
81 0.846 0.00011243 2.3056E-07 2.20866719 0.00452922 0.847 0.91813617
82 0.848 0.00011813 2.4218E-07 2.32055394 0.00475738 0.849 0.91337878
83 0.85 0.00012405 2.5424E-07 2.43683072 0.0049944 0.851 0.90838438
84 0.852 0.00013019 2.6676E-07 2.55757091 0.00524041 0.853 0.90314397
85 0.854 0.00013657 2.7975E-07 2.68284013 0.00549554 0.855 0.89764843
86 0.856 0.00014318 2.9321E-07 2.81269521 0.00575988 0.857 0.89188856
87 nAO A AA0150A0l2 32 30714n nAa0i n An700e Q  n"Y 00 n rnr,%'
88 0.86 0.00015711 3.2154E-0
89 0.862 0.00016443 3.3643E-0
90 0.864 0.000172 3.5179E-0
91 0.866 0.0001798 3.6763E-0
92 0.868 0.00018784 3.8395E-0
93 0.87 0.00019611 4.0073E-0
S. Q1 9I1 U. 0.8UUQ9 U O V.OO8O88UO3
3.08633974 0.00631653 0.861 0.87953851
3.23018874 0.00660893 0.863 0.87292958
3.37874018 0.00691073 0.865 0.86601885
3.53198915 0.0072219 0.867 0.85879694
3.68991437 0.00754239 0.869 0.85125455
3.85247659 0.00787209 0.871 0.84338246
94 0.872 0.00020462 4.1798E-07 4.01961703 0.00821087 0.873 0.83517159
95 0.874 0.00021336 4.3568E-07 4.19125567 0.00855855 0.875 0.82661304
96 0.876 0.00022232 4.5381E-07 4.36728956 0.00891488 0.877 0.81769816
97 0.878 0.0002315 4.7238E-07 4.54759092 0.0092796 0.879 0.80841856
98 0.88 0.00024088 4.9136E-07 4.73200528 0.00965235 0.881 0.79876621
99 0.882 0.00025047 5.1072E-07 4.92034957 0.01003276 0.883 0.78873345
100 0.884 0.00026025 5.3045E-07 5.11241004 0.01042035 0.885 0.7783131
101 0.886 0.0002702 5.5052E-07 5.30794022 0.0108146 0.887 0.7674985
102 0.888 0.00028032 5.709E-07 5.50665883 0.01121491 0.889 0.75628359
103 0.89 0.00029058 5.9155E-07 5.7082476 0.0116206 0.891 0.744663
104 0.892 0.00030097 6.1244E-07 5.91234912 0.01203091 0.893 0.73263208
105 0.894 0.00031147 6.3352E-07 6.11856463 0.01244502 0.895 0.72018707
106 0.896 0.00032205 6.5474E-07 6.32645186 0.01286197 0.897 0.70732509
107 0.898 0.00033269 6.7606E-07 6.53552284 0.01328076 0.899 0.69404433
108 0.9 0.00034337 6.9742E-07 6.74524179 0.01370026 0.901 0.68034406
109 0.902 0.00035405 7.1874E-07 6.95502303 0.01411925 0.903 0.66622481
110 0.904 0.0003647 7.3998E-07 7.16422903 0.0145364 0.905 0.65168841
111 0.906 0.00037528 7.6105E-07 7.3721685 0.01495026 0.907 0.63673815
112 0.908 0.00038576 7.8187E-07 7.57809469 0.0153593 0.909 0.62137885
113 0.91 0.0003961 8.0236E-07 7.78120385 0.01576184 0.911 0.60561701
114 0.912 0.00040626 8.2243E-07 7.98063394 0.0161561 0.913 0.58946092
115 0.914 0.00041617 8.4198E-07 8.17546354 0.01654017 0.915 0.57292074
116 0.916 0.00042581 8.6091E-07 8.36471117 0.01691205 0.917 0.5560087
117 0.918 0.0004351 8.7911E-07 8.54733495 0.01726957 0.919 0.53873913
118 0.92 0.00044401 8.9647E-07 8.7222327 0.01761048 0.921 0.52112865
119 0.922 0.00045246 9.1285E-07 8.88824258 0.01793239 0.923 0.50319627
120 0.924 0.00046039 9.2815E-07 9.04414431 0.01823281 0.925 0.48496346
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A B C D E F G H I J
121 0.926 0.00046775 9.4221E-07 9.18866108 0.01850912 0.927 0.46645434
122 0.928 0.00047446 9.5491E-07 9.32046225 0.01875863 0.929 0.44769571
123 0.93 0.00048045 9.6611E-07 9.43816692 0.01897852 0.931 0.42871719
124 0.932 0.00048565 9.7564E-07 9.54034853 0.01916589 0.933 0.4095513
125 0.934 0.00048999 9.8338E-07 9.6255406 0.01931778 0.935 0.39023352
126 0.936 0.00049339 9.8915E-07 9.69224375 0.01943118 0.937 0.37080234
127 0.938 0.00049576 9.9281E-07 9.7389341 0.01950301 0.939 0.35129933
128 0.94 0.00049704 9.9419E-07 9.76407341 0.01953019 0.941 0.33176914
129 0.942 0.00049715 9.9314E-07 9.7661209 0.01950967 0.943 0.31225947
130 0.944 0.000496 9.8952E-07 9.74354716 0.0194384 0.945 0.29282107
131 0.946 0.00049352 9.8316E-07 9.69485023 0.01931342 0.947 0.27350765
132 0.948 0.00048964 9.7391E-07 9.61857425 0.01913191 0.949 0.25437574
133 0.95 0.00048428 9.6166E-07 9.51333079 0.01889115 0.951 0.23548459
134 0.952 0.00047738 9.4626E-07 9.37782325 0.0185887 0.953 0.21689589
135 0.954 0.00046888 9.2761E-07 9.21087469 0.01822233 0.955 0.19867356
136 0.956 0.00045873 9.0561E-07 9.0114593 0.0177902 0.957 0.18088336
137 0.958 0.00044688 8.8019E-07 8.77873807 0.01729084 0.959 0.16359252
138 0.96 0.00043331 8.513E-07 8.51209888 0.0167233 0.961 0.14686922
139 0.962 0.00041799 8.1892E-07 8.21120166 0.01608723 0.963 0.13078199
140 0.964 0.00040093 7.8307E-07 7.876029 0.01538297 0.965 0.11539902
141 0.966 0.00038214 7.4381E-07 7.50694267 0.01461169 0.967 0.10078733
142 0.968 0.00036167 7.0125E-07 7.10474689 0.01377551 0.969 0.08701183
143 0.97 0.00033958 6.5554E-07 6.67075862 0.01287764 0.971 0.07413418
144 0.972 0.00031596 6.0692E-07 6.20688588 0.0119226 0.973 0.06221158
145 0.974 0.00029096 5.557E-07 5.71571461 0.01091632 0.975 0.05129526
146 0.976 0.00026474 5.0225E-07 5.20060499 0.0098664 0.977 0.04142886
147 0.978 0.00023751 4.4707E-07 4.66579802 0.00878233 0.979 0.03264653
148 0.98 0.00020955 3.9073E-07 4.1165333 0.00767571 0.981 0.02497081
149 0.982 0.00018118 3.3397E-07 3.55917907 0.00656055 0.983 0.01841026
150 0.984 0.00015279 2.7762E-07 3.00137551 0.00545357 0.985 0.01295669
151 0.986 0.00012483 2.2268E-07 2.45219255 0.0043745 0.987 0.0085822
152 0.988 9.7855E-05 1.7035E-07 1.92230342 0.00334648 0.989 0.00523572
153 0.99 7.2498E-05 1.2199E-07 1.42417529 0.00239645 0.991 0.00283926
154 0.992 4.9494E-05 7.9188E-08 0.97227855 0.00155559 0.993 0.00128367
155 0.994 2.9694E-05 4.3768E-08 0.58331618 0.00085979 0.995 0.00042388
156 0.996 1.4074E-05 1.7826E-08 0.27647511 0.00035018 0.997 7.3701E-05
157 0.998 3.7518E-06 3.7518E-09 0.0737012 7.3701E-05 0.999 -2.22E-16
158 1
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APPENDIX B
LAUNCH DELAY MODEL
To simulate the backlog which is created after a stand down, and the clearing
of that backlog with a surge launch rate, a dynamic model was built using STELLA
software. STELLA allows the modeler to pictorially represent the time derivatives
and integrals of a dynamic system as show in Figure B-1. In this figure the flows
(which appear as valves) represent time derivatives, and the stocks (which appear
as squares) the integral over those derivatives. Constants appear as circles in the
diagram. In the following paragraphs, a qualitatively description of the model
will be given followed by the system of equations it represents.
The NOMINAL_RATE represents the rate at which satellite launches are
ordered, and under nominal conditions would be equal to the launch rate.
Similarly, the LAUNCH_RATE represents the rate at which satellites on the
manifest are actually launched. A BACKLOG is created when the LAUNCH_RATE
drops below the NOMINAL_RATE. One might be tempted to model the LAUNCH_RATE
and NOMINAL_RATE as periodic pulses because an order or launch only occurs
every few months, but a better model is obtained if these variables are modeled as
smooth flows. The reason for this is quite simple. Think of the real situation with
launches and payloads awaiting launches. If one launch experiences a short
delay, say a week or two, it would inevitably cause delays for upcoming launches.
STELLA DYNAMIC LAUNCH DELAY MODEL.
ULAUV I IVL:SURGE_RATE
FIGURE B-1
STELLA DYNAMIC LAUNCH DELAY MODEL
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However, if LAUNCH_RATE and NOMINAL_RATE were modeled as pulses, a delay
shorter than the period between pulses would not manifest itself in the model as
creating a BACKLOG. Thus, these factors are modeled as a weekly flow rate of
launches to give the model finer sensitivity to shorter delays.
When the model is run, initially the NOMINAL_RATE equals the LAUNCH_RATE
and no BACKLOG exists. However, after a few weeks of simulated time, the
DOWNTIME variable turns off the LAUNCH_RATE for a length of time equal to the
stand down. This causes satellites from the NOMINAL_RATE to create a BACKLOG.
Once the stand down is over, the DOWNTIME variable reengages the LAUNCH_RATE,
and the SURGERATE variable increases the LAUNCH_RATE up to the surge
capability. For example, if the surge capability is 12 launches per year and the
nominal launch rate 10/year, then SURGE_RATE multiplies the LAUNCH_RATE by
1.2. Since the LAUNCH_RATE is now greater than the NOMINAL_RATE the backlog
will be cleared over ensuing launches.
The BACKLOG represents the number of satellites which are experiencing a
delay at any given time. For instance, two weeks into a stand down the BACKLOG
will be greater than one week earlier. The item of interest is the total delay
experienced by all satellites from a stand down, and not the number experiencing
a delay at any given time. In other words, an integral is desired of the BACKLOG
from before the stand down to after the BACKLOG is cleared. This is done in STELLA
by summing the BACKLOG experienced at each calculation interval. The
SUM_BACKLOG flow is equal to the BACKLOG at each calculation interval, and
CUM_BACKLOG is just the summation of SUM_BACKLOG. Thus, CUM_BACKLOG
represents the total delay experienced by all satellites.
The system of equations represented in this model are as follows:
BACKLOG=(NOMINAL_RATE-LAUNCH_RATE)*dt
CUM_BACKLOG=(SUM_BACKLOG)*dt
DOWNTIME=if(Time>t) and (Time<t') then 0 else 1
where (t'-t)=length of stand down
LAUNCH_RATE=NOMINAL_RATE*SURGE_RATE*DOWNTIME
NOMINAL_RATE=constant
SUM_BACKLOG=BACKLOG
SURGE_RATE=if(BACKLOG>0) then Surge Capability else 1
STELLA numerically solves these equations with the output being a dynamic flow
of the variables as they change during the simulation. The model was run with a
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NOMINAL_RATE of .192 launches/week (10 launches/year), and with various stand
down times and surge capabilities with the following output.
TOTAL LAUNCH DELAY EXPERIENCED AFTER A STAND DOWN
(Nominal Launch Rate of 10/year)
(Satellite-Weeks)
Stand Down Launch Rate Capability (Launches/year)(weeks) 11 12 14 16 20
8 51.7 28.2 16.5 12.6 9.4
13 151.7 82.8 48.1 36.8 27.7
20 381.2 207.9 121.3 92.4 69.3
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